



C A R Y  F R A N K L I N  
The New Class Blindness 
abstract.  There is a widespread perception that class receives no special protection under 
the Fourteenth Amendment. That perception arose forty years ago, when the Supreme Court 
shifted to the right, rejected the idea that the Constitution protects positive rights, and declined to 
recognize class as a suspect classification under the Equal Protection Clause. But those consequen-
tial developments have obscured an important, ongoing form of class-related constitutional pro-
tection: one that resides not in equal protection but in fundamental rights doctrine. This Article 
shows that a nontrivial number of fundamental rights came to be recognized as such—particularly 
during the Warren Court era—because they are essential not only to individual liberty but also to 
the equal citizenship of people without financial resources. Today, there are still doctrinal mecha-
nisms in fundamental rights law that require courts to consider class when adjudicating the con-
stitutionality of rights-burdening state action. 
 To illustrate this phenomenon, this Article focuses on reproductive rights, a major area of 
fundamental rights law whose connection to class is poorly understood. The Court’s opinions in 
Griswold v. Connecticut and Roe v. Wade were not framed in terms of class, but class-related concerns 
informed the Court’s decision to recognize birth control and abortion as fundamental rights. In 
the contexts of voting and criminal procedure too, the Court identified certain rights as funda-
mental in part because the state was denying them to financially disadvantaged people. In all of 
these areas, the Court developed fundamental rights doctrines that limited the extent to which the 
state could block such people from exercising their rights. 
 Today, these long-standing class-sensitive doctrines are under threat. An increasing number 
of conservative judges—including a number of Supreme Court Justices—have begun to argue that 
class-related concerns have no place under the Fourteenth Amendment. In support of this new 
class-blind approach, these judges cite Burger Court precedents rejecting positive rights claims 
and declining to treat the poor as a protected class under the Equal Protection Clause. But the 
Burger Court never held that courts are prohibited from considering class when interpreting the 
Fourteenth Amendment. Indeed, it preserved many of the class-sensitive mechanisms its prede-
cessor had developed to protect fundamental rights. Thus far, the Court has rejected attempts to 
eradicate these remaining forms of class-related protection from the law. But the composition of 
the federal judiciary is now in flux, and it is not clear that resistance to the new class blindness will 
endure. What is clear is that the emergent notion that class-based considerations have no place 
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introduction 
In the 1960s, class was a major focus of constitutional concern. It was the era 
of Gideon v. Wainwright
1
 and Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections,
2
 an era in 
which the Court often spoke about the necessity of “[p]roviding equal justice for 
poor and rich,” and sometimes held that universally applicable fees “invidi-
ous[ly] discriminat[ed]” against people who could not afford to pay.
3
 There was 
disagreement at the time about how to interpret these holdings. Some scholars 
viewed them as part of an “egalitarian revolution”
4
—evidence that the poor were 
on their way to becoming a protected class for equal protection purposes. Others 
argued that these holdings vindicated a constitutional right to minimum wel-
fare.
5
 On that view, the Warren Court was not demanding equal treatment of 
rich and poor, but rather “charting some islands of haven from economic disaster 
in the ocean of . . . free enterprise.”
6
 Either way, it seemed clear by the end of the 
1960s that economic disadvantage had assumed a constitutional dimension—
that the Court had embarked on the development of a Fourteenth Amendment 
jurisprudence of class. 
That jurisprudence never materialized. In the 1970s, the New Right rose to 
political power, a new form of economic libertarianism (sometimes called neo-
liberalism) became dominant, and Supreme Court decision-making turned in a 
 
1. 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (holding that indigent defendants have a constitutional right to the assis-
tance of state-provided legal counsel in a criminal trial). 
2. 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (holding that poll taxes violate the equal protection rights of those too 
poor to pay). 
3. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 16-17 (1956). 
4. Philip B. Kurland, The Supreme Court, 1963 Term—Foreword: “Equal in Origin and Equal in 
Title to the Legislative and Executive Branches of the Government,” 78 HARV. L. REV. 143, 144-45 
(1964); see also Archibald Cox, The Supreme Court, 1965 Term—Foreword: Constitutional Adju-
dication and the Promotion of Human Rights, 80 HARV. L. REV. 91, 91 (1966) (“For a decade and 
a half the Supreme Court has been broadening and deepening the constitutional significance 
of our national commitment to Equality.”). 
5. Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1968 Term—Foreword: On Protecting the Poor Through 
the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARV. L. REV. 7, 9 (1969); see also Albert M. Bendich, Privacy, 
Poverty, and the Constitution, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 407, 408 (1966) (drawing on recent decisions 
to argue in favor of “requiring, as matters of constitutional entitlement, provision of the min-
imal necessaries of membership, not merely existence, in our society” (internal quotation 
marks omitted)); Arthur Selwyn Miller, Toward a Concept of Constitutional Duty, 1968 SUP. 
CT. REV. 199, 200 (arguing that “a judicial concept of constitutional duty, of obligation to take 
action, is being evolved out of a series” of recent decisions involving, among other things, race 
relations and criminal law). 
6. Michelman, supra note 5, at 33. 
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decidedly more conservative direction.
7
  Those developments had significant 
ramifications for the interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Burger 
Court declined to recognize class-based discrimination as suspect under the 
Equal Protection Clause,
8
 and it rejected the idea that the Constitution guaran-
tees affirmative rights.
9
 Those jurisprudential moves generated a widespread 
perception—beginning in the late 1970s and persisting to this day—that class 
merits no special consideration under the Fourteenth Amendment. As a result, 
the amount of space in constitutional law casebooks devoted to class-related 
questions has shrunk.
10
 Class is now taught in constitutional law courses, if at 
 
7. For more on this rightward shift in law and politics, see JEFFERSON COWIE, STAYIN’ ALIVE: 
THE 1970S AND THE LAST DAYS OF THE WORKING CLASS (2012); MICHAEL J. GRAETZ & LINDA 
GREENHOUSE, THE BURGER COURT AND THE RISE OF THE JUDICIAL RIGHT (2016); LAURA KAL-
MAN, RIGHT STAR RISING: A NEW POLITICS, 1974-1980 (2010); and BRUCE J. SCHULMAN, THE 
SEVENTIES: THE GREAT SHIFT IN AMERICAN CULTURE, SOCIETY, AND POLITICS (2001). 
8. GRAETZ & GREENHOUSE, supra note 7, at 90-94 (discussing San Antonio Independent School 
District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973), in which the Burger Court declined to extend height-
ened scrutiny to class-based discrimination). 
9. Helen Hershkoff, Positive Rights and State Constitutions: The Limits of Federal Rationality Re-
view, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1131, 1132-35 (1999) (discussing the Burger Court’s rejection of Four-
teenth Amendment claims to welfare, housing, public education, and medical services on the 
ground that “the government does not owe its citizens any affirmative duty of care”); see also, 
e.g., DeShaney v. Winnebago Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 195-96 (1989) (“The 
[Due Process] Clause is phrased as a limitation on the State’s power to act, not as a guarantee 
of certain minimal levels of safety and security. . . . [It] was intended to prevent government 
‘from abusing [its] power, or employing it as an instrument of oppression’ . . . . The Framers 
were content to leave the extent of governmental obligation . . . to the democratic political 
processes.” (citations omitted) (quoting Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 348 (1986))). 
10. See, e.g., Stephen Loffredo, Poverty, Inequality, and Class in the Structural Constitutional Law 
Course, 34 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1239, 1242 (2007) (“Not long ago, poverty law issues held a 
vibrant, if not central, place in many constitutional law classes, and even elite law journals 
routinely featured articles examining the constitutional dimensions of wealth, poverty, and 
class. Yet for all appearances these issues have faded from the constitutional law curriculum 
. . . . It seems that each year the major constitutional law casebooks devote fewer pages and 
less attention to the constitutional status of poverty and economic inequality.”). This situation 
stands in sharp contrast to the period before the Burger Court narrowed class-related consti-
tutional protections. For instance, in the early 1970s, poverty law was a burgeoning field of 
study, and there were entire law school courses and textbooks devoted to the subject. See, e.g., 
ARTHUR L. BERNEY ET AL., LEGAL PROBLEMS OF THE POOR: CASES AND MATERIALS (1975); 
GEORGE COOPER ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON LAW AND POVERTY (2d ed. 1973); ARTHUR 
B. LAFRANCE ET AL., LAW OF THE POOR (1973); see also LAFRANCE, supra, at xvii (observing that 
poverty-related concerns have begun to infuse the law school curriculum and that “[e]ven 
basic subjects, such as property and constitutional law, have begun to reflect developments 
concerning the law of the poor”). 
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all, from a historical perspective: it is a dead-end street, a road not taken.
11
 If one 
were to tell the story of class over the past half century in the context of the Four-
teenth Amendment, the narrative arc would look like a bell curve: the rise and 
fall of class as a matter of constitutional concern. 
This Article differs from most of what has been written about class in con-
stitutional law over the past few decades. It focuses not on the class-related doc-
trine the Court curtailed and rejected in the 1970s, but rather on the class-related 
doctrine that survived that retrenchment. Despite the very significant doctrinal 
changes that occurred in the Burger Court era, concerns about class did not 
simply vanish from Fourteenth Amendment law. There remain strains of Four-
teenth Amendment law in which class still matters. Long-standing doctrine still 
constrains state action that infringes the rights of the financially disadvantaged. 
Recently, however, these remaining domains of class-related concern have 
come under threat from a new form of judicial class blindness considerably more 
extreme than any doctrine wrought by the Burger Court. The Court in the 1970s 
made it more difficult in all sorts of ways to challenge the constitutionality of 
laws that disproportionately burden people without financial resources. But the 
Court in those years never held—never even suggested—that judges are flatly 
prohibited from taking class into account when interpreting the Fourteenth 
Amendment. Yet that is precisely what some litigants and judges have recently 
begun to contend in a range of legal contexts: that courts are bound by 1970s 
precedent to ignore class entirely when adjudicating Fourteenth Amendment 
claims. Thus far, these concerted and transcontextual efforts categorically to ex-
clude class from the realm of constitutional concern have fallen below the radar 
of legal scholarship. This Article seeks to remedy this oversight and to make clear 
what is at stake in these new and emerging constitutional battles over class. 
In almost all cases today, people without financial resources receive no special 
protection under the Equal Protection Clause: discrimination on the basis of 
class is subject only to rational basis review.
12
 Outside of a very few contexts—
 
11. See Loffredo, supra note 10, at 1242 (postulating that “most law students hear virtually nothing 
in their basic constitutional law classes about [poverty law]; or about poor people, burgeon-
ing economic inequality, plummeting mobility, the persistence of hunger and homelessness 
in the United States, class-based distribution of privilege and power, the political and social 
marginalization of people living in poverty, state responsibility regarding any of these phe-
nomena, or the constitutional significance of a legal and political system that perpetuates this 
order of things”). 
12. See, e.g., Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 471 (1977) (stating that the Court “has never held that 
financial need alone identifies a suspect class for purposes of equal protection analysis”); 
Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 656, 660 (1973) (“Appellants urge that the filing fee violates the 
Equal Protection Clause by unconstitutionally discriminating against the poor. . . . [T]his lit-
igation . . . ‘is in the area of economics and social welfare.’ No suspect classification, such as 
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most notably in the area of criminal justice
13
—class-based arguments grounded 
solely in equal protection are exceedingly unlikely to prevail. But the Court’s de-
cision, nearly half a century ago, not to accord heightened scrutiny to class-based 
state action under the Equal Protection Clause did not mean that it simply aban-
doned the project of protecting people without financial resources under the 
Fourteenth Amendment. Rather, it decided to do (almost all of) that work under 
the Due Process Clause. Under substantive due process, the Court accords spe-
cial constitutional protection not to particular groups, but to certain fundamen-
tal rights. When the state regulates in ways that infringe those rights, the Court 
generally applies heightened scrutiny; it bars the state from too severely restrict-
ing those rights without a compelling reason for doing so.
14
 
This doctrine has long functioned as an important source of protection for 
the financially disadvantaged. Substantive due process protections are, for the 
most part, negative rights protections; the Court does not require the state to 
fund the exercise of fundamental rights.
15
 Fundamental rights jurisprudence of-
 
race, nationality, or alienage, is present. The applicable standard is that of rational justifica-
tion.” (citations omitted) (quoting United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 446 (1973))). 
13. For a notable, but limited, exception to the rule that discrimination on the basis of financial 
disadvantage triggers only rational basis review under equal protection, see, for example, 
ODonnell v. Harris County, 892 F.3d 147, 161 (5th Cir. 2018), which held that although indi-
gents do not ordinarily “constitute a suspect class . . . heightened scrutiny is required when 
criminal laws detain poor defendants because of their indigence” (internal quotation marks 
omitted). See also, e.g., Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395, 397-99 (1971) (invalidating a facially neu-
tral statute that authorized imprisonment for failure to pay fines because it violated the equal 
protection rights of indigents); Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 241-42 (1970) (invalidating 
a facially neutral statute that required convicted defendants to remain in jail beyond the max-
imum sentence if they could not pay fines and court costs associated with their sentences be-
cause it violated the equal protection rights of indigents). Reviewing these precedents and 
others in San Antonio v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 20, the Court observed that the indigents “who 
constituted the class discriminated against in our prior cases shared two distinguishing char-
acteristics: because of their impecunity they were completely unable to pay for some desired 
benefit, and as a consequence, they sustained an absolute deprivation of a meaningful oppor-
tunity to enjoy that benefit.” 
14. See, e.g., Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 357 (1978) (Brennan, White, 
Marshall & Blackmun, JJ., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (“[A] 
government practice or statute which restricts ‘fundamental rights’ . . . is to be subjected to 
‘strict scrutiny’ and can be justified only if it furthers a compelling government purpose and, 
even then, only if no less restrictive alternative is available.”). 
15. Of course, legal scholars have long questioned the distinction between positive and negative 
rights. Stephen Holmes and Cass Sunstein have argued that we ought to think of rights—
even so-called “negative” rights—as “taxpayer-funded and government-managed social ser-
vices” because they “presuppose taxpayer funding of effective supervisory machinery for 
monitoring and enforcement.” STEPHEN HOLMES & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE COST OF RIGHTS: 
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ten works nonetheless to safeguard the rights of people without financial re-
sources. In fact, a nontrivial number of the rights labeled fundamental in our 
constitutional tradition came to be recognized and protected as such because the 
state was denying them to financially disadvantaged people. In other words, in 
a substantial number of cases, concerns about the equal citizenship of the finan-
cially disadvantaged helped to shape what rights the Court recognized as funda-
mental in the first place. 
This Article examines the genealogy and development of class-based protec-
tions that operate through substantive due process. Not all fundamental rights 
protected under the Fourteenth Amendment work to safeguard the equality in-
terests of people without financial resources. But a wider range of such rights 
than we generally recognize do function this way, especially those that emerged 
in the Warren Court era. Even when the Court did not explicitly address class, 
its landmark fundamental rights decisions often reflected widespread concern 





WHY LIBERTY DEPENDS ON TAXES 44, 48 (1999). Holmes and Sunstein observe that when one 
tallies up what the state spends on the judicial system, law enforcement, and the vast network 
of government-funded agencies necessary to the enforcement of rights, the total annual cost 
of rights to American taxpayers runs into the billions. See id. at 233-36. This observation pro-
vides a theoretical foundation for arguing that interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment to 
guarantee affirmative welfare rights is perfectly consistent with our legal tradition. But the 
Court has been resistant to this proposition for decades. 
16. This Article focuses on the role of class in the development of fundamental rights doctrine, 
but that is not the only constitutional domain in which class-related considerations have 
shaped the law in profound and lasting ways. This Article touches briefly on the “right to 
travel” cases of the early 1970s, in which the Court held that states could not deprive newly 
resident poor people of the welfare and nonemergency medical benefits they provided to 
longer-term indigent residents because doing so violated the constitutional right to travel. See 
infra text accompanying notes 166-167. But there was a much greater revolution in those years 
where freedom of movement was concerned, and it had to do with the Court’s invalidation of 
vagrancy laws, which had been used for centuries to police the visibly poor and underem-
ployed. In its landmark 1972 decision striking down a Florida vagrancy law, the Court relied 
on void-for-vagueness doctrine to find the law unconstitutional. See Papachristou v. City of 
Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972). But there was no question that concerns about the rights of 
people without financial resources helped to drive the Court’s decision. See, e.g., id. at 170 
(“Those generally implicated by the imprecise terms of the ordinance—poor people, noncon-
formists, dissenters, idlers—may be required to comport themselves according to the lifestyle 
deemed appropriate by the Jacksonville police . . . . Where, as here, there are no standards 
governing the exercise of . . . discretion . . . , the scheme . . . . furnishes a convenient tool for 
harsh and discriminatory enforcement by local prosecuting officials, against particular groups 
deemed to merit their displeasure. It results in a regime in which the poor and the unpopular 
are permitted to stand on a public sidewalk . . . only at the whim of any police officer.” (internal 
quotation marks and citation omitted)). The dismantling of vagrancy laws profoundly trans-
formed policing and criminal procedure in this country and thus is another example of the 
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To illustrate this phenomenon, this Article focuses on one major area of fun-
damental rights jurisprudence whose connection to class is poorly understood: 
reproductive rights, particularly birth control and abortion. In 1965, the Court 
recognized the fundamental right of married people to use birth control in Gris-
wold v. Connecticut.
17
 In 1973, in Roe v. Wade, the Court recognized abortion as a 
fundamental right.
18
 Neither of these decisions discussed class-based inequality 
in the way that, for example, the Court’s contemporaneous equal protection de-
cision in Harper, invalidating a state poll tax, did.
19
 Indeed, Griswold and Roe 
barely touched on the issue. But this was the era of the War on Poverty and the 
Poor People’s Campaign.
20
 Class-related concerns played a major role in consti-
tutional contestation over birth control and abortion, both inside and outside 
the Court. Reproductive rights advocates in these years routinely argued that 
laws restricting access to birth control and abortion discriminated against the 
poor.
21
 Such laws did not necessarily prevent rich women from safely accessing 
these services, but they did often block the access of less privileged women. Over 
time, the increasing dominance of other (frequently overlapping) frames
22
 has 
obscured the extent to which class-based concerns motivated the campaign for 
 
way in which class-related concerns have deeply shaped and continue to infuse our law in 
ways we do not always recognize. For an excellent account of this history, see RISA GOLUBOFF, 
VAGRANT NATION: POLICE POWER, CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE, AND THE MAKING OF THE 1960S 
(2016). 
17. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). A few years later, in Eisenstadt v. Baird, the Court held that the right to 
use birth control applied to unmarried individuals as well. 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (“If the 
right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free 
from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person 
as the decision whether to bear or beget a child.”). 
18. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
19. See Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 668 (1966) (“Wealth, like race, creed, or 
color, is not germane to one’s ability to participate intelligently in the electoral process. Lines 
drawn on the basis of wealth or property, like those of race, are traditionally disfavored.” (ci-
tation omitted)).  
20. For more on the War on Poverty, see THE WAR ON POVERTY: A NEW GRASSROOTS HISTORY, 
1964-1980 (Annelise Orleck & Lisa Gayle Hazirjian eds., 2011). For more on the Poor People’s 
Campaign, see SYLVIE LAURENT, KING AND THE OTHER AMERICA: THE POOR PEOPLE’S CAM-
PAIGN AND THE QUEST FOR ECONOMIC EQUALITY (forthcoming Jan. 2019). 
21. See infra Sections I.A, II.A. 
22. See generally LINDA GREENHOUSE & REVA SIEGEL, BEFORE ROE V. WADE: VOICES THAT SHAPED 
THE ABORTION DEBATE BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT’S RULING 167-77 (2d ed. 2012), 
https://documents.law.yale.edu/sites/default/files/beforeroe2nded_1.pdf [https://perma.cc
/Z5NP-7XML] (collecting primary source documents that reveal the multiplicity of frames 
through which Americans viewed reproductive rights in the years before Roe). 
the new class blindness 
11 
constitutional rights in these contexts—and how deeply embedded such con-
cerns were in the logic of the fundamental rights protections the Court con-
structed. 
Scholars have long noted that due process and equal protection are not per-
fectly distinct, but rather overlapping and mutually reinforcing constitutional 
values.
23
 The lines between these two constitutional values were particularly in-
distinct in the middle decades of the twentieth century, when the Warren Court 
breathed new life into the Fourteenth Amendment and began to develop the 
doctrinal frameworks that govern due process and equal protection today. In 
those years, class-based equality concerns were often at the center of hybrid due 
process-equal protection litigation under the Fourteenth Amendment. As a re-
sult, such concerns were built into many of the fundamental rights protections 
the Court established half a century ago, in more and less explicit ways.
24
 
In arguing that concerns about people without financial resources were an 
engine driving the establishment of some fundamental rights in the 1960s and 
 
23. See, e.g., Rebecca L. Brown, Liberty, The New Equality, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1491, 1491-92 (2002) 
(arguing that “a key feature of American constitutional structure” is “the interdependence of 
equality and liberty”); Pamela S. Karlan, Equal Protection, Due Process, and the Stereoscopic Four-
teenth Amendment, 33 MCGEORGE L. REV. 473, 474 (2002) (noting that the intertwining of due 
process and equal protection “can have synergistic effects, producing results that neither 
clause might reach by itself”); Kenneth L. Karst, The Liberties of Equal Citizens: Groups and the 
Due Process Clause, 55 UCLA L. REV. 99, 102 (2007) (observing that “for a century, concerns 
about group subordination have profoundly influenced the doctrinal growth of substantive 
due process”); Laurence H. Tribe, Lawrence v. Texas: The “Fundamental Right” That Dare Not 
Speak Its Name, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1893, 1898 (2004) (arguing that “due process and equal 
protection, far from having separate missions and entailing different inquiries, are profoundly 
interlocked in a legal double helix”); Kenji Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, 124 HARV. L. 
REV. 747, 749 (2011) (arguing that “[t]oo much emphasis has been placed on the formal dis-
tinction between the equality claims made under the equal protection guarantees and the lib-
erty claims made under the due process or other guarantees” and that “[i]n practice, the Court 
does not abide by this distinction”); see also Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 575 (2003) 
(“Equality of treatment and the due process right to demand respect for conduct protected by 
the substantive guarantee of liberty are linked in important respects, and a decision on the 
latter point advances both interests.”); Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 665-66 (1983) (ob-
serving that “[d]ue process and equal protection principles [often] converge in the Court’s 
analysis” and warning against the resolution of Fourteenth Amendment cases “by resort to 
easy slogans or pigeonhole analysis”). 
24. Gideon is an example of a fundamental rights decision in which class-based equality concerns 
were relatively close to the surface. Gideon recognized the right of an indigent defendant in a 
state criminal prosecution to state-appointed counsel, reaffirming the fundamentality of the 
right to legal representation in the criminal justice system. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 
335, 341-45 (1963). Yet the Court’s opinion also raised concerns about the rights of indigents. 
See id. at 344 (asserting that the “noble ideal [of equality before the law] cannot be realized if 
the poor man charged with crime has to face his accusers without a lawyer to assist him”). 
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early 1970s, this Article does not mean to suggest that those rights are equivalent 
to the equal protection rights that might have developed if the Court had recog-
nized financial disadvantage as a suspect classification. Equal protection protects 
groups across the board, against all kinds of discriminatory state action; sub-
stantive due process protects against the infringement only of particular rights. 
More importantly, the Court’s failure to develop a class-based equal protection 
jurisprudence meant that it never fully defined the concept of class. There was 
voluminous conversation about class in the 1960s and early 1970s, and the Court 
responded to that conversation, explicitly and otherwise, in multiple landmark 
opinions. But all that conversation never crystalized into a shared understanding 
of what we mean when we talk about class in the context of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.
25
 The Court’s decision not to protect class under the Equal Protec-
tion Clause meant that it was not required to develop a coherent definition of the 
 
25. Especially given this lack of consensus, a note is in order about the meaning of the term “class” 
in this Article. “Class” has a number of different meanings. In some prominent discourses, 
particularly those influenced by Marxist thought and its legacy, “class” is fundamentally about 
relations of production: people are assigned to different classes based on their relationship to 
processes of production. See, e.g., Erik Olin Wright, A General Framework for the Analysis of 
Class Structure, in THE DEBATE ON CLASSES 3 (Erik Olin Wright et al. eds., 1989). Sociological 
conceptions of class rooted in the thought of Max Weber focus on the nature and prestige of 
different forms of work to define different classes based mainly on occupation. See, e.g., ROB-
ERT ERICKSON & JOHN H. GOLDTHORPE, THE CONSTANT FLUX: A STUDY OF CLASS MOBILITY 
IN INDUSTRIAL SOCIETIES (1992). Some important works of legal scholarship have made use 
of conceptions of class that are similarly group-based—indeed caste-like—and tied funda-
mentally to work, ownership, and production. See, e.g., William E. Forbath, Caste, Class, and 
Equal Citizenship, 98 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1999). This Article does not use the term “class” in any 
of these ways. Instead, it uses the term as it is increasingly used in the American vernacular, 
to refer to an individual’s level of access to material resources—that is, to where an individual 
falls on a spectrum that stretches from destitution to great wealth. This use of the term “class” 
situates individuals along a scale, as economists do when they conceptualize inequality in 
terms of income and/or wealth. See, e.g., THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST 
CENTURY 252 (2014) (defining class in terms of wealth and income and noting that “the un-
derlying social reality is always a continuous distribution”). 
  From this perspective, class-related constitutional concerns include, but are not limited 
to, concerns about people who fall below some specific economic threshold, such as the pov-
erty line or the court-defined concept of indigency. Such concerns may be triggered by various 
forms of regulation that impinge on the rights of people with relatively limited financial re-
sources, including people who struggle to find legal representation, or to access abortion, be-
cause they cannot afford to obtain these goods through the market. Legal scholars sometimes 
use the term “wealth” (as in “wealth-based discrimination”) to describe the family of concerns 
that are the focus of this Article. However, that term gives rise to unnecessary confusion be-
cause on its face it appears to be distinguishing wealth (as in net assets) from income (as in 
earnings)—a distinction that is critically important in economics and increasingly important 
in conversations about inequality, but not one that this Article means to invoke. Legal scholars 
sometimes focus instead on “poverty,” and in that way evoke a subset, but not the entirety, of 
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term. Indeed, that may have been one of the reasons the Justices leaned toward 




The fact that “class” never gained a fixed meaning in American constitutional 
law, however, does not diminish the fact that the Court in the 1960s made clear 
that an individual’s lack of financial resources has consequences for equal citi-
zenship that are sometimes a matter of constitutional concern. This Article 
shows how a particular line of substantive due process rulings, in the context of 
reproductive liberty, responded to those concerns and protected the rights of 
people without financial resources. These rulings did not simply deem certain 
rights fundamental and thereby bar the state from blocking financially disadvan-
taged women’s access to goods and services essential to their equal standing in 
society; they also built into substantive due process doctrine particular mecha-
nisms that sometimes require courts to examine the effects of governmental reg-
ulation on women without financial resources in particular. These mechanisms 
have been part of Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence for almost half a cen-
tury, and they remain an often overlooked, but important, form of class-based 
constitutional protection. 
These doctrinal mechanisms, and the basic idea that the Fourteenth Amend-
ment sometimes offers special protection to people without financial resources, 
are currently under attack. Some states, and some judges, have begun to argue—
across a variety of substantive due process contexts, including abortion, voting, 
and criminal procedure—that it is impermissible for courts to consider the par-
ticular burdens that government action places on those without financial re-
sources when determining the constitutionality of that action. Advocates of this 
new class blindness claim that they are simply applying precedent. They cite 
landmark decisions from the Burger Court era declining to recognize the finan-
cially disadvantaged as a protected class under the Equal Protection Clause and 
rejecting the assertion that the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees affirmative 
welfare rights. 
But those decisions were not about protecting fundamental rights from state 
interference under the Due Process Clause. The Burger Court was not willing to 
apply heightened scrutiny to class-based discrimination under equal protection, 
 
the set of concerns that are the focus of this Article. Fifty years ago, many commentators be-
lieved the Court was poised to recognize “the poor” as a protected class. This Article is not 
simply about “the poor.” The kinds of constitutional protections it identifies may protect a 
wider swath of people than those who would qualify as “poor” according to federal definitions 
of poverty. For these reasons, this Article uses the term “class” to refer to an individual’s finan-
cial circumstances—and the term “class blindness” to refer to the insistence that those circum-
stances ought to be irrelevant to the adjudication of Fourteenth Amendment claims. 
26. See infra Section I.C. 
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and it was not willing to recognize positive rights under the Constitution. It 
never suggested, however, that the government could restrict the exercise of fun-
damental rights with no regard for the effects of those restrictions on people 
without financial resources. Instead, the Court made clear, in the contexts of 
abortion, voting, and criminal procedure, that there were constitutional limita-
tions on how far the government could go when it regulated in ways that trun-
cated the ability of financially disadvantaged people to exercise their rights. In-
deed, the Court was quite explicit about the fact that—although it was not 
prepared to engage in other, broader forms of class-based constitutional protec-
tion—it would carefully scrutinize governmental action that blocked the finan-
cially disadvantaged from exercising fundamental rights. Today, some jurists are 
attempting to use the Burger Court’s reticence to engage in bolder forms of class-
based constitutional protection to do away with the more limited forms of class-
based protection the Burger Court affirmed. 
In order to recognize what is now under threat, and to appreciate the radical 
nature of the new class blindness, it is necessary to recover some of the forgotten 
history of class-related protections under the Due Process Clause and to see how 
deeply embedded class-based concerns are in some prominent strains of sub-
stantive due process doctrine. To those ends, Part I of this Article examines Gris-
wold, one of the central and most generative foundations of modern fundamental 
rights law. The Court’s recognition of a right to privacy that encompasses the use 
of birth control spawned decades of debate about the legitimacy of judicial pro-
tection of unenumerated constitutional rights. But the intense scholarly focus on 
privacy—much like the focus on privacy in the Court’s opinion—masks the role 
that concerns about people without financial resources played in Griswold. Con-
stitutional contestation over birth control was shot through with class-related 
concerns in the Warren Court era, and those concerns informed popular and ju-
dicial understandings of what was at stake in the case. The Court did not issue a 
class-based equal protection ruling in Griswold, as some had urged. It relied in-
stead on fundamental rights doctrine—indeed, helped to develop that doc-
trine—to invalidate a law whose harshest effects were felt by women without 
financial resources. In this way, although we often overlook it today, Griswold 
was of a piece with the Warren Court’s other, more overtly class-focused deci-
sions. Indeed, it was an important part of the trend in this era toward using fun-
damental rights doctrine to safeguard the equal citizenship of the financially dis-
advantaged. 
The 1970s undoubtedly marked a turning point, not just with respect to 
class, but with respect to Fourteenth Amendment law more generally. The 
Burger Court narrowed the protection afforded historically subordinated groups 
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under the Equal Protection Clause.
27
 It declined to recognize the financially dis-
advantaged as a protected class for equal protection purposes and it rejected the 
idea that the Constitution guarantees affirmative rights—closing two major av-
enues of class-based constitutional protection. But closing those two avenues did 
not spell the end of constitutional concerns about class. Part II examines the sur-
vival, through the Burger Court era and beyond, of the idea that class matters in 
assessing the constitutionality of laws that impinge on fundamental rights pro-
tected by the Fourteenth Amendment. It focuses in particular on abortion, a con-
text in which class-related protections were built into the substantive due process 
doctrine the Court constructed in Roe and Planned Parenthood of Southeastern 
Pennsylvania v. Casey.
28
 Roe’s trimester framework and Casey’s undue burden test 
both reflect concerns about the rights of financially disadvantaged women. The 
undue burden test, which remains operative today, sometimes requires courts to 
examine how an abortion restriction will affect the ability of women without fi-
nancial resources to exercise their rights. 
Part III examines current challenges to the past half century of class-con-
scious fundamental rights adjudication in a range of constitutional contexts. It 
looks first at attempts to block the consideration of class in the context of abor-
tion, including, most prominently, by the Fifth Circuit and several Justices on 
the Supreme Court. It then turns to voting, where a similar struggle over the role 
of class in Fourteenth Amendment law is now occurring in contexts such as voter 
identification laws. Finally, it turns to criminal procedure, a context in which 
some Supreme Court Justices have argued that the Burger Court effectively over-
ruled a number of landmark class-related Warren Court holdings, and that those 
holdings no longer afford constitutional protection to people without financial 
resources. 
 
27. One of the key ways in which the Court narrowed equal protection was by holding that evi-
dence of disparate impact alone is insufficient to prove discrimination under the Fourteenth 
Amendment. By the end of the 1970s, equal protection plaintiffs challenging facially neutral 
laws were required to prove that the state acted with discriminatory purpose, which “implies 
more than intent as volition or intent as awareness of consequences. It implies that the deci-
sionmaker . . . selected or reaffirmed a particular course of action at least in part ‘because of,’ 
not merely ‘in spite of,’ its adverse effects upon an identifiable group.” Pers. Adm’r v. Feeney, 
442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979) (citation and footnote omitted). For more on this standard, see Ian 
Haney-López, Intentional Blindness, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1779, 1825-37 (2012), which character-
izes the constitutional standard in cases involving facially neutral state action as one of “mali-
cious intent”; and Reva B. Siegel, Equality Talk: Antisubordination and Anticlassification Values 
in Constitutional Struggles over Brown, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1470, 1536-37 n.227 (2004), which 
asserts that by the late 1970s, the Court had “define[d] discriminatory purpose as involving a 
mental state akin to malice.” 
28. 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
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Thus far, the Court has resisted invitations categorically to exclude class from 
consideration in these areas, and in fundamental rights jurisprudence more gen-
erally. But it has said very little about why class-based protections persist under 
due process, what function they serve, and what is wrong with the historical and 
doctrinal accounts being offered by proponents of the new class blindness. This 
Article seeks to answer those questions—questions that will only become more 
pressing as the Supreme Court and the federal appeals courts shift even further 
to the right.
29
 This shift in the composition of the federal courts may very well 
result in the destruction or diminishment of long-standing Fourteenth Amend-
ment protections for financially disadvantaged people; it will certainly intensify 
pressure in that direction. The history this Article recovers should enable us to 
argue in more informed ways about constitutional precedent, to better appreci-
ate the important role class has played in our constitutional tradition, and to rec-
ognize all that is at stake in coming battles over the meaning of landmark Four-
teenth Amendment precedents. Most importantly, this history demonstrates 
that the emergent notion that class-related considerations have no place any-
where under the Fourteenth Amendment is a product not of the Burger Court 
era, but of our own. 
 
29. See John Gramlich, With Another Supreme Court Pick, Trump Is Leaving His Mark on Higher 
Federal Courts, PEW RES. CTR. (July 16, 2018), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018
/07/16/with-another-supreme-court-pick-trump-is-leaving-his-mark-on-higher-federal 
-courts [https://perma.cc/SH9U-BB3K] (“Donald Trump has successfully appointed more 
federal appeals court judges so far in his presidency than Barack Obama and George W. Bush 
combined had appointed at the same point in theirs . . . .”); Thomas Kaplan, Trump Is Putting 
Indelible Conservative Stamp on Judiciary, N.Y. TIMES (July 31, 2018), https://www.nytimes
.com/2018/07/31/us/politics/trump-judges.html [https://perma.cc/XNW4-5P4R] (“Presi-
dent Trump and Senate Republicans are leaving an ever-expanding imprint on the judiciary, 
nudging powerful appeals courts rightward through a determined effort to nominate and 
confirm a steady procession of young conservative jurists.”); id. (“‘I think it’s the longest-term 
sort of impact we can have on the future of the country,’ Senator Mitch McConnell, Republi-
can of Kentucky and the majority leader, said in an interview . . . . ‘[I]t’s my top priority.’”); 
Rorie Spill Solberg & Eric N. Waltenburg, Are Trump’s Judicial Nominees Really Being Con-
firmed at a Record Pace? The Answer Is Complicated, WASH. POST (June 14, 2018) https://www
.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2018/06/14/are-trumps-judicial-nominees 
-really-being-confirmed-at-a-record-pace-the-answer-is-complicated [https://perma.cc
/KQ82-5A47] (“[A]bout three-quarters of [Trump’s] nominees have been men, and 90 per-
cent are white, reversing a presidential trend . . . . And Trump is selecting considerably more 
conservative judges than have previously served in these spots. So it is indeed likely that many 
federal benches will shift to the right.”). 
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i .  the class-based foundations of modern fundamental 
rights law 
In 1969, Frank Michelman published On Protecting the Poor Through the Four-
teenth Amendment, one of the most famous Harvard Forewords ever written.
30
 
The consensus among constitutional scholars in the late 1960s was that the War-
ren Court’s increasing sensitivity to class evidenced an emerging “judicial hostil-
ity towards official discrimination, be it de jure or de facto, according to pecuni-
ary circumstance.”
31
  “If the commentators are right,” Michelman observed, 
“relative impecuniousness appears to be joining race and national ancestry to 
compose a complex of traits which, if detectible as a basis of officially sanctioned 
disadvantage, render such disadvantage ‘invidious’ or ‘suspect.’”
32
 Michelman, 
however, saw things differently. He argued that the Court’s supposedly egalitar-
ian holdings “could be more soundly and satisfyingly understood as vindication 
of a state’s duty to protect against certain hazards which are endemic in an un-




Michelman’s “minimum welfare” theory is famous in its own right, but it 
remains well known today in part because, within a few years of the Foreword’s 
publication, the Burger Court rejected this theory with impressive force. By the 
late 1970s, the Court had made it clear that the Fourteenth Amendment did not 
impose a duty on the state to protect people “against certain hazards associated 
with impecuniousness which even a society strongly committed to competition 
and incentives would have to find unjust.”
34
 Unjust though those hazards may 
be, the Burger Court held, constitutional law offers no remedies. Of course, the 
egalitarians of the 1960s fared no better than Michelman when the political 
winds shifted. The Burger Court rejected their theory too, holding that class-
based discrimination did not trigger heightened scrutiny under the Equal Pro-
tection Clause. For this reason, Michelman’s essay functions today not only as a 
work of constitutional theory, but also as a historical artifact. It provides a fading 
snapshot of a lost world—a world in which legal scholars took the Court’s solic-
itude toward the financially disadvantaged as a given and the real argument was 
about how best to understand the shape of the emerging constitutional protec-
tion accorded this group. 
 
30. Michelman, supra note 5. 
31. Id. at 19. 
32. Id. 
33. Id. at 9 (emphasis omitted). 
34. Id. at 42. 
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This Part returns to that lost world, but it differs from most such excursions 
today in that its aim is not to describe all that has changed since the 1960s but 
rather to identify the germ of something that persists. There is no question that 
much has changed. It would be “off-the-wall”
35
 in our current constitutional re-
gime to argue, as legal scholars did in the Warren Court era, that “relative impe-
cuniousness” triggers heightened scrutiny or that the state is constitutionally ob-
ligated to provide people with social welfare benefits.
36
 When it comes to class, 
Fourteenth Amendment doctrine today provides less protection than it did in 
the 1960s—and less protection than scholars at the time imagined it would pro-
vide in the future. But there is a difference between asserting that sensitivity to 
class under the Fourteenth Amendment has declined, and asserting, as some 
courts and advocates now do, that it has been extinguished. 
This Part focuses on the Court’s growing recognition in the 1960s of an in-
terrelationship between class and fundamental rights—a recognition that eco-
nomic disadvantage often interferes with the exercise of such rights in ways that 
can deprive people without financial resources of the guarantees of the Four-
teenth Amendment. The 1960s was a period of tremendous growth in the num-
ber and scope of fundamental rights protections, in no small part because the 
Court in 1965 dramatically recommitted itself to the idea that the Constitution 
protects unenumerated rights in addition to those explicitly contained in the 
document’s text. This Part begins by examining Griswold, the case in which the 
Court recognized an unenumerated, constitutionally protected right to privacy 
that encompasses the use of birth control. Today, we do not think of Griswold as 
a case about class. But concerns about the ability of poor and low-income women 
to obtain birth control fueled the litigation in Griswold and informed the liti-
gants’ and the Court’s sense of why judicial intervention was necessary to protect 
a fundamental right in this context. This Part then looks with a wider lens at 
some of the cases in which the Court in the 1960s and 1970s more directly ad-
dressed the relationship between protecting people without financial resources 
and safeguarding fundamental rights. These cases reveal the Court’s anxiety 
about the potential of a class-based equal protection approach to unsettle too 
 
35. JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM 17-18 (2011) (describing as “off-the-wall” constitutional 
arguments that are inconsistent with “existing understandings and existing doctrines”). 
36. This is not categorically true. For a limited exception on the equal protection front, see supra 
note 13, which discusses courts’ application of intermediate scrutiny in some criminal proce-
dure contexts in which the state detains poor defendants because of their indigence. In addi-
tion, some legal academics have argued that all rights are effectively positive rights. See supra 
note 15. This point provides a theoretical foundation for advocating recognition of positive 
social welfare rights under the Constitution, but the Court has remained resistant. 
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much socioeconomic regulation and its surprising volubility about the benefits 
of doing class-based equality work under due process instead. 
A. Class and the Fundamental Right to Use Birth Control 
When the Court decided in 1973 that the Fourteenth Amendment protects 
the right to abortion, and when it decided in 2015 that the Fourteenth Amend-
ment protects same-sex couples’ right to marry, it cited Griswold as precedent.
37
 
It is not surprising to see Griswold cited in these contexts. When we think about 
the right to birth control today, we group it with other Fourteenth Amendment 
rights involving reproduction, sexuality, and the family. Griswold may not have 
been the first Supreme Court decision to address these topics, but it is widely 
considered the progenitor of the important and controversial line of cases that 
protect rights to reproductive and sexual autonomy. More recently, scholars have 
also begun to link Griswold with sex-based equal protection doctrine.
38
 Although 
concerns about women’s equality do not appear on the surface of the opinion, 
even in the early 1960s some Americans had begun to view the right to use birth 
control as a prerequisite for women’s equal standing in American society.
39
 Over 
time, the links between reproductive autonomy and women’s equality have be-
come clearer, to the public and to the Court.
40
 
Yet at the time Griswold was decided, sexual liberty and women’s equality 
were not the only frames for thinking about laws that restricted access to contra-
ception. The women’s movement, the sexual revolution, and the gay rights 
movement had not yet gotten off the ground in 1965. Early constitutional battles 
over birth control predated the founding of the National Organization for 
Women and the Summer of Love. This is not to say that ideas about sexual free-
dom and women’s equality did not inform early debates about birth control. 
 
37. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2597-98 (2015); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 
(1973). 
38. See, e.g., Neil S. Siegel & Reva B. Siegel, Contraception as a Sex Equality Right, 124 YALE L.J.F. 
349, 349-50 (2015) (recovering the history of Connecticut’s birth control ban and showing the 
ways in which that ban reflected and reinforced traditional gender roles). 
39. See Melissa Murray, Overlooking Equality on the Road to Griswold, 124 YALE L.J.F. 324 (2015) 
(discussing the birth control cases that immediately predated Griswold and that explicitly 
linked access to birth control with women’s equality). 
40. See Reva B. Siegel, Sex Equality Arguments for Reproductive Rights: Their Critical Basis and 
Evolving Constitutional Expression, 56 EMORY L.J. 815, 820, 828-34 (2007) (describing the 
growing recognition in American constitutional law of a close nexus between reproductive 
rights and women’s equality). 




 But at the time of Griswold, there were other prominent frames for 
thinking about the right to birth control—frames that were later obscured by the 
increasing dominance of gender and sexuality frames. One of those early frames 
for thinking about the right to birth control was class. 
Concerns about financially disadvantaged women were interwoven with the 
campaign for birth control from the start. Margaret Sanger, the founder of 
Planned Parenthood and the leader of the national birth control campaign in the 
first half of the twentieth century, began her career as a nurse on the Lower East 
Side of Manhattan, where she witnessed scores of women grow ill and some-
times die for lack of any effective means of controlling their fertility.
42
 In her au-
tobiography, Sanger describes how her patients, many of them immigrants, “im-
plored [her] to reveal the ‘secret’ that rich people had” for spacing their 
pregnancies.
43
 Her goal, when she became a birth control advocate, was to create 
a publicly accessible “‘chain’ of clinics” throughout the country that would enable 
 
41. See, e.g., Murray, supra note 39, at 325-27 (discussing Trubek v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 907 (1961), 
an early challenge to Connecticut’s birth control ban—dismissed by the Court for lack of ju-
risdiction—that was brought by a married couple who viewed “contraception [as] an essential 
tool for effective family planning in a marriage that was organized as a partnership of equals”); 
Siegel & Siegel, supra note 38, at 355-56 (citing the American Civil Liberties Union’s amicus 
brief in Griswold, which argued that laws barring the use of birth control violated the Four-
teenth Amendment because “the right of the individual to engage in any of the common oc-
cupations . . . applies to women as well as men. . . . [I]n addition to its economic conse-
quences, the ability to regulate child-bearing has been a significant factor in the emancipation 
of married women. In this respect, effective means of contraception rank equally with the 
Nineteenth Amendment in enhancing the opportunities of women who wish to work in in-
dustry, business, the arts, and the professions. Thus, the equal protection clause protects the 
class of women who wish to delay or regulate child-bearing effectively.” (internal quotation 
marks and citations omitted)); see also Mary L. Dudziak, Just Say No: Birth Control in the Con-
necticut Supreme Court Before Griswold v. Connecticut, 75 IOWA L. REV. 915, 937 (1990) (quot-
ing an anti-birth control campaigner who claimed in the early 1960s that “a Planned 
Parenthood Center is like a house of prostitution,” in that it augments sexual freedom at the 
expense of morality and contravenes the important precept that “marital relations are for pro-
creation and not entertainment”).  
42. Margaret Sanger Is Dead at 82; Led Campaign for Birth Control, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 7, 1966), 
https://archive.nytimes.com/www.nytimes.com/learning/general/onthisday/bday/0914
.html [https://perma.cc/74E3-9GZZ]. 
43. MARGARET SANGER, AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY 89 (Cooper Square Press 1999) (1938). A study con-
ducted in New York at the time Sanger was working as a nurse revealed that forty-one percent 
of women treated at the city’s health clinics had never used contraception, and, of those, a 
majority had had at least one abortion. See Jill Lepore, Birthright, NEW YORKER, Nov. 14, 2011, 
at 48. “These were not merely ‘unfortunate conditions among the poor,’” Sanger wrote. “I 
knew the women personally.” SANGER, supra, at 89. 
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women—especially those who lacked financial resources—to obtain birth con-
trol.
44
 Sanger viewed her advocacy work as part of “a fighting, forward, no fool-
ing movement, battling for the freedom of the poorest parents and for women’s 
biological freedom and development.”
45
 It was no small battle. As Jill Lepore ob-
serves, “[f]rom the start, the birth control movement has been as much about 
fighting legal and political battles as it has been about staffing clinics, because, 
in a country without national healthcare, making contraception available to poor 
women has required legal reform.”
46
 
One such reform occurred in 1936, in a case called United States v. One Package 
(of Japanese pessaries), in which the Second Circuit invalidated a federal law 
barring the importation of contraceptive devices.
47
 The court held in One Package 
that when Congress in the late nineteenth century passed its infamous Comstock 
laws—which barred, among other things, the transport of birth control
48
 —it 
could not have intended to “prevent the importation, sale, or carriage by mail of 
things which might intelligently be employed by conscientious and competent 
physicians for the purpose of saving life or promoting the wellbeing of their pa-
tients.”
49
 This broad holding, which effectively legalized the dissemination of 
contraceptive devices in much of the United States, was a major victory for birth 
control advocates and providers, who had lived under the very real threat of ar-
rest in previous decades.
50
 Morris Ernst, general counsel of the American Civil 
 
44. MARGARET SANGER, MY FIGHT FOR BIRTH CONTROL 144 (1931). 
45. See Lepore, supra note 43, at 50. 
46. Id. at 49; cf. Martha J. Bailey, Fifty Years of Family Planning: New Evidence on the Long-Run 
Effects of Increasing Access to Contraception, 2013 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY 341, 
349, https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/2013a_bailey.pdf [https://
perma.cc/3GAY-JB73] (noting that, in the early 1960s, an annual supply of Enovid (the pill) 
cost an amount of money equivalent to more than three weeks of full-time work at the 1960 
minimum wage, meaning that many low-income women could not afford it on their own). 
47. 86 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1936). 
48. In 1873, Congress passed an “Act for the Suppression of Trade in, and Circulation of, Obscene 
Literature and Articles of Immoral Use.” Act of Mar. 3, 1873, ch. 258, 17 Stat. 598. This crimi-
nalized the use of the United States Postal Service to send contraceptives, abortifacients, and 
other materials deemed obscene—including books and pamphlets containing information 
about these items. This law, along with other federal and state laws of similar character and 
vintage, are known as Comstock laws, after Anthony Comstock, the head of the New York 
Society for the Suppression of Vice and the driving force behind this regulation. For more on 
Comstock and his legal legacy, see NICOLA BEISEL, IMPERILED INNOCENTS: ANTHONY COM-
STOCK AND FAMILY REPRODUCTION IN VICTORIAN AMERICA 76-103 (1997). 
49. One Package, 86 F.2d at 739. 
50. For descriptions of various arrests of advocates and medical professionals for providing 
women with birth control or information about birth control in the years between the two 
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Liberties Union and lead attorney challenging the law in One Package, jubilantly 
declared in 1936 that the decision “mean[t] the end of birth control laws.”
51
 
Ernst spoke too soon. Around the time of One Package, activists in Connect-
icut decided to defy that state’s birth control ban and open a chain of reproduc-
tive-healthcare clinics intended to meet the needs of women who lacked the re-
sources to find ways around the law.
52
 By 1938, they had opened nine.
53
 But 
when police began to arrest clinic personnel, the Second Circuit’s decision in One 
Package, invalidating a federal law, was of little help. In 1940, the Connecticut 
Supreme Court upheld the state’s ban,
54




For two decades after the Connecticut court’s decision, those clinics re-
mained closed, leaving women without financial resources very limited options 
for obtaining birth control.
56
 By the early 1960s, however, pressure to expand 
access to contraception was mounting, even in the heavily Catholic states of the 
Northeast. By that point, most Americans—even most Catholics—believed birth 
control should be legal.
57
 Millions of women had begun taking the new pill—
 
World Wars, see PETER C. ENGELMAN, A HISTORY OF THE BIRTH CONTROL MOVEMENT IN 
AMERICA 83-86, 96, 157-58 (2011). 
51. Id. at 168. 
52. See DAVID J. GARROW, LIBERTY AND SEXUALITY: THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY AND THE MAKING OF 
ROE V. WADE 1-78 (1994). Connecticut’s law barred the distribution or use of any drug, me-
dicinal article, or instrument for the purpose of preventing conception. It was originally en-
acted in 1879, one of many Comstock laws enacted in that period. See Act of March 28, 1879, 
ch. 78, 1879 Conn. Pub. Acts 428; see also JOHN W. JOHNSON, GRISWOLD V. CONNECTICUT: 
BIRTH CONTROL AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF PRIVACY 15 (2005) (noting that some 
private doctors in Connecticut in the decades before Griswold were willing to bend the law for 
married couples, but that many women, “particularly those of lower socio-economic status,” 
lacked this special access). 
53. GARROW, supra note 52, at 78. 
54. State v. Nelson, 11 A.2d 856, 862-63 (Conn. 1940). 
55. GARROW, supra note 52, at 78. 
56. Catherine G. Roraback, Griswold v. Connecticut: A Brief Case History, 16 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 
395, 396 (1989) (noting that between 1940 and the time Griswold and Buxton opened their 
clinic, “there was no public or private clinic or facility in Connecticut providing free birth 
control or family planning service”); see also SUSAN M. HARTMANN, THE HOME FRONT AND 
BEYOND: AMERICAN WOMEN IN THE 1940S 171 (1982); Dudziak, supra note 41, at 917; Jonathan 
Daniels, Birth Control and Democracy, NATION, Nov. 1, 1941, at 429. 
57. DANIEL K. WILLIAMS, DEFENDERS OF THE UNBORN: THE PRO-LIFE MOVEMENT BEFORE ROE V. 
WADE 59-60 (2016) (“A January 1965 Gallup survey showed that 78 percent of American 
Catholics supported making birth control information available to anyone who requested 
it . . . . [I]ndeed, a survey conducted in 1965 revealed that 53 percent of Catholic wives in their 
late teens or twenties were using a form of contraception forbidden by the Church.”). 
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first approved for contraceptive use in 1960—and millions more were using 
other artificial means of contraception.
58
 In many places, aside from Connecti-
cut, governments had gone from suppressing birth control to, at least tentatively, 
supporting its use by funding reproductive-health clinics and subsidizing the 
cost of contraception through public health programs.
59
 
Against this backdrop, birth control advocates in Connecticut decided to try 
again. In November of 1961, they opened a Planned Parenthood clinic in the city 
of New Haven.
60
 Several days later, police arrested the clinic’s directors—Estelle 
Griswold, the Executive Director of Planned Parenthood in Connecticut, and Dr. 
Lee Buxton, head of Obstetrics and Gynecology at the Yale School of Medicine 
and the clinic’s medical director—for violating the birth control ban.
61
 
When contemporary constitutional scholars tell the story of Griswold, they 
almost always describe Connecticut’s birth control law as antiquated.
62
 They 
regularly assert that the law had fallen into desuetude long before the Court in-
validated it.
63
 This characterization assumes that, despite the law on the books, 
birth control was readily available in practice to those who wanted it. Commen-
tators frequently note that, by the early 1960s, condoms were available in drug 
stores in Connecticut (ostensibly for the purpose of preventing disease, which 
 
58. ELIZABETH SIEGEL WATKINS, ON THE PILL: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF ORAL CONTRACEPTIVES, 
1950-1970, at 34-35 (1998); Steven M. Spencer, The Birth Control Revolution, SATURDAY EVEN-
ING POST (Jan. 15, 1966), http://www.saturdayeveningpost.com/2015/12/31/history/post 
-perspective/50-years-ago-the-birth-control-revolution.html [https://perma.cc/S5DG 
-RADT]. 
59. See generally Brief for Planned Parenthood Federation of America, Inc., as Amicus Curiae at 
app. A, Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (No. 496), 1965 WL 115612 [hereinafter 
Planned Parenthood Griswold Brief]; id. at 26 (explaining that, by the mid-1960s, the archi-
tects of the War on Poverty had begun to devote “significant federal funds and federal effort 
to aiding Americans . . . to secure . . . contraceptive services”). 
60. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 480. 
61. Id. 
62. See, e.g., 2 THE SOCIAL HISTORY OF CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA 
714 (Wilbur R. Miller ed., 2012); Nathan S. Chapman & Michael W. McConnell, Due Process 
as Separation of Powers, 121 YALE L.J. 1672, 1797 (2012). 
63. See, e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE 
LAW 95 (1990) (“If any Connecticut official had been mad enough to attempt enforcement, 
the law would at once have been removed from the books and the official from his office.”); 
Cass R. Sunstein, What Did Lawrence Hold? Of Autonomy, Desuetude, Sexuality, and Marriage, 
2003 SUP. CT. REV. 27, 50 (arguing that by the early 1960s, Connecticut’s birth control ban 
had fallen into desuetude because it was so “hopelessly out of touch with existing convic-
tions”). 




 For women, however, this was insufficient: women generally 
needed to see a doctor to obtain birth control. Some doctors would skirt the law 
for women in their social milieu, and women with money could sometimes visit 
other states with less restrictive laws.
65
 But this hardly amounted to universal 
access. Thus, even as late as the 1960s, Connecticut’s law effectively impeded 
many women’s access to birth control. For young and unmarried women,
66
 and 




That lack of access—particularly acute in Connecticut, but still a problem 
even in states that officially permitted the use of birth control—had real conse-
quences for women’s health. Unwanted pregnancies could be dangerous, espe-
cially for poor women and women of color. In 1960, the maternal mortality rate 
for nonwhite women was nearly four times higher than it was for white 
 
64. See Daniel J. Kevles, The Secret History of Birth Control, N.Y. TIMES (July 22, 2001), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2001/07/22/books/the-secret-history-of-birth-control.html 
[https://perma.cc/G7V5-SRSQ] (discussing the availability of condoms in this period). In-
deed, in 1961, in a case predating Griswold that ducked the question of the law’s constitution-
ality, the Court itself observed that “contraceptives are commonly and notoriously sold in 
Connecticut drug stores.” Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 502 (1961); see also Senior Lawyers 
Div., Oral History of Catherine G. Roraback, A.B.A. (2006) [hereinafter Oral History], 
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/directories/women_trailblazers/roraback
_interview_1.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/R9RZ-BJHY] (noting that in the early 
1960s, “things like condoms were sold in drug stores and other places around Connecticut” 
because the phrase “for the prevention of disease” was printed on the box, and law enforce-
ment “couldn’t prove that the physicians or the druggists’ intention was to purchase it to be 
preventing conception”). 
65. Lori Ann Brass, An Arrest in New Haven, Contraception and the Right to Privacy, 41 YALE MED., 
Spring 2007, at 16, 16; Jonathan T. Weisberg, In Control of Her Own Destiny: Catherine G. 
Roraback and the Privacy Principle, YALE L. REP., Winter 2004, at 39, 41. 
66. Even Planned Parenthood would not provide birth control to unmarried women in Connect-
icut: Griswold and Buxton’s clinic “gave information, instruction, and medical advice to mar-
ried persons” only. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 480 (1965); see also Weisberg, supra 
note 65, at 42 (quoting Katie Roraback, who noted that doctors in Connecticut would not 
prescribe birth control to unmarried women and that even in New York clinics, where Con-
necticut women would sometimes go to obtain birth control, “there was a need to be a married 
person, in quotes”—a requirement unmarried women sometimes tried to satisfy by borrow-
ing a ring). 
67. See C. THOMAS DIENES, LAW, POLITICS, AND BIRTH CONTROL 116 (1972) (observing that alt-
hough many women in Connecticut obtained birth control prior to Griswold, “the poor, de-
pendent on free medical services, were effectively denied assistance”). It is worth noting that 
Griswold did not end this struggle. See, e.g., La’Tasha D. Mayes, Black Women are Dying from 
a Lack of Access to Reproductive Health Services, TIME (Jan. 19, 2018), http://time.com/5109797
/black-women-dying-reproductive-health [https://perma.cc/HJS5-CGNC]. 




 A significant percentage of those deaths resulted from illegal abor-
tions, which biostatisticians in this period estimated, at the high end, occurred 
at a rate of 1.2 million a year.
69
 
Women with limited financial resources were dramatically overrepresented 
in these statistics. A study of low-income women in New York City in the 1960s 
found that, of those who reported having had an abortion, approximately eighty 
percent reported that they had attempted to perform the procedure on them-
selves, and only two percent said that a physician had been involved in any way.
70
 
Unsurprisingly, this situation constituted a grave danger to women’s health. In 
1962, nearly 1,600 women were admitted to the Harlem Hospital Center for in-
complete abortions, which amounted to one abortion-related hospital admission 
for every forty-two deliveries at that hospital that year.
71
 In 1968, the University 
of Southern California Los Angeles County Medical Center—another public fa-
cility serving primarily indigent patients—admitted just over 700 women with 




68. 2 U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH, EDUC., & WELFARE, VITAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES 1960 
pt. A 1-49 (1963). 
69. Statistics regarding abortion were difficult to come by in this period because the procedure 
was generally illegal and even abortions performed legally were not always recorded as such. 
The upper-range estimate of 1.2 million a year was first reported in 1955, at a landmark con-
ference on abortion, by a committee chaired by the prominent biostatistician Christopher 
Tietze. The committee’s lower-range estimate for induced abortions was 200,000. See CAROLE 
JOFFE, DOCTORS OF CONSCIENCE: THE STRUGGLE TO PROVIDE ABORTION BEFORE AND AFTER 
ROE V. WADE 211 n.1 (1995). Joffe notes that the 1.2 million estimate was considered 
“credib[le] in most medical and social science circles” in the 1960s, and that in 1968, Michael 
Burnhill, a physician and demographer, estimated that the number of illegal abortions in the 
United States fell between 650,000 and 1.3 million annually. Id. Another analysis, extrapolat-
ing from data from North Carolina, estimated that in 1967, there were 829,000 illegal or self-
induced abortions in the United States. Rachel Benson Gold, Lessons from Before Roe: Will 
Past Be Prologue?, 6 GUTTMACHER REP. ON PUB. POL’Y 8, 8 (2003). As far as abortion-related 
deaths were concerned: in the 1930s, the number of reported deaths from illegal abortion 
annually numbered in the thousands. Id. By the mid-1960s, that number had dropped into 
the hundreds, but in the year Griswold was decided, illegal abortions still accounted for sev-
enteen percent of all deaths attributed to pregnancy and childbirth. Id. That figure included 
only deaths that were officially attributed to illegal abortion—the actual figure was likely much 
higher. Id.  
70. Gold, supra note 69, at 8. 
71. Id. 
72. Id. For further discussion of the toll that lack of access to reproductive-health services took in 
this period, especially on poor women and women of color, see DAVID A. GRIMES & LINDA G. 
BRANDON, EVERY THIRD WOMAN IN AMERICA: HOW LEGAL ABORTION TRANSFORMED OUR 
NATION 8-14 (2014); and Steven Polgar & Ellen S. Fried, The Bad Old Days: Clandestine Abor-
tions Among the Poor in New York City Before Liberalization of the Abortion Law, 8 FAM. PLAN. 
PERSP. 125 (1976). 
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The consequences that resulted from a lack of access to birth control were 
particularly dire for women of color.
73
 When Martin Luther King, Jr., received 
the Margaret Sanger Award from Planned Parenthood in 1966, he focused on 
this disparity. “Negroes have no mere academic nor ordinary interest in family 
planning,” he asserted. “They have a special and urgent concern.”
74
 “Like all 
poor,” he noted, African Americans experience real suffering as a result of being 
deprived of access to contraception.
75
 “For th[is] reason[],” he contended, “we 
are natural allies of those who seek to inject any form of planning in our society 
that enriches life and guarantees the right to exist in freedom and dignity.”
76
 
Disadvantaged women were foremost in the minds of the advocates who 
challenged Connecticut’s birth control ban in Griswold. As Executive Director of 
Connecticut Planned Parenthood, Estelle Griswold made the accessibility of 
birth control to poor women and outreach to minority communities her top pri-
orities.
77
 In 1956, she launched a service through which women in Connecticut 
 
73. See Melanie Tervalon, Black Women’s Reproductive Rights, in WOMEN’S HEALTH: READINGS ON 
SOCIAL, ECONOMIC, AND POLITICAL ISSUES 136 (Nancy Worcester & Marianne Whatley eds., 
1988). 
74. MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., FAMILY PLANNING—A SPECIAL AND URGENT CONCERN 3 (1966), 
http://www.thekingcenter.org/archive/document/family-planning-special-and-urgent 
-concern [https://perma.cc/D95E-KYX4]. 
75. Id. at 4. 
76. Id. at 5. Not all leaders in the civil rights movement supported expanding African American 
women’s access to birth control. In the late 1960s and 1970s, some members of the Black Pan-
thers and the Black Muslims strongly opposed increased access to contraception among black 
women, viewing it as “a white plot to decimate the black race.” Simone M. Caron, Birth Control 
and the Black Community in the 1960s: Genocide or Power Politics?, 31 J. SOC. HIST. 545, 545, 547 
(1998). Although African American women in this period shared deep concerns about racist 
uses of birth control, including the forced sterilization of women of color (which many 
women in the civil rights movement campaigned against), the “genocide arguments espoused 
by the Black Power Movement” against birth control “made little headway” among them—
or, indeed, among most African American men. Id. at 549. A study in the early 1970s showed 
that eighty-seven percent of African Americans approved of publicly financed birth control 
clinics and sharply differentiated voluntary forms of contraception from involuntary ones. 
Barbara Williams, Blacks Reject Sterilization—Not Family Planning, PSYCHOL. TODAY, June 
1974, at 26; see also DOROTHY ROBERTS, KILLING THE BLACK BODY: RACE REPRODUCTION, AND 
THE MEANING OF LIBERTY 101 (1997) (reporting that a 1970 study showed that eighty percent 
of black women in Chicago approved of birth control, and noting that one reason black 
women “supported family planning was that they were disproportionately victims of unsafe 
abortions”). 
77. See GARROW, supra note 52, at 135-40. In 1962, when Alan Guttmacher became president of 
the national Planned Parenthood, his priorities overlapped significantly with those of Gris-
wold. His top three priorities for the national organization were “improving Planned 
Parenthood’s relationship with the black community, securing federal support for family-
planning programs for the poor, and liberalizing abortion law.” Lepore, supra note 43, at 50. 
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could obtain free referrals and transportation to a birth control clinic in New 
York, just across the state line.
78
 In 1961, when she was arrested for opening the 
New Haven clinic, Griswold told reporters: “It is the woman of the lower socio-
economic group who does not know she can space her children, who cannot af-
ford to go to a private doctor, who is being discriminated against by the Con-
necticut law.”
79
 Such concerns also motivated Buxton, the Yale School of Medi-
cine professor who served as the clinic’s chief physician. “It’s the poor women I 
worry about,”
80
 he explained, because what the state’s enforcement of the birth 
control ban “adds up to [is] the rich getting contraceptives and the poor getting 
children.”
81
 Catherine (Katie) Roraback, one of the lead attorneys in Griswold, 
recalled that Buxton was very insistent that “the issue [wa]s that [he] c[ould]n’t 
prescribe to poor patients,” and that the ultimate goal of the case was to “take 
care of poor women.”
82
 
Roraback and the handful of other young female lawyers who litigated the 
early reproductive rights cases discussed in this Part and the next shared this 
class-based perspective.
83
 These pioneering lawyers have largely been written 
out of legal scholarship on the foundational reproductive rights cases.
84
 But they 
 
Of course, one reason outreach to minority communities was necessary was that the main-
stream campaign for reproductive rights, in the period of Griswold and Roe, was led by whites 
and often excluded people of color. See Amy Kesselman, Women Versus Connecticut, in ABOR-
TION WARS: A HALF-CENTURY OF STRUGGLE, 1950-2000, at 42, 51 (Rickie Solinger ed., 1998) 
(observing that “[a]lthough New Haven . . . had a sizable African-American and growing 
Puerto Rican population” in the late 1960s and 1970s, “[i]n Connecticut, as in the rest of the 
country, the racist policies and practices of population control groups had left a bitter legacy 
in communities of color”). 
78. GARROW, supra note 52, at 139-40. 
79. Id. at 197 (quoting Griswold). 
80. Oral History, supra note 64, at 50 (quoting Buxton). 
81. Philip S. Cook, For Connecticut, a Chain of Birth Control Clinics, N.Y. HERALD TRIB., June 21, 
1961, at 14 (quoting Buxton); see also Jack V. Fox, Court Test to Bring Birth Control Issue into 
Open, CHI. DAILY DEFENDER, Dec. 6, 1961, at 10 (quoting Buxton explaining that clinics are 
necessary because, among low-income women, “it is almost invariably the responsibility of 
the woman alone to avoid pregnancy. She hasn’t the money to go to a doctor. And, anyway, 
she wouldn’t think of going to a private doctor for that reason.”). 
82. Oral History, supra note 64, at 50 (quoting Buxton). 
83. For more on the young female lawyers who made feminist class-based arguments in cases 
challenging restrictive abortion laws pre-Roe, see infra notes 226-241 and accompanying text. 
84. For notable exceptions to the general erasure in legal scholarship of these pioneering young 
lawyers’ contributions to the development of reproductive rights law, see, for example, 
Dudziak, supra note 41, at 932-33; Linda Greenhouse & Reva B. Siegel, The Unfinished Story of 
Roe v. Wade, in REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS AND JUSTICE STORIES (Melissa Murray, Kate Shaw & 
Reva Siegel eds., forthcoming 2019) (manuscript at 11-13), https://law.yale.edu/system/files
/documents/faculty/papers/ssrn_-_greenhouse_siegel_-_the_unfinished_story_of_roe_v
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played a crucial role in championing those cases and in constructing constitu-
tional frames that ultimately influenced the development of reproductive rights 
law under the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Roraback—who went on from Griswold to represent Ericka Huggins, one of 
the defendants in New Haven’s famous Black Panther trials
85
—argued that “the 
important thing about the Griswold case always was the fact that it . . . [was] an 
issue of whether poor people could get access to birth control.”
86
 Harriet Pilpel, 
who authored Planned Parenthood’s amicus brief in the case, was similarly at-
tuned to “the class discrimination angle which . . . characterized the enforcement 
of the birth control laws.”
87
  Pilpel, an important civil liberties lawyer who 
worked for Planned Parenthood and the ACLU, had been involved in legal chal-
lenges to birth control regulations for decades.
88
 She argued in 1952 that Con-
necticut’s enforcement of its birth control ban meant that “sales of less reliable, 
expensive and ‘capable of other use’ contraceptives continued to flourish,” while 
“lower income women whose health urgently required the prescription of con-
traceptive devices were no longer able to obtain them at low prices or free from 
medically supervised clinics.”
89
 By 1965, Pilpel sensed among the American pub-
lic a “growing awareness that birth control legislation and policy is often class 




_wade_7-9.pdf [https://perma.cc/AB27-CBSG]; Murray, supra note 39, at 324-26; and Siegel 
& Siegel, supra note 38, at 354-55. 
85. See Kesselman, supra note 77, at 47. For more on the extraordinary challenges Roraback faced 
in these cases and more generally as a young female lawyer at a time when there were not 
many women practicing law, see Interview with Catherine Roraback, by Marilyn Kuberka, ORAL 
HISTORY ARCHIVE OF THE CONNECTICUT WOMEN’S HALL OF FAME (Feb. 14, 2003), 
http://cwhf.org/media/upload/files/Transcripts/Roraback%20Interview%20Transcript.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/492M-LQP2]. 
86. Oral History, supra note 64, at 41; see also Roraback, supra note 56, at 396 (“The persons most 
disadvantaged by the legal situation in Connecticut were poor women whose only sources of 
medical advice and service were public or private clinic facilities.”). 
87. Harriet F. Pilpel, The Crazy Quilt of Our Birth Control Laws, 1 J. SEX RES. 135, 140 (1965). 
88. See id. at 139. Indeed, one of the first cases she worked on as a young lawyer was United States 
v. One Package, 86 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1936). She also worked on State v. Nelson, 11 A.2d 856 
(Conn. 1940), and Tileston v. Ullman, 26 A.2d 582 (Conn. 1942), cases in which the Connect-
icut Supreme Court upheld the state’s birth control ban. See GARROW, supra note 52, at 64-68, 
101-02. 
89. HARRIET F. PILPEL & THEODORA ZAVIN, YOUR MARRIAGE AND THE LAW 175 (1952). 
90. Pilpel, supra note 87, at 135; see also LEIGH ANN WHEELER, HOW SEX BECAME A CIVIL LIBERTY 
115 (2013) (noting that Pilpel gave a presentation at the ACLU’s Biennial Conference in 1964 
in which she argued that “sex laws” constitute a form of “class legislation” because they are 
applied primarily against poor and underprivileged people). 
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Like many of the other birth control advocates in Griswold, Pilpel viewed the 
challenge to Connecticut’s birth control ban as part of a broader campaign for 
reproductive freedom with both class and race dimensions. The point of Gris-
wold, she observed, was to establish the idea “of free choice in the birth control 
field,”
91
 a freedom that would allow women to use birth control—and also not 
to use it. Griswold was founded on “a constitutional principle of voluntarism in 
reference to procreation,” she argued—a principle that not only disallowed bans 
on birth control but also prohibited the compulsory and involuntary sterilization 
of women,
92
 a form of abuse the state continued to visit on poor women and 
women of color.
93
 Buxton shared this broad conception of the case. Immediately 
after the oral argument at the Supreme Court, he began to talk to his lawyers 
“about the abortion statutes,”
94
 which, in his view, also violated the principle of 
voluntarism with respect to procreation. They agreed: a few years after Griswold, 




91. Harriet F. Pilpel, Birth Control and a New Birth of Freedom, 27 OHIO ST. L.J. 96, 98 (1967). 
92. Id. at 98-99; see also WHEELER, supra note 90, at 95 (reporting that in addition to providing 
legal assistance to Planned Parenthood and the American Birth Control League, Pilpel also 
provided such assistance to the Association for Voluntary Sterilization and the Kinsey Insti-
tute). 
93. For more on the brutal history of involuntary sterilization among women of color in the mid-
dle decades of the twentieth century, see ANGELA DAVIS, WOMEN, RACE, AND CLASS 215-21 
(1981); ROBERTS, supra note 76, at 89-103; and JOANNA SCHOEN, CHOICE AND COERCION: 
BIRTH CONTROL, STERILIZATION, AND ABORTION IN PUBLIC HEALTH AND WELFARE 202-16 
(2005). See also LESLIE J. REAGAN, WHEN ABORTION WAS A CRIME 207 (1997) (“The ease with 
which doctors sterilized poor women, a crucial issue to black feminists and other feminists of 
color by the 1970s, was already apparent in 1965.”). 
94. Oral History, supra note 64, at 50. 
95. Roraback was one of the chief architects of Abele v. Markle, also known as Women v. Connecti-
cut, in which a federal district court invalidated Connecticut’s ban on abortion one year prior 
to Roe v. Wade. See Abele v. Markle, 342 F. Supp. 800, 800 (D. Conn. 1972). Roraback and her 
colleague Nancy Stearns of the Center for Constitutional Rights ultimately recruited nearly 
two thousand women to serve as plaintiffs in the case, and their arguments against the ban 
were grounded in broad, feminist conceptions of reproductive rights—including the idea that 
banning abortion discriminates against poor women. For more on this case and the litigation 
strategy behind it, see GREENHOUSE & SIEGEL, supra note 22, at 167-77 (reprinting primary 
source documents related to the case); and Kesselman, supra note 77. Harriet Pilpel was also 
deeply involved in the legal campaign for abortion rights in the 1960s and 1970s; among other 
things, she authored amicus briefs in Roe v. Wade and Maher v. Roe. See Brief Amici Curiae & 
Annexed Brief of the American Public Health Ass’n et al., Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977) 
(Nos. 75-1440, 75-442), 1976 WL 181644; Supplemental Brief for Amici Curiae Planned 
Parenthood Federation of America, Inc. et al., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (Nos. 70-18, 
70-40), 1972 WL 126043. 
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idea that the fight for access to contraception was part of a larger fight for repro-
ductive justice was also taking hold in this period outside the courtroom, as Af-
rican American, Asian, Latina, and Native American activists began to argue that 
“[t]he lack of the availability of safe birth control methods, . . . forced steriliza-
tion practices and the inability to obtain legal abortions” relegated women of 




The Court’s opinion in Griswold does not (visibly) reflect any of this history. 
It focuses, famously, on privacy—more specifically, on the privacy that inheres 
within marriage. “Would we allow the police to search the sacred precincts of 
marital bedrooms for telltale signs of the use of contraceptives?” an outraged 
Justice William O. Douglas asked in his majority opinion. “The very idea is re-
pulsive to the notions of privacy surrounding the marriage relationship.”
97
 As 
commentators at the time noted, Justice Douglas had simply conjured up this 
image of “fictional police invading a fictional bedchamber of a fictional couple.”
98
 
There was no evidence that police had ever—in the history of Connecticut’s 
law—searched a married couple’s bedroom for contraceptives.
99
 Yet in the half 
century that has elapsed since Griswold was decided, this imaginary scene of mar-
ital disruption has substantially obscured the actual facts in the case and the 
class-related concerns that pervaded the litigation. 
In 1965, however, those concerns were readily apparent, even to the Justices 
on the Supreme Court. Indeed, four years prior to Griswold, in Poe v. Ullman, the 
Court cited the state’s enforcement of the law exclusively against birth control 
clinics as a justification for ducking the question of the law’s constitutionality.
100
 
Poe was brought by Buxton and three patients in his private medical practice, 
 
96. Frances Beal, Double Jeopardy: To Be Black and Female, in BLACK WOMAN’S MANIFESTO 29 
(1969), https://library.duke.edu/digitalcollections/wlmpc_wlmms01009/#info [https://
perma.cc/E26B-RWN8]; see also ROBERTS, supra note 76, at 100-03 (discussing reproductive-
justice arguments by African American women in the late 1960s and 1970s). See generally JAEL 
SILLIMAN ET AL., UNDIVIDED RIGHTS: WOMEN OF COLOR ORGANIZE FOR REPRODUCTIVE JUS-
TICE (2004) (discussing reproductive-justice activism among African Americans, Native 
Americans, Latinas, and Asians and Pacific Islanders). 
97. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965). 
98. Robert G. Dixon, Jr., The Griswold Penumbra: Constitutional Charter for an Expanded Law of 
Privacy?, 64 MICH. L. REV. 197, 218 (1965). 
99. See Transcript of Oral Argument at *3, Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (No. 
496) [hereinafter Griswold Oral Argument], http://academic.brooklyn.cuny.edu/history
/johnson/griswoldoral.htm [https://perma.cc/2RFM-62TK] (“The only prosecutions, actu-
ally, have been in the case of clinics, where the prosecutions have been brought against doc-
tors, nurses and assistants.”). 
100. 367 U.S. 497, 508-09 (1961). 
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who argued that the birth control ban violated their Fourteenth Amendment 
rights.
101
 The Court concluded the case was nonjusticiable because there was no 
evidence the law would be enforced against “the conduct in which the present 
appellants wish to engage—the giving of private medical advice by a doctor to 
his individual patients, and their private use of the devices prescribed.”
102
 Justice 
Felix Frankfurter, who authored the Court’s opinion in Poe, complained to his 
colleagues that what the plaintiffs were actually seeking was not the right to use 
birth control or to dispense it in the context of a private medical practice, but 
rather, authorization to open clinics accessible to the public.
103
 Justice William 
Brennan echoed this assessment, asserting in his concurring opinion that “[t]he 
true controversy in this case is over the opening of birth-control clinics on a large 
scale . . . [as] it is that which the State has prevented in the past.”
104
 
As the dissenters in Poe heatedly pointed out, the fact that Buxton and his 
patients would have been required to break the law and at least potentially risk 
prosecution to prescribe and use birth control ought to have been sufficient to 
render the case justiciable.
105
 The real problem in Poe was that, for a number of 
 
101. Id. at 498-500. 
102. Id. at 502, 508-09. 
103. See GARROW, supra note 52, at 183. To persuade a skeptical Court that the birth control ban did 
indeed make a material difference in people’s lives, Fowler Harper, the Yale Law professor who 
represented Buxton and his patients at the Supreme Court, argued in Poe that, as a result of 
the State’s continued enforcement of the law, “no public or private clinic for the purpose of 
advising on contraception[]” had existed in the State for twenty years. Oral Argument at 
43:30, Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961) (No. 60), https://www.oyez.org/cases/1960/60. 
Thus, he asserted, “[t]he people in Connecticut who need contraceptive advice from doctors 
most, the people in the lower income brackets and lower education brackets, the people who 
need it most do not get it because there are no clinics available.” Id. at 43:55. But these argu-
ments were of no avail. Indeed, the Court seized on them to avoid deciding the case. 
104. Poe, 367 U.S. at 509 (Brennan, J., concurring); see also GARROW, supra note 52, at 198-99 (not-
ing that just after Poe came down, Justice Brennan informed an audience of British barristers 
that the plaintiffs “actually were seeking invalidation of the Connecticut statute in the interest 
of opening birth control clinics”). 
105. See Poe, 367 U.S. at 533 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“I find it difficult to believe that doc-
tors . . . would continue openly to disseminate advice about contraceptives . . . in reliance on 
the State’s supposed unwillingness to prosecute, or to consider that high-minded members of 
the profession would in consequence of such inaction deem themselves warranted in disre-
specting this law so long as it is on the books.”); id. at 511-12 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (“[T]he 
Court feels that it can, contrary to every principle of American or English common law, go 
outside the record to conclude that there exists a ‘tacit agreement’ that these statutes will not 
be enforced. No lawyer, I think, would advise his clients to rely on that ‘tacit agreement.’ No 
police official, I think, would feel himself bound by that ‘tacit agreement.’” (footnote omit-
ted)); id. at 513 (“What are these people—doctor and patients—to do? Flout the law and go 
to prison? Violate the law surreptitiously and hope they will not get caught?”). 
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historical and jurisprudential reasons, the Court (and particularly Justice Frank-
furter) did not want to adjudicate the Connecticut law’s constitutionality in 
1961.
106
 The way the Court ducked the question in Poe, however, ensured that 
clinics would play a central role in Griswold. On his second trip to the Supreme 
Court, Buxton contested the constitutionality of the Connecticut law as medical 
director of the new Planned Parenthood clinic downtown. At oral argument, 
Thomas Emerson, the Yale Law School professor who took over the case when 
it reached the Supreme Court, repeatedly drew the Justices’ attention to the 
class-based impact of the birth control ban.
107
 “[T]he newly developed devices 
[i]n the contraceptive field[] require medical supervision,”
108
 he argued, and by 
closing clinics, the state limited access to these essential forms of birth control to 
middle-class women. Thus, he contended, Griswold was not simply about the 
right to use birth control; it was also about the “right to operate a birth control 
center, and of persons unable to afford private medical advice to make use of 
those facilities.”
109
 Emerson emphasized that the state was directing its enforce-
ment authority exclusively against clinics, and that “what this means is not only 
that contraceptive devices are not available as such to persons who cannot afford 
 
106. For further discussion of the Court’s desire to avoid adjudicating the constitutionality of Con-
necticut’s law in 1961, see Philip P. Frickey, Getting from Joe to Gene (McCarthy): The Avoidance 
Canon, Legal Process Theory, and Narrowing Statutory Interpretation in the Early Warren Court, 
93 CALIF. L. REV. 397, 412 n.65, 444 n.278 (2005), which argues that the Court in Poe invoked 
“dubious justiciability grounds” and “treated its mandatory appellate jurisdiction as discre-
tionary to avoid addressing sensitive constitutional issues”; and Jonathan D. Varat, Variable 
Justiciability and the Duke Power Case, 58 TEX. L. REV. 273, 317 (1980) (footnote omitted), 
which observes that “the Court occasionally appears to use justiciability doctrine, as in Poe v. 
Ullman, to avoid decision of controversial constitutional issues that the Court would rather 
decide at a later, more politically acceptable time, if at all.” See generally Ryan C. Williams, The 
Paths to Griswold, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2155 (2014) (providing an extensive and thought-
ful account of the Court’s resistance to deciding this question in the early 1960s). 
107.  Katie Roraback served as lead attorney for Griswold and Buxton as their case made its way 
through the lower courts. Kesselman, supra note 77, at 47. Emerson took over that role when 
the case reached the Supreme Court; “[h]e argued Griswold v. Connecticut . . . with Catherine 
Roraback sitting beside him at the counsel’s table.” Weisberg, supra note 65, at 43. Like his 
colleagues on the Griswold case, Emerson had a broad interest in civil rights; in the 1930s, he 
served on the defense team that successfully appealed the conviction of the Scottsboro boys. 
Glenn Fowler, Thomas I. Emerson, 83, Scholar Who Molded Civil Liberties Law, N.Y. TIMES 
(June 22, 1991), https://www.nytimes.com/1991/06/22/obituaries/thomas-i-emerson-83 
-scholar-who-molded-civil-liberties-law.html [https://perma.cc/9D4T-4UAE]. 
108. Griswold Oral Argument, supra note 99, at *16. 
109. Brief for Appellants at 20, Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (No. 496), 1965 WL 
115611. 
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to go to private doctors, but that the whole range of medical services which are 
supplied by a clinic are not available to those people.”
110
 
Planned Parenthood’s brief in Griswold, authored by Harriet Pilpel, amplified 
this point in a lengthy appendix listing all of the government programs now de-
voted to helping low-income people obtain birth control, nearly everywhere 
aside from Connecticut, which cut off disadvantaged people from such assis-
tance.
111
 Unsurprisingly, the brief focused heavily on the need for birth control 
clinics to serve populations for whom contraception would otherwise be inac-
cessible. Many of its arguments were framed in terms of public health—a frame 
that was highly prevalent in debates about reproductive rights in the 1960s.
112
 
Planned Parenthood argued that “far from guarding the public morals, the pub-
lic safety and the public health,” Connecticut’s birth control law undermined 
those values.
113
 It drew extensively on statements by the American Public Health 
Association and various government entities concerned with public health to ex-
plain why it was essential, particularly for financially disadvantaged people, for 




Had John Hart Ely, who was then clerking for Chief Justice Warren, had his 
way, the Court’s opinion in Griswold would have been framed almost entirely in 
terms of class. Ely wrote a series of memoranda for the Chief Justice that focused 
on the starkly class-stratified landscape of birth control provision Connecticut’s 
ban had created.
115
  Women without financial resources were the ones who 
wanted most for birth control, he observed.
116
 “Clinics are of course the answer,” 
Ely asserted, “[y]et it is only against the clinics that the law is enforced . . . . Thus 
 
110. Griswold Oral Argument, supra note 99, at *16. 
111. See Planned Parenthood Griswold Brief, supra note 59, at app. A. 
112. For a notable example of this public health frame in early debates over reproductive rights, 
see Mary Steichen Calderone, Illegal Abortion as a Public Health Problem, 50 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 
948 (1960), reprinted in GREENHOUSE & SIEGEL, supra note 22, at 22-24. 
113. Planned Parenthood Griswold Brief, supra note 59, at 6 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
114. Id. at *20; see also id. at *28-32 (quoting representatives of the American Medical Association 
and American Public Health Association to stress the importance of rendering safe contracep-
tives accessible to all). 
115. See Bench Memorandum from J.H. Ely to Chief Justice Earl Warren 27-28 (Feb. 26, 1965) 
[hereinafter Ely Bench Memo] (on file with the Library of Congress, Earl Warren Papers, box 
267, folder 2); Memorandum from J.H. Ely to Chief Justice Earl Warren 3-5 (Apr. 27, 1965) 
[hereinafter Ely Memo re Douglas Opinion] (on file with the Library of Congress, Earl War-
ren Papers, box 520, folder 3). 
116. Ely Bench Memo, supra note 115, at 27 (“It is the poor and ill-informed who most need con-
traception and advice on family planning.”); Ely Memo re Douglas Opinion, supra note 115, at 
4 (same). 
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those who need birth control most are the only ones who are denied it.”
117
 Ely 
argued that this amounted to discrimination of the sort the Court had deemed 
unconstitutional in Yick Wo v. Hopkins,
118
 a late-nineteenth-century decision 
that invalidated a facially neutral law that was administered in a prejudicial 
way.
119
 The only difference, he argued, was that in Griswold, the discrimination 
was based on class rather than race.
120
 
Before the Chief Justice could develop the “Yick Wo theory,”
121
 Justice White 
circulated his own opinion, observing that “the clear effect of these statutes, as 
enforced, is to deny disadvantaged citizens of Connecticut, those without either 
adequate knowledge or resources to obtain private counseling, access to medical 
assistance and up-to-date information in respect to proper methods of birth con-
trol.”
122
 “In my view,” Justice White continued, “a statute with these effects bears 
a substantial burden of justification when attacked under the Fourteenth 
 
117. Ely Bench Memo, supra note 115, at 27; Ely Memo re Douglas Opinion, supra note 115, at 4 
(same). 
118. 118 U.S. 356 (1886). Yick Wo invalidated a San Francisco ordinance that required operators of 
commercial laundries in wooden buildings to obtain permits from the city; virtually all white 
applicants received permits, while all Chinese applicants were denied permits. 
119. Ely Bench Memo, supra note 115, at 28; Ely Memo re Douglas Opinion, supra note 115, at 3-5. 
120. Today, the Court would likely also differentiate Yick Wo from Griswold on the ground that the 
facts in the former case clearly demonstrated discriminatory purpose, while the facts in the 
latter case did not. Closing clinics undeniably had a disparate impact on women without fi-
nancial resources, but the Burger Court would introduce into Fourteenth Amendment doc-
trine a sharpened conception of discriminatory purpose under which such an undeniable and 
foreseeable impact is not enough to establish a constitutional violation. See Pers. Adm’r v. 
Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979) (defining discriminatory purpose under the Equal Protection 
Clause to mean that the state “selected or reaffirmed a particular course of action at least in 
part ‘because of,’ not merely ‘in spite of,’ its adverse effects upon an identifiable group). Ely, 
of course, was writing before Feeney or Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), which held 
that to challenge a facially neutral form of state action on equal protection grounds, a plaintiff 
must show the state acted with discriminatory purpose. Ely’s failure to distinguish between 
proof of impact and proof of intent to discriminate was characteristic of equal protection ju-
risprudence prior to the late 1970s. See Reva B. Siegel, The Supreme Court, 2012 Term—Fore-
word: Equality Divided, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1, 11-23 (2013) (discussing the period, prior to the 
end of the 1970s, in which equal protection doctrine did not sharply distinguish between pur-
pose and impact). 
121. Evidence in the Chief Justice’s papers suggests that he seriously considered writing an opinion 
in Griswold based on Yick Wo. See Ely Bench Memo, supra note 115 (handwritten annotation 
on the final, unnumbered page, apparently by Chief Justice Warren, stating of Griswold and 
Buxton’s claim: “I might sustain it on a Yick Wo theory or on the basis that the statute is not 
tightly drawn.”). 
122. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 503 (1965) (White, J., concurring). 




 Very likely at the urging of the Chief Justice,
124
 Justice White 
added a citation to Yick Wo here, driving home the point that the burden Con-




In the end, the Chief Justice decided not to write in Griswold, and the “Yick 
Wo theory” never made it into the published opinion. Justice White’s brief dis-
cussion of the “disadvantaged citizens of Connecticut” is the only explicit indi-
cation in the text of Griswold that the case had anything to do with class. Over 
time, Justice Douglas’s arresting image of police invading the marital bedroom 
has come to define how we think about Griswold: as a bulwark against state in-
tervention in people’s sexual and reproductive lives, but not as a bulwark against 
state action that infringes the rights of people without financial resources. 
B. What Privacy Hides 
The Court’s decision in Griswold to protect sexual and reproductive rights 
under the banner of privacy has led some commentators to portray the case as 
an outlier. This characterization rests on the idea that “[t]he doctrinal themes 
with which the Warren Court is most closely associated—such as the protection 
of racial . . . minorities, refashioning the law of democracy, and solicitude for 
First Amendment values and for the rights of the criminally accused and the 
poor—played either no role or only a tangential role” in the case.
126
 On this view, 
“Griswold, which involved a criminal prosecution of two upper middle class 
white defendants,” was simply out of step with its time.
127
 
Yet as the discussion above suggests, this view of the case obscures the cen-
trality of class-based concerns to the story of Griswold—and the case’s continuity, 
in that respect, with other cases central to the Warren Court’s constitutional ju-
risprudence. But this underlying continuity leads to a new question: why did the 
Court place Griswold on a distinctive doctrinal path? Why did it protect the right 
to use birth control—a right that would plainly have enormous consequences for 
 
123. Id. 
124. See Memorandum from J.H. Ely to Chief Justice Earl Warren re Justice White’s Concurrence 
in No. 496, Griswold v. Connecticut 2 (May 19, 1965) (on file with the Library of Congress, Earl 
Warren Papers, box 520, folder 3) (suggesting to the Chief Justice that Justice White might 
be persuaded to include a citation to Yick Wo in his opinion). 
125. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 503 (White, J., concurring). 
126. Williams, supra note 106, at 2155 (citation omitted). 
127. Id. at 2156; see also id. (arguing that, “[w]ith its focus on sexual privacy, procreative liberty, 
and unenumerated rights, Griswold shares a much greater affinity with the decisions of the 
later Burger Court of the 1970s” than with those of the Warren Court). 
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the poor—as part of the fundamental right to privacy? This Section seeks to ex-
plain this development, which has obscured the class-related concerns central to 
Griswold for over half a century. 
At the time Griswold was decided, privacy was not a fringe concern. Anxieties 
about threats to privacy burst onto the scene in the late 1950s, triggered by the 
rise of totalitarianism in Eastern Europe and by concurrent and rapid advances 
in surveillance technology in the United States. By the end of the decade, warn-
ings about Big Brother were everywhere.
128
 These concerns reached their apex 
in the first half of the 1960s.
129
 Best-selling books warned in breathless prose 
that there were forces “loose in our modern world . . . that threaten to annihilate 
everybody’s privacy,” and that such forces were “establishing the preconditions 
of totalitarianism that could endanger the personal freedom of modern man.”
130
 
That ominous warning came from the prominent social commentator Vance 
Packard, whose book The Naked Society elicited an enormous response when it 
was published in 1964.
131
 By the following year, “no fewer than three standing 
House committees—the Post Office, Government Operations, and the Judici-
 
128. See David Alan Sklansky, Too Much Information: How Not to Think About Privacy and the Fourth 
Amendment, 102 CALIF. L. REV. 1069, 1076 (2016); see id. at 1076 n.27 (noting that “[t]here is 
a book to be written about the role of Nineteen Eighty-Four in discussions of privacy”); see also 
DEBORAH NELSON, PURSUING PRIVACY IN COLD WAR AMERICA 9 (2002) (observing that “[t]he 
stunning appearance of privacy as a lost thing” in this period could be “observed in an aston-
ishing variety of locations—journalistic exposés, television programs, law review articles, 
mass-market magazines, films, Supreme Court decisions, poems, novels . . . and in response 
to an extraordinary range of stimuli—satellites, surveillance equipment such as ‘spike mikes’ 
and telephoto lenses, job testing, psychological surveys . . . and more”). 
129. See SARAH E. IGO, THE KNOWN CITIZEN: A HISTORY OF PRIVACY IN MODERN AMERICA 141 
(2018) (“By the time the 1960s rolled around, a veritable explosion of public discussion cen-
tered on the shrinking sphere of personal privacy in American life.”). 
130. VANCE PACKARD, THE NAKED SOCIETY 4 (1964). 
131. See, e.g., John Brooks, There’s Somebody Watching You, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 15, 1964), https://
www.nytimes.com/1964/03/15/theres-somebody-watching-you.html [https://perma.cc
/NT8K-Z9HX] (“Mr. Packard makes an overwhelming case for his contention that the new 
spying and snooping tools, in the hands of the morally unaware or indifferent, or the down-
right totalitarian-minded, constitute a new and extraordinarily vivacious threat to privacy and 
individual liberty.”). Myron Brenton’s The Privacy Invaders made a similar splash when it was 
published that same year—as did Fred Cook’s The F.B.I. Nobody Knows. See MYRON BRENTON, 
THE PRIVACY INVADERS (1964); FRED COOK, THE F.B.I. NOBODY KNOWS (1964). For other 
prominent discussions of the loss of privacy in this era, see SAMUEL DASH ET AL., THE EAVES-
DROPPERS (1959); MORRIS L. ERNST & ALAN U. SCHWARTZ, PRIVACY: THE RIGHT TO BE LET 
ALONE (1962); EDWARD V. LONG, THE INTRUDERS (1967); JERRY M. ROSENBERG, THE DEATH 
OF PRIVACY (1969); and ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM (1967). 
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ary—not to mention ad hoc committees on ‘data processing and information re-




In the light of these developments, it is hardly surprising that the Court 
adopted privacy as the dominant frame for analyzing Connecticut’s birth control 
ban. It is even less surprising when one considers that Justice Douglas wrote the 
majority opinion in Griswold. By the time Griswold reached the Court, Justice 
Douglas was a leading commentator on the right to privacy. In 1957, he delivered 
a series of lectures warning of creeping totalitarianism in Eastern Europe and 
decrying invasions of privacy on American shores as one step in that direction.
133
 
In one of those lectures, entitled “The Right to Be Let Alone,” Douglas described 
privacy as a penumbral right, yet one deeply rooted in American constitutional 
history.
134
 Indeed, he argued, the right to privacy was one of the chief forms of 
protection the Constitution offered against an ever-more-interventionist and 
technologically sophisticated state.
135
 By the time the Court heard Griswold, ref-
erences to Justice Douglas’s views (“The right to be let alone is indeed the be-
ginning of all freedom”) had become ubiquitous in popular and scholarly dis-
cussions about the impending death of privacy.
136
 
Of course, Justice Douglas did not simply lecture on the right to privacy. He 
also advocated for its protection in his judicial opinions, particularly those in-
volving the Fourth Amendment. In one such opinion, he declared: “We are rap-
idly entering the age of no privacy, where everyone is open to surveillance at all 
times; where there are no secrets from government.”
137
 Citing examples derived 
from the Senate Judiciary Committee’s 1965 hearings on “Invasions of Privacy,” 
Douglas lamented the “alarming trend whereby the privacy and dignity of our 
citizens is being whittled away by sometimes imperceptible steps.”
138
 “[W]hen 
viewed as a whole,” he claimed, “there begins to emerge a society quite unlike 
 
132. NELSON, supra note 128, at 19. 
133. WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS, THE RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE (1958) (reprinting a series of three lectures 
delivered at Franklin and Marshall College in 1957). 
134. Id. at 87-89. 
135. Id. 
136. The quotation comes from Justice Douglas’s dissenting opinion in Public Utilities Commission 
v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451, 467 (1952), one of a number of dissenting opinions prior to Griswold in 
which Douglas expressed his views on privacy. For a representative deployment of this quo-
tation, see Glendy Culligan, Brothers of Assorted Sizes Are Kibitzing on Our Lives, WASH. POST 
& TIMES-HERALD, Mar. 18, 1964, at A4. 
137. Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. 323, 341 (1966) (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
138. Id. at 343. 
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any we have seen—a society in which government may intrude into the secret 
regions of man’s life at will.”
139
 
There were few regions more secret, in midcentury America, than the phys-
ical space of the bedroom and the intimate landscape of sexual relationships. 
Years before the controversy over Connecticut’s birth control ban even reached 
the Court, Justice Douglas had begun to describe the core of privacy as the “right 
to keep the officers of the law out of one’s bedroom.”
140
 When Poe arrived at the 
Court, Douglas argued the ban should be invalidated on privacy grounds. “If we 
imagine a regime of full enforcement of the law in the manner of an Anthony 
Comstock,” he wrote in his dissenting opinion, “we would reach the point where 
search warrants issued and officers appeared in bedrooms to find out what went 
on.”
141
 A few years later, he spun out an even more dramatic version of this image 
in his majority opinion in Griswold, when he imagined police bursting into peo-
ple’s bedrooms in search of evidence of contraceptive use.
142
 
Although one can clearly trace the lineage of Griswold’s privacy right through 
Justice Douglas’s earlier writings, he was far from the only legal actor in this 
period thinking in terms of privacy. Katie Roraback made speeches in the years 
before Griswold about the risk that computers could be used to create centralized 
health records that would be easier to access than scattered paper files.
143
 She 
later cited the privacy concerns generated by the McCarthy hearings and the sen-
sational U2 spy plane as major influences on the shape Griswold took.
144
 In ad-
dition, she noted, the Court issued its decision in Poe on the same day as its land-
mark decision in Mapp v. Ohio,
145
  in which it held that evidence obtained 
through an unconstitutional search of the defendant’s home was inadmissible in 
court and that the state had violated the defendant’s right to privacy.
146
 “Natu-
rally as we went up on Griswold,” Roraback observed, “privacy became integrated 
 
139. Id. 
140. DOUGLAS, supra note 133, at 149. 
141. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 519-20 (1961) (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
142. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965). 
143. Weisberg, supra note 65, at 42. 
144. See id. (“Suddenly you thought that up in the sky somebody might be photographing you 
doing something that you wanted to keep to yourself.”). 
145. 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
146. Weisberg, supra note 65, at 42; see also WHEELER, supra note 90, at 104 (observing that the 
privacy argument in the context of birth control—“and its eventual acceptance by the High 
Court—owed a great deal to Mapp and to the broad . . . civil liberties agenda that brought the 
two cases together”). 




 Privacy had obvious appeal, as Justice Douglas and some 




But privacy was also appealing for a different reason. The class-based con-
cerns that were central to the litigation and argument in Griswold could be folded 
into a variety of doctrinal frameworks. Griswold and Buxton’s lawyers consid-
ered presenting the Court with a “bare equal protection”
149
 claim: that Connect-
icut’s law was unconstitutional because “in actual operation the law did not apply 
to the private sector of medical practice but did restrict the public sector, thereby 
discriminating against persons of low income.”
150
 But this Yick Wo-like approach 
raised hard questions. The lawyers were concerned that the Justices might find 
it difficult “to reconcile such equal protection theories with the economic and 
social laissez-faire assumptions upon which our society has operated over many 
years.”
151
 Although the Court in the early 1960s seemed potentially receptive to 
class-based equal protection arguments, Griswold and Buxton’s lawyers were 
uncertain about “how much further the Court w[ould] go in utilizing this con-
stitutional provision to aid the economically and socially disadvantaged.”
152
 For-
tunately, from their perspective, equal protection was not the only constitutional 
provision in play. The lawyers concluded that “there was little to gain in raising 
bare equal protection issues,”
153
 but that they could still make the same underly-
ing point, that the ban “operate[s] discriminatorily, as part of [their] due process 
argument”
154
—which is exactly what they did. The idea that Connecticut’s law 
discriminated against the poor became one part, but not the doctrinal home, of 
a legal claim based instead on a fundamental right to privacy. 
 
147. Weisberg, supra note 65, at 42; see also WHEELER, supra note 90, at 259-60 n.20 (noting that 
there is scholarly disagreement about precisely which of Buxton and Griswold’s lawyers was 
initially responsible for developing the argument that the birth control ban violated the con-
stitutional right to privacy). 
148. See David Alan Sklansky, “One Train May Hide Another”: Katz, Stonewall, and the Secret Subtext 
of Criminal Procedure, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 875, 923 (2008) (describing how “the fear of a 
kind of creeping totalitarianism, the slow emergence, as Justice Douglas put it, of ‘a society in 
which government may intrude into the secret regions of a man’s life at will,’” motivated the 
development of Fourth Amendment privacy doctrine in the 1960s and 1970s (quoting Osborn 
v. United States, 385 U.S. 323, 343 (1966) (Douglas, J., dissenting))). 
149. Thomas I. Emerson, Nine Justices in Search of a Doctrine, 64 MICH. L. REV. 219, 221 (1965). 
150. Id. at 220. 
151. Id. at 221. 
152. Id. at 220. 
153. Id. at 221. 
154. Griswold Oral Argument, supra note 99, at *3. 
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C. Equality Under the Rubric of Fundamental Rights 
The lawyers challenging the birth control ban in Griswold had ample reason 
to believe it would be possible to incorporate constitutional equality concerns 
into a fundamental rights framework. The Court in this period frequently pro-
tected the Fourteenth Amendment rights of the financially disadvantaged in de-
cisions that blended due process and equal protection values. For example, in 
1956, in Griffin v. Illinois, the Court ruled that the state was obligated to provide 
indigent criminal defendants with trial transcripts at no cost where such tran-
scripts were necessary to appeal their convictions.
155
 The Court stated in Griffin 
that both the “Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses protect persons like 
petitioners from invidious discriminations” and that “[b]oth equal protection 
and due process emphasize the central aim of our entire judicial system”—equal-
ity before the law.
156
 In 1963, the Court held in Gideon v. Wainwright that due 
process obligated the state to provide indigent criminal defendants with legal 
representation at trial, in a decision that also reflected constitutional equality 
concerns.
157
 That same year, the Court held in Douglas v. California that the state 
was obligated to provide legal representation to indigent defendants statutorily 
entitled to appeal their convictions.
158
 Again, “the Court appear[ed] to rely both 
on the Equal Protection Clause and on the guarantees of fair procedure inherent 
in the Due Process Clause.”
159
 
Griffin, Gideon, Douglas, and the line of equally hybrid decisions that fol-
lowed in their wake involved criminal procedure.
160
 But the Court’s constitu-
tional solicitude for the fundamental rights of the financially disadvantaged was 
 
155. 351 U.S. 12 (1956). 
156. Id. at 17-18. 
157. 372 U.S. 335 (1963). For more on the intertwining of due process and equal protection con-
cerns in Gideon, see supra note 24. 
158. 372 U.S. 353 (1963). 
159. Id. at 360-61 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
160. For additional criminal procedure decisions evincing class-related concerns, see, for example, 
Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189 (1971), which held that an indigent person cannot be 
denied an adequate record to appeal a conviction under a fine-only statute; Tate v. Short, 401 
U.S. 395 (1971), which held that a state cannot convert a fine imposed under a fine-only statute 
into a jail term solely because the defendant is indigent and cannot immediately pay the fine 
in full; Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235 (1970), which held that a state cannot subject a certain 
class of convicted defendants to a period of imprisonment beyond the statutory maximum 
solely because they are too poor to pay fines and court costs; and Roberts v. LaVallee, 389 U.S. 
40 (1967), which held that an indigent defendant is entitled to a free transcript of a prelimi-
nary hearing for use at trial. One might also include Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), 
in this list. The Court in Miranda held that prosecutors may not use statements arising from 
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not confined to the criminal law context. In Harper, the Court invalidated a state 
poll tax on the ground that “the requirement of fee paying causes an ‘invidious’ 
discrimination that runs afoul of the Equal Protection Clause”
161
—while also as-
serting that “the right of suffrage is a fundamental matter in a free and demo-
cratic society.”
162
 In Boddie v. Connecticut, a case brought by female welfare recip-
ients, the Court invalidated on due process grounds divorce-related filing fees 
those women could not afford to pay.
163
 Justice Brennan argued in a concurring 
opinion that the question in Boddie “inevitably implicates considerations of both 
due process and equal protection,”
164
 and Justice Douglas too viewed Connecti-
cut’s divorce-related fees as “discrimination against the indigent.”
165
 In Shapiro 
v. Thompson, the Court held that a state violated equal protection when it denied 
welfare benefits to poor residents who had lived in state for less than a year, 
thereby disproportionately burdening “the fundamental right of interstate 
movement.”
166
 A few years later, the Court issued a similar ruling in Memorial 
Hospital v. Maricopa County, holding that a state could not condition eligibility 




the custodial interrogation of a suspect unless certain procedural safeguards were in place, 
including, among other things, the now-famous requirement that police inform suspects of 
their rights to remain silent and to have an attorney present while being questioned. For more 
on the class-related concerns motivating the Court’s decision in Miranda, see LUCAS A. POWE, 
JR., THE WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICS 397-98 (2000). 
161. Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 668 (1966) (citation omitted). The Court framed 
its concerns in Harper in terms of economic discrimination. But it is worth noting that, as in 
Griswold, class was not the only equal protection issue raised by the controverted regulation. 
See Justin Driver, Recognizing Race, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 404, 445 (2012) (“Even though Justice 
Douglas did not deliver Harper in the register of racial equality, there can be little doubt that 
black Virginians formed a disproportionately large percentage of the group that benefited 
from the poll tax’s elimination.”). 
162. Harper, 383 U.S. at 667 (quoting Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561-62 (1964)); see also id. 
(“Long ago in Yick Wo v. Hopkins the Court referred to ‘the political franchise of voting’ as a 
‘fundamental political right, because [it is] preservative of all rights.’” (citation omitted)). 
163. 401 U.S. 371 (1971). 
164. Id. at 388 (Brennan, J., concurring in part). 
165. Id. at 384 (Douglas, J., concurring in the result) (quoting Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 
355 (1963)). 
166. 394 U.S. 618, 638 (1969). 
167. 415 U.S. 250 (1974). Fourteenth Amendment concerns about people without financial re-
sources were also evident in this period in procedural due process cases such as Goldberg v. 
Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970), in which the Court held that the state is constitutionally obligated 
to conduct pretermination evidentiary hearings before discontinuing public assistance pay-
ments to welfare recipients. 
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Today, we generally situate these decisions within a familiar taxonomy of 
Fourteenth Amendment doctrine: fundamental rights, equal protection, and the 
fundamental rights strand of equal protection (although even the name of that 
last category hints at the difficulty involved in this project).
168
 These categories 
are not meaningless, but they are very fuzzy around the edges, and the question 
of which case belongs in which category is highly contestable.
169
 
At first glance, equal protection seemed the most obvious doctrinal rubric in 
the 1960s for challenging state action that disproportionately burdened the fi-
nancially disadvantaged. Brown v. Board of Education breathed new life into equal 
protection law in 1954,
170
 and, by the mid-1960s, race-based equal protection 
jurisprudence was rapidly developing. Analogizing class to race seemed a prom-
ising strategy for winning greater constitutional protection for people without 
financial resources.
171
 It seemed entirely possible in these years that the Court 
might declare class a suspect classification. 
It thus came as a significant blow to advocates of class-based Fourteenth 
Amendment protections when the Burger Court declined to extend heightened 
scrutiny to laws with disproportionate class-based effects. In 1973, the Court re-
jected the race-class analogy, bluntly stating in Ortwein v. Schwab—a challenge 
brought by welfare recipients who could not afford the filing fees necessary to 
appeal decisions lowering their benefits—that “[n]o suspect classification, such 
as race, nationality, or alienage, is present.”
172
 Two weeks later, in San Antonio 
Independent School District v. Rodriguez, the Court similarly (and more famously) 
rejected a class-based equal protection challenge to Texas’s school financing 
 
168. Under the rubric of fundamental rights equal protection, the Court invalidates state action 
that unequally distributes or affects constitutional rights and interests deemed fundamental. 
For more on the fundamental rights strand of equal protection, see Michael Klarman, An In-
terpretive History of Modern Equal Protection, 90 MICH. L. REV. 213, 264-69 (1991); and id. at 
266, which observes that, as the Court’s class-based Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence 
developed, “[t]he virtually limitless reach of a constitutional rule condemning disparate 
wealth effects pressured the Court to restrict its wealth discrimination rationale to ‘fundamen-
tal’ rights.” Today, the Court engages in this form of analysis far less often than it did in the 
1960s and early 1970s. 
169. See, e.g., Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 608-09 (1974) (“The precise rationale for the Griffin 
and Douglas lines of cases has never been explicitly stated, some support being derived from 
the Equal Protection Clause . . . and some from the Due Process Clause . . . . Neither Clause 
by itself provides an entirely satisfactory basis for the result reached . . . .” (footnote omit-
ted)). 
170. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
171. Indeed, the Court itself made the analogy in Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 
668 (1966). See supra note 19. 
172. 410 U.S. 656, 660 (1973). 
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scheme, which left some school districts much poorer than others.
173
 In both 
cases, the Court applied rational basis review and upheld the challenged laws.
174
 
These decisions were highly consequential. But even in the mid-1960s, when 
the Court’s receptivity to class-based arguments was at its apex, it was apparent 
that the Court might curtail its use of “bare equal protection” doctrine to protect 
people without financial resources. As noted above, this concern helped to con-
vince the lawyers who litigated Griswold to emphasize privacy, rather than class-
based equality, in the arguments they presented to the Supreme Court.
175
 The 
worry, even then, was that the broad sweep of equal protection law, its potential 
indictment of all state action that disproportionately affects those on the lower 
rungs of the economic ladder, would deter the Justices from recognizing class as 
a suspect classification—particularly given that the Court had not yet insulated 
state action with a disparate impact on protected classes from review under the 
Equal Protection Clause.
176
 The Warren Court had issued a number of decisions 
interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment to protect the rights of the indigent. 
But, the lawyers in Griswold feared, the Court might ultimately be unwilling to 
unsettle the “economic and social laissez-faire assumptions” upon which Amer-
ican society rested in the way that reckoning with economic inequality under the 




173. 411 U.S. 1, 44-55 (1973). 
174. See id. at 40; Ortwein, 410 U.S. at 660. 
175. Concerns about the potentially limitless reach of class-based equal protection arguments be-
came particularly acute when the case was heading to the Supreme Court. But Roraback and 
her colleagues who wrote the briefs at the state-court level did not lead with class-based equal 
protection arguments there either—both, one suspects, because they were worried about the 
potential reach of such arguments and because they calculated that a conservative bench 
would not be prepared to give constitutional voice to the intersectional feminist and antiracist 
class-based arguments they were beginning to develop in the early 1960s in support of repro-
ductive rights. For more on the development of the briefs in Griswold in the Connecticut 
courts, see GARROW, supra note 52, at 221; and Weisberg, supra note 65, at 41-42. 
176. The Court did not insulate state action with a disparate impact on protected classes from re-
view under the Equal Protection Clause until the second half of the 1970s, when it decided 
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), and Personnel Administrator v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 
279 (1979). For more on these two cases, see supra note 120. Had the Court in the 1960s de-
clared that all class-based state action was subject to strict scrutiny, it would have called into 
question the constitutionality of vast numbers of laws and policies. The number of laws and 
policies that have a disparate impact on the financially disadvantaged is staggering—and that 
fact no doubt fueled the Court’s reticence to treat class as a protected classification under the 
Equal Protection Clause. 
177. See Emerson, supra note 149, at 221. 




 with according class special status under 
equal protection was one the Court itself raised: how to define the category of 
people protected? This question proved to be a major stumbling block to the 
equal protection argument in Rodriguez. The Court devoted page after page of 
its opinion to demonstrating the difficulty of defining the set of individuals who 
would qualify for class-based equal protection.
179
 It accused the district court, 
which had found a class-based equal protection violation, of ignoring “the hard 
threshold questions, including whether it makes a difference . . . under the Con-
stitution that the class of disadvantaged ‘poor’ cannot be identified or defined in 
customary equal protection terms, and whether the relative—rather than abso-
lute—nature of the asserted deprivation is of significant consequence.”
180
 The 
Court reasserted its concerns about the relative nature of wealth and the chal-
lenges this presented under equal protection in Bearden v. Georgia, which in-
volved the constitutionality of revoking an indigent defendant’s probation be-
cause he was too poor to pay a fine and make restitution.
181
 Because “indigency 
in this context is a relative term rather than a classification,” the Court concluded, 
“fitting ‘the problem of this case into an equal protection framework is a task too 
Procrustean to be rationally accomplished.’”
182
 
The solution to this problem? Due process. The Court observed in Bearden 
that “[a] due process approach has the advantage . . . of directly confronting the 
intertwined question of the role that a defendant’s financial background can play 
in determining an appropriate sentence,” without requiring courts to confront 
the difficulties associated with an equal protection approach.
183
 Moreover, the 
Court noted, very little was lost in this case by taking account of class under due 
 
178. Id. 
179. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 18-28. 
180. Id. at 19; see also id. (“The case comes to us with no definitive description of the classifying 
facts or delineation of the disfavored class.”). The Court drew a distinction in Rodriguez be-
tween the relatively precisely defined class of indigents protected in cases such as Griffin and 
the large and amorphous group of children and parents in relatively less well-funded school 
districts who served as the plaintiffs in this case. Id. at 20-22. But its lengthy discussion of the 
difficulties of identifying the group of people class-based equal protection law would protect 
spelled the beginning of the end for that nascent doctrine. For more on the Court’s equal 
protection holding in Rodriguez, see infra note 202. 
181. 461 U.S. 660 (1983). 
182. Id. at 666 n.8 (citing North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969)); id. (observing that “a 
defendant’s level of financial resources is a point on a spectrum rather than a classification”). 
183. Id. 
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process, rather than equal protection, because the central question “is substan-
tially similar” either way.
184
 Is the state infringing an important right—a right 
central to full and equal membership in our constitutional democracy—in a way 
that relegates people without financial resources to the status of second-class cit-
izens? “Whether analyzed in terms of equal protection or due process,” the Court 
observed, that question “cannot be resolved by resort to easy slogans or pigeon-




The use of due process to vindicate equal protection values did not originate 
with the Burger Court. Due process has functioned this way for much of the life 
of the Fourteenth Amendment. In 1923, the Court held in Meyer v. Nebraska that 
the Fourteenth Amendment protects the right of parents to direct the upbringing 
of their children, including by sending them to schools where learning happens 
in languages other than English.
186
 Two years later, in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 
it held that that right also protected parents’ choice to send their children to pri-
vate school.
187
 Both decisions were framed in terms of fundamental rights. But 
the litigants challenging the laws in both cases were members of historically sub-
ordinated minority groups: Meyer was brought by German Americans and Pierce 
by Catholics, during a period in American history in which discrimination 
against those groups was pervasive. Indeed, the Court itself later characterized 
Meyer and Pierce as involving “prejudice” against “national” and “reli-
gious . . . minorities.”
188
 
The difficulties that arose with respect to class-based equal protection law in 
the 1960s—the seeming lack of a limiting principle and the challenges associated 
 
184. Id. at 666; see also id. at 665-66 (“To determine whether this differential treatment violates 
the Equal Protection Clause, one must determine whether, and under what circumstances, a 
defendant’s indigent status may be considered in the decision whether to revoke probation. 
This is substantially similar to asking directly the due process question of whether and when 
it is fundamentally unfair or arbitrary for the State to revoke probation when an indigent is 
unable to pay the fine.”). 
185. Id. at 666. For a more recent articulation of these principles, see In re Humphrey, 228 Cal. Rptr. 
3d 513, 526-30 (Ct. App. 2018) (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting Bearden, 
461 U.S. at 665), which finds that “[d]ue process and equal protection principles converge” 
to yield a ruling that requiring money bail as a condition of pretrial release at an amount im-
possible for an arrestee to pay, without first considering the arrestee’s ability to pay or alter-
natives to money bail, is unconstitutional. 
186. 262 U.S. 390 (1923). 
187. 268 U.S. 510 (1925). 
188. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938). 
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with defining precisely who counts as financially disadvantaged
189
—helped to 
drive Griswold into this precedential line.
190
 It led the lawyers challenging Con-
necticut’s birth control ban to tuck their equal protection concerns into their pri-
vacy arguments—or, as they framed it to the Court, to argue that the ban “oper-
ate[s] discriminatorily, as part of [their] due process argument.”
191
 This way of 
framing the case meant that class-based equality concerns did not appear on the 
surface of Griswold. But it also meant that those concerns were built into the de-
cision on a fundamental level. In all of these cases—from Meyer and Pierce to 
Griswold and Bearden—the deprivation of the equal citizenship of a historically 
subordinated group (or groups) helped to drive the establishment of a funda-
mental right. The inability of subordinated groups to exercise particular rights 
helped to demonstrate how central those rights were to full and equal participa-
tion in our constitutional democracy and why those rights required heightened 
protection under the Fourteenth Amendment. Thus, when class-based equal 
protection law faltered, concerns about class did not simply disappear from the 
law.
192
  As Part II shows, fundamental rights remained—and remain, to this 
day—an important source of class-based constitutional protection. 
 
189. Kenji Yoshino has observed that increasing “pluralism anxiety”—anxiety about the seemingly 
endless emergence of new and different social groups—also informed the Burger Court’s gen-
eral retreat from equal protection and turn toward due process to protect subordinated 
groups. Yoshino, supra note 23, at 747-49. The Court itself expressed such a concern in ex-
plaining its decision not to treat disability as a suspect classification for equal protection pur-
poses in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center. See 473 U.S. 432, 445-46 (1985) (“[I]f the 
large and amorphous class of the mentally retarded were deemed quasi-suspect . . . it would 
be difficult to find a principled way to distinguish a variety of other groups . . . . One need 
mention in this respect only the aging, the disabled, the mentally ill, and the infirm. We are 
reluctant to set out on that course . . . .”). 
190. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482-83 (1965) (locating Griswold in a line of cases 
beginning with Meyer and Pierce, and asserting that the later decision “reaffirm[s] the princi-
ple of the Pierce and the Meyer cases”); Brief for Appellants, supra note 109, at 15-23 (relying 
heavily on Meyer and Pierce). 
191. Griswold Oral Argument, supra note 99, at *3. 
192. Yoshino, who has written in general terms about the Court’s practice of using due process to 
advance equal protection aims, observes, in describing this phenomenon, that “[s]queezing 
law is often like squeezing a balloon. The contents do not escape, but erupt in another area, 
in a dynamic that Professor Louis Henkin once dubbed ‘constitutional displacement.’” 
Yoshino, supra note 23, at 748. 
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i i .  the incorporation and preservation of class-based 
concerns in abortion law 
It is hard to believe the Burger Court era—which spanned from 1969 to 
1986—was ever considered “a chapter of Supreme Court history during which 
nothing much happened.”
193
 There are few areas of the law that were not affected 
in some important way by the political and ideological shift that occurred in the 
mid-to-late 1970s on the Court and in the country itself.
194
 
In no Fourteenth Amendment context was that shift more profound than in 
the context of class. The forms of constitutional protection the Court was willing 
to extend to people without financial resources were considerably smaller in 
number and narrower in scope when President Reagan took office than they had 
been when President Nixon did. When constitutional scholars in the late 1970s 
and 1980s began to write about what had happened with respect to class under 
the Fourteenth Amendment, their narratives almost invariably focused on this 
decline. They chronicled all that the Court had rejected, foreclosed, and left be-
hind. Scholars on the left often asserted that the law had completely abandoned 
people in the lower echelons of the American class structure.
195
 
These narratives are not incorrect in their broad outlines. Financially disad-
vantaged people now have a much harder time winning class-based constitu-
tional protection than they did in the 1960s; the Burger Court almost entirely 
 
193. GRAETZ & GREENHOUSE, supra note 7, at 7. 
194. For a collection of essays on the effects of this political and ideological shift across a wide range 
of legal fields, see Law and Neoliberalism, 77 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 4, 2014 (David 
Singh Grewal & Jedediah Purdy, eds.). 
195. See, e.g., William H. Clune III, The Supreme Court’s Treatment of Wealth Discriminations Under 
the Fourteenth Amendment, 1975 SUP. CT. REV. 289, 290 (“[T]he beginnings of open doctrines 
about wealth discriminations established by the Warren Court have been halted or reversed 
by the Burger Court, principally through doctrines which are not open, or sensitive, to these 
discriminations.”); Peter B. Edelman, The Next Century of Our Constitution: Rethinking Our 
Duty to the Poor, 39 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 3 (1987) (“The present Supreme Court will surely not 
adopt the ideas advanced in this Essay,” including a “constitutional right to a ‘survival in-
come.’” “Indeed, this particular Court has essentially already rejected them.”); Kenneth L. 
Karst, Citizenship, Race, and Marginality, 30 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 19 (1988) (“[R]ecent ma-
jorities of the Supreme Court have been unwilling to embrace any broad-scale theory of af-
firmative state responsibility to afford citizens the necessities for effective citizenship. Even in 
the face of poverty that excludes people from respected membership in the society, the pre-
vailing equal protection doctrine imposes no remedial obligation on government absent a 
showing of state ‘action’ that can be called invidious discrimination.”); William L. Taylor, 
Brown, Equal Protection, and the Isolation of the Poor, 95 YALE L.J. 1700, 1728-29 (1986) (“[T]he 
courts have sent a clear message, particularly over the past decade, that they will not serve as 
major vehicles for redressing economic injustices visited on the poor.”). 
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crushed class-based equal protection law. But the Court never held—not even in 
the late 1970s—that class has no role in the adjudication of Fourteenth Amend-
ment claims. In fact, where some fundamental rights are concerned, the Court 
preserved space for taking class into account. 
This Part examines the ongoing role of class-related concerns in the context 
of abortion jurisprudence. That might seem precisely the wrong place to look: 
abortion lies at the center of narratives describing the decline in judicial sensitiv-
ity in the Burger Court era to the plight of people without financial resources. 
The abortion funding decisions of the late 1970s eviscerated a number of the 
class-based constitutional protections the Warren Court had constructed. Those 
decisions are now regularly cited, even outside the abortion context, by propo-
nents of the new class blindness as evidence that it is illegitimate to take class 
into account when adjudicating Fourteenth Amendment claims.
196
 To demon-
strate that this is not so, this Part examines how concerns about class helped to 
inform the initial recognition of abortion as a fundamental right, how the fund-
ing decisions left space for certain key forms of class-based constitutional pro-
tection while terminating others, and how due process doctrine in the abortion 
context continues to this day to take class into account. 
A. Class and the Fundamental Right to Abortion 
Between 1977 and 1980, the Court issued a string of decisions delineating the 
scope of the abortion right it had identified a few years earlier in Roe. At issue in 
these decisions was the question of when, if ever, the government is constitu-
tionally obligated to pay for abortion. Understanding what the Court held—and 
what it did not hold—in these decisions is crucial to understanding the role that 
class initially played, and continues to play, in the area of abortion rights, because 
these decisions have shaped current perceptions not only of the abortion cases 
that followed them, but also of the cases that preceded them. 
 
196. For examples of this phenomenon, inside and outside the context of abortion, see, for exam-
ple, infra notes 338 and 380 and accompanying text. 




 Harris v. McRae,
198
 and Williams v. Zbaraz
199
 concerned 
Medicaid funding. The question was: if the government uses Medicaid funds to 
pay for medical care related to pregnancy and childbirth, must it also use Medi-
caid funds to pay for abortion? Poelker v. Doe raised a similar question about 
public hospitals: if those hospitals provide publicly financed care to pregnant 




In all four cases, the Court said no.
201
 By the time of the funding cases, the 
Burger Court had already expressed skepticism about the idea that class-based 
state action triggers heightened scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause.
202
 
But it was not entirely clear, circa 1977, where the law stood with respect to that 
question. The indigent plaintiffs in the abortion funding cases argued that they 
qualified as a protected class.
203
 The Court rejected that argument, declaring that 
 
197. 432 U.S. 464 (1977) (considering the constitutionality of a Connecticut statute prohibiting the 
funding of elective, nontherapeutic abortions). 
198. 448 U.S. 297 (1980) (considering the constitutionality of the Hyde Amendment, which barred 
the use of federal funds to reimburse the cost of abortions under the federal Medicaid program 
except in cases involving rape or incest or where necessary to save a woman’s life). 
199. 448 U.S. 358 (1980) (considering the constitutionality of an Illinois statute that prohibited 
state medical-assistance payments for all abortions except those necessary to save a woman’s 
life). 
200. 432 U.S. 519 (1977). 
201. See also Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438 (1977) (holding that Title XIX of the Social Security Act does 
not require states that participate in the Medicaid program to fund the cost of “nontherapeu-
tic” abortions). 
202. See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (upholding Texas’s 
property-tax-based school financing system against such a challenge). Rodriguez has subse-
quently become legal shorthand for the proposition that wealth is not a suspect classification 
(as well as the proposition that education is not a fundamental right). But the decision itself 
is somewhat more diffident on both counts. The Court held that there was no suspect classi-
fication in Rodriguez because there was “reason to believe that the poorest families are not 
necessarily clustered in the poorest property districts,” and there was no “evidence that the 
financing system discriminate[d] against any identifiable category of ‘poor’ people.” Id. at 23, 
25; see also id. at 21 (noting that the individuals “who constituted the class discriminated 
against in our prior cases shared two distinguishing characteristics: because of their impecu-
nity they were completely unable to pay for some desired benefit, and as a consequence, they 
sustained an absolute deprivation of a meaningful opportunity to enjoy that benefit,” and leav-
ing open the question of whether poor people could constitute a protected class if those criteria 
were met). 
203. See, e.g., Brief of Appellees at 15-16, Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977) (No. 57-1440), 1976 
WL 181642 (“Plaintiffs are members of a disfavored class . . . [because] [t]hey are denied the 
right to choose an abortion solely because of their indigency.”); Brief for Respondents at 48, 
53, Poelker, 432 U.S. 519 (No. 75-442), 1976 WL 181351 (“In recent years, this Honorable Court 
has focused upon laws which in effect discriminate against individuals because of poverty . . . . 
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it had “never held that financial need alone identifies a suspect class for purposes 
of equal protection analysis.”
204
 The Court also rejected the argument, under the 
fundamental rights strand of equal protection, that if the state paid for child-
birth, then it was constitutionally obligated to pay for abortion as well.
205
 The 
Court held that the government was under no obligation to provide services to 
those who could not afford them and that the decision not to fund abortion 
through Medicaid and public hospitals did not place any obstacles in the path of 
women seeking to end their pregnancies. It simply left them alone, no worse off 




The abortion funding decisions thus disabled two of the key doctrinal mech-
anisms the Warren Court had used to protect people without financial resources. 
This prompted many critics on the left to characterize these decisions as the end 
of the line for class-based constitutional protections. These critics argued that 
the Court had rendered “the right to abort meaningless for poor women”
207
 and 
“extinguished for [those] women the practical importance of the fundamental 
right to an abortion.”
208
  Indeed, these critics argued, the funding decisions 
“treat[ed] the privacy interests of poor people as commodities which are pro-
tected only to the extent that the person claiming privacy has the money to pay 
 
In the instant case . . . the statutes in question have resulted in a discrimination against the 
poor.”). 
204. Maher, 432 U.S. at 471; see also id. at 471 n.6 (acknowledging Warren Court decisions like 
Griffin and Douglas that accord heightened scrutiny to class-based state action, but asserting 
that those decisions were “grounded in the criminal justice system, a governmental monopoly 
in which participation is compelled,” and that “subsequent decisions have made it clear that 
the principles underlying Griffin and Douglas do not extend to legislative classifications gen-
erally”). 
205. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 317-18 (1980) (“Although the liberty protected by the Due 
Process Clause affords protection against unwarranted government interference with freedom 
of choice in the context of certain personal decisions, it does not confer an entitlement to such 
funds as may be necessary to realize all the advantages of that freedom.”). 
206. Id. at 317 (“[T]he Hyde Amendment leaves an indigent woman with at least the same range 
of choice in deciding whether to obtain a medically necessary abortion as she would have had 
if Congress had chosen to subsidize no health care costs at all. We are thus not persuaded that 
[it] impinges on the constitutionally protected freedom of choice recognized in Wade.”); Ma-
her, 432 U.S. at 474 (“[The State] has imposed no restriction on access to abortions that was 
not already there. The indigency that may make it difficult—and in some cases, perhaps, im-
possible—for some women to have abortions is neither created nor in any way affected by the 
Connecticut regulation.”). 
207. Lenore DiStefano, A Meaningful Right to Abortion for Indigent Women?, 24 LOY. L. REV. 301, 
307 (1978). 
208. Laura Crocker, Harris v. McRae: Whatever Happened to the Roe v. Wade Abortion Right?, 8 
PEPP. L. REV. 861, 861 (1981). 
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for the material goods . . . required to exercise privacy.”
209
  In other words, 
“[w]omen with privileges get rights”;
210
 those without do not. 
Many of these critics blamed the Court’s decision to root Griswold and Roe in 
the fundamental right to privacy for the subsequent outcome of the funding 
cases. Feminist critics argued that the Court’s embrace of privacy had essentially 
reinscribed the public/private divide, shielding what happens in the bedroom 
from state intervention while offering no protection to those who require state 
assistance to effectuate their rights. From this perspective, Catharine MacKinnon 
contended in an influential essay, “a right to privacy looks like an injury got up 
as a gift.”
211
 MacKinnon argued that the idea that a man’s house is his castle had 
shielded from legal inquiry vast amounts of gender-based inequality.
212
 She also 
argued that “[f]reedom from public intervention coexists uneasily with any 
right that requires social preconditions to be meaningfully delivered”
213
 —by 
which she meant that the decision to base constitutional protection for repro-
ductive rights on the concept of privacy gave rise to a doctrine that did next to 
nothing for women who could not afford to obtain abortions. All Roe had done 
for financially disadvantaged women, MacKinnon asserted, was to take jail out 
of the equation.
214
 On her view, the funding decisions only confirmed what the 
Court’s landmark reproductive rights decisions had themselves suggested: that 
abortion law offers virtually no protection to women without financial resources. 
There is now a vast literature criticizing the Court for relying on privacy as 
the conceptual foundation of modern reproductive rights law.
215
 Judges and 
 
209. Robin Morris Collin & Robert William Collin, Are the Poor Entitled to Privacy?, 8 HARV. BLACK-
LETTER J. 181, 182 (1991). 
210. CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, Privacy v. Equality: Beyond Roe v. Wade, in FEMINISM UNMODI-
FIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW 93, 100 (1987). 
211. Id. at 100. 
212. Id. at 96-102. 
213. Id. at 100. 
214. Id. 
215. The most prominent critic of the privacy rationale (among supporters of the abortion right) 
is Justice Ginsburg. She has long criticized the Court’s reliance on privacy in Roe. See, e.g., 
Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality in Relation to Roe v. Wade, 63 
N.C. L. REV. 375, 383 (1985); Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Speaking in a Judicial Voice, 67 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 1185, 1200 (1992); see also Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 172 (2007) (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting) (“[L]egal challenges to undue restrictions on abortion procedures do not seek to 
vindicate some generalized notion of privacy; rather, they center on a woman’s autonomy to 
determine her life’s course, and thus to enjoy equal citizenship stature.”); Cass R. Sunstein, 
Opinion, Ginsburg’s Dissent May Yet Prevail, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 20, 2007), http://articles
.latimes.com/2007/apr/20/opinion/oe-sunstein20 [https://perma.cc/96ZY-2FES] (noting 
that in Carhart, Ginsburg sought “to justify the right to abortion squarely in terms of women’s 
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scholars today often emphasize other grounds when discussing the constitu-
tional foundations of the abortion right.
216
 In fact, it is not even clear what role 
privacy currently plays in reproductive rights law. In recent decades, the Court 
has almost entirely omitted discussion of privacy from its abortion decisions, re-
lying instead on concepts such as liberty, equality, and dignity to describe the 
constitutional locus of the right.
217
 This Article offers no defense of the Court’s 
decision to ground reproductive rights law in the fundamental right to privacy. 
But it does aim to show that, contrary to the conventional wisdom, privacy did 
not entirely displace class-related constitutional concerns in reproductive rights 
jurisprudence. 
As in Griswold, the Court framed its decision in Roe in terms of privacy. But 
once again, class-related concerns were not very far from the surface. The plain-




equality rather than privacy”). John Hart Ely also famously criticized the Court’s reliance on 
privacy in Roe, though for reasons different from those cited by Justice Ginsburg. See John 
Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920, 937-43, 947 
(1973) (arguing that Roe’s embrace of an unenumerated right to privacy is Lochner-like, and 
that the decision “is bad because it is bad constitutional law, or rather because it is not consti-
tutional law and gives almost no sense of an obligation to try to be”). In addition to these 
critiques, there is a substantial literature that began to develop long before Roe, and continued 
after it, that questions the philosophical coherence of the concept of privacy and argues that 
“when we study the cases in which the law (or our moral intuitions) suggest that a ‘right to 
privacy’ has been violated, we always find that some other interest has been involved.” Ruth 
Gavison, Privacy and the Limits of Law, 89 YALE L.J. 421, 422 (1980) (describing this literature). 
Indeed, even Ruth Gavison, who penned an important defense of privacy, agrees that “privacy 
is seldom protected in the absence of some other interest.” Id. at 424. Ultimately, this Article 
is interested not in the question of whether “privacy is indeed a distinct and coherent concept” 
from a jurisprudential standpoint, id. at 423, but rather, in the way that privacy has masked 
concerns about class in the context of reproductive rights law. 
216. See, e.g., Thomas P. Crocker, From Privacy to Liberty: The Fourth Amendment After Lawrence, 
57 UCLA L. REV. 1, 10 (2009) (observing that in contexts such as “marriage and procreation, 
the Court has shifted significantly away from further development of privacy protections in 
favor of protecting a realm of personal and interpersonal liberty grounded in the Due Process 
Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments”). 
217. See, e.g., id. at 15 (noting that in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 
U.S. 833 (1992), the Court’s most important abortion decision since Roe, “[p]rivacy, as a sep-
arate analytic category . . . faded back into the liberty right from whence it in part emerged”). 
218. The New York Times referred to Norma McCorvey’s early life as “a Dickensian nightmare” in 
her obituary. Robert D. McFadden, Norma McCorvey, ‘Roe’ in Roe v. Wade, Is Dead at 69, N.Y. 
TIMES (Feb. 18, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/18/obituaries/norma-mccorvey 
-dead-roe-v-wade.html [https://perma.cc/UY7L-SK7A]. For more on McCorvey’s early 
struggles, see The Consequences of Roe v. Wade and Doe v. Bolton: Hearing Before the Subcomm. 
on the Constitution, Civil Rights & Prop. Rights of the Sen. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 
7-9 (2005) (statement of Norma McCorvey); GARROW, supra note 52, at 402-03; and Sabrina 
Tavernise, Roe v. Wade, Part I: Who Was Jane Roe?, N.Y. TIMES (July 23, 2018), https://www
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suffering abuse as a child and dropping out of high school, she had a baby at 
sixteen; she lost that baby to her mother, who filed for custody on the ground 
that her daughter was unfit, by virtue of her lesbianism and substance abuse 
problems, to care for a child. Not long after losing custody of her first child, she 
had a second child, whom she put up for adoption. When she got pregnant a 
third time, still mired in addiction and barely making ends meet, she had had 
enough. She visited a doctor, who told her that abortion was prohibited in her 
home state of Texas and that if she wanted to end her pregnancy, she would have 
to travel to New York or California—both journeys well beyond her limited 
means. So there she was: impoverished, addicted, and unhappily pregnant. 
While her situation may have been particularly bleak, the plaintiff in Roe was 
far from alone. It was difficult for women in most places in the United States to 
obtain legal abortions in the early 1970s. Between 1967 and 1970, four states en-
acted “repeal” statutes that permitted abortion without restriction early in preg-
nancy, and another twelve enacted “reform” statutes that authorized medical 
committees to review women’s requests for abortion and to allow the procedure 
if necessary for reasons of health, sexual assault, or concern about birth de-
fects.
219
 But abortion remained a challenge to obtain even for many women in 
the “reform” states,
220
 and, in most places, the procedure was still banned. This 
regulatory landscape placed legal abortion beyond the reach of many of the same 
groups of women that struggled to obtain birth control prior to Griswold, includ-
ing racial minorities and the economically disadvantaged.
221
 Women in these 
groups, among others, frequently resorted to illegal abortion, and this practice 
exacted a massive toll on public health. Every year, tens of thousands of women 
required medical attention as a result of illegal abortions, and some of them 
died.
222
 The risk of dying from an abortion was strongly correlated with race and 
class.
223




219. Linda Greenhouse & Reva B. Siegel, Before (and After) Roe v. Wade: New Questions About 
Backlash, 120 YALE L.J. 2028, 2047 (2011). 
220. Abortion and the Unwanted Child: An Interview with Alan F. Guttmacher, M.D. and Harriet F. 
Pilpel, 2 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 16, 18 (1970) (“Some of these reform laws have had virtually no 
impact on the number of abortions performed legally. Nor have they significantly reduced the 
number of dangerous illegal abortions. In few of the reform states have abortions become 
more available to poor women.”). 
221. See REAGAN, supra note 93, at 193-215; Polgar & Fried, supra note 72, at 125. 
222. REAGAN, supra note 93, at 210-11. 
223. Id. at 211-14; Abortion and the Unwanted Child, supra note 220, at 24 (“It is the poor . . . whom 
we see with the complications—infection, hemorrhage, peritonitis, renal failure and, some-
times, death.”); see also text accompanying notes 68-72. 
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Rican women in New York City between 1960 and 1962 were associated with 
botched abortions (among white women, the figure stood at a much smaller but 
still-alarming twenty-five percent).
224
 Another found that in Georgia, between 
1965 and 1967, the maternal death rate among black women due to illegal abor-
tion was fourteen times that of white women.
225
 
Reproductive rights advocates in the late 1960s and early 1970s worked hard 
to direct courts’ attention to the ways in which abortion restrictions dispropor-
tionately burdened women who were already disadvantaged. Whereas earlier 
challenges to abortion laws had focused on the rights of medical professionals, 
an emergent wave of abortion litigation focused on the rights of women them-
selves.
226
 This new litigation was highly attuned to the issue of class. In Illinois, 
for instance, class was the focal point of a successful constitutional challenge to 
the state’s abortion ban in 1971.
227
 Susan Grossman, the Legal Aid lawyer who 
brought the case, explained that her “feeling from the beginning . . . was that the 
women who were most hurt by the statute were the poor women of Illinois”; 
Grossman felt that she was bringing the case on their behalf.
228
 She and her co-
counsel argued that Illinois’s law “systematically discriminates against poor 
women, depriving them of equal access to the treatment available to women of 
means solely because they are poor.”
229




224. Edwin M. Gold et al., Therapeutic Abortions in New York City: A 20-Year Review, 55 AM. J. PUB. 
HEALTH 964, 965 (1965); see also id. at 966 (reporting that, in addition to receiving the most 
dangerous nonmedical abortions, Puerto Rican and nonwhite women received very few of the 
abortions granted by hospital committees: between 1960 and 1962, white women obtained 
92.7% of the hospital abortions granted in New York City, nonwhite women received 6.4%, 
and Puerto Rican women received 0.9%). 
225. See Tervalon, supra note 73, at 136. 
226. See Janice Goodman, Rhonda Copelon Schoenbrod & Nancy Stearns, Doe and Roe: Where Do 
We Go from Here?, WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP., Spring 1973, at 20, 23; Reva B. Siegel, Roe’s Roots: 
The Women’s Rights Claims that Engendered Roe, 90 B.U. L. REV. 1875, 1885 (2010); see also 
Siegel, supra, at 1885-94 (providing a detailed account of the woman-focused efforts of repro-
ductive rights litigators in the years prior to Roe). 
227. See REAGAN, supra note 93, at 235. 
228. Id. at 236. One of the two plaintiffs in the case actually was an indigent woman who “was 
compelled to bear an unwanted child since the option of a foreign abortion was economically 
foreclosed.” Doe v. Scott, 321 F. Supp. 1385, 1386 (N.D. Ill. 1971). 
229. REAGAN, supra note 93, at 236. Grossman’s cocounsel was Sybille Fritzsche, a lawyer for the 
ACLU. Id. at 235. Reagan explains that “[t]he Illinois challenge grew out of [Grossman’s and 
Frtizsche’s] commitment to the poor.” Id. at 236. 
230. See Doe, 321 F. Supp. at 1391 (invalidating Illinois’s prohibition of abortions performed in the 
first trimester of pregnancy in licensed medical facilities). 
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About a thousand miles to the east, advocates—including Nancy Stearns of 
the Center for Constitutional Rights and Katie Roraback—were also working to 
educate courts and the public about the tremendous hardships that restrictive 
abortion laws placed on women who lacked financial resources.
232
 To recruit 
women to serve as plaintiffs in a suit against Connecticut’s abortion ban, these 
advocates issued a pamphlet pointing out that wealthy women “can afford to 
travel to London or Puerto Rico for abortions” and also have the “opportunity to 
learn of private New York hospitals that perform abortions for out-of-state 
women at fees of $500-600.”
233
 The pamphlet noted that “poor women . . . can-
not afford the prices charged by hospitals in New York . . . nor can they afford a 
trip out of the country.”
234
 Thus, it alleged, among other things, that Connecti-
cut’s law violated equal protection by discriminating against the poor.
235
 
These arguments were not simply a recruiting tool. They resurfaced in the 
(ultimately successful) complaint in the Connecticut case,
236
 and—because abor-
tion-rights litigators shared their strategies and court filings
237
—in many other 
briefs as well. In the years before Roe, abortion-rights litigators in lawsuits chal-
lenging state abortion laws frequently emphasized how little access women with 
limited financial resources had to reproductive healthcare, the enormous health 
risks associated with the unsafe abortions poor women disproportionately ob-
tained, and the ways in which lack of access to abortion interacted with discrim-
 
231. REAGAN, supra note 93, at 240. 
232. Class was not the only concern of Stearns, Roraback, and their allies in the Connecticut case. 
Their central aim was to educate the court and the public about the ways in which abortion 
restrictions denied women equal citizenship. But class played a key role in those arguments, 
because poor women, among other doubly disadvantaged groups of women, particularly suf-
fered as a result of the state’s infringement of their reproductive rights. For more on the fem-
inist arguments of the Connecticut litigants, see Siegel, supra note 226, at 1886-94; and Green-
house & Siegel, supra note 84, at 11-13. 
233. WOMEN VS. CONNECTICUT ORGANIZING PAMPHLET (1970), reprinted in GREENHOUSE & 
SIEGEL, supra note 22, at 174. 
234. Id. 
235. Id. 
236. See Kesselman, supra note 77, at 52 (observing that, among other things, “[c]ount one, the 
most substantial portion of the complaint, claimed that Connecticut’s abortion laws . . . de-
nied ‘equal protection of the law’ to poor women”). 
237. See REAGAN, supra note 93, at 335 n.67. 
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ination against pregnant workers to trap low-income women in a cycle of pov-
erty.
238
 In the Connecticut case, Abele v. Markle,
239
 these litigators “proved re-
markably successful in communicating with the judiciary the social meaning and 
consequences of forced motherhood for women.”
240
 The court in Abele held, 
among other things, that the Fourteenth Amendment protects the right to abor-
tion because “[t]he decision to carry and bear a child has extraordinary ramifi-
cations for a woman . . . . The working or student mother frequently must cur-
tail or end her employment or educational opportunities. The mother with an 




In Roe, as in Griswold, concerns about the lived experience of financially dis-
advantaged women seeking reproductive healthcare did not appear on the sur-
face of the Court’s opinion. The Court held in Roe that due process protects the 
right to be “free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fun-
damentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child,”
242
 
and that “[t]hat right necessarily includes the right of a woman to decide 
 
238. For a sample of these arguments, across a number of states, see Siegel, supra note 226, at 1889 
n.66 (citing Complaint at 6, Women of Mass. v. Quinn, Civ. No. 71-2420-W (D. Mass. Nov. 
1, 1971)) (“[Poor women] without economic means are unable to procure psychiatric and 
medical evaluations that are necessary to obtain ‘legal’ abortions in Massachusetts, thus vio-
lating the constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws.”); Brief of Plaintiff at 12, 
Ryan v. Specter, 321 F. Supp. 1109 (E.D. Pa. 1971) (No. 70-2527) (“[B]y far the most disaster-
ous [sic] effect of this comfortable and closely guarded monopoly [on therapeutic abortions] 
is the fact that it makes safe medical abortions unavailable to most women of low income, and 
consequently condemns them to choose between bearing an unwanted child and risking a 
self-induced abortion or an abortion at the hands of an unqualified practitioner.”); id. at 13 
(“[T]he inevitable effect of the statute has been systematically to deny safe medical abortions 
to the poor, Negroes, and Puerto Ricans . . . . The law operates in a socio-economic environ-
ment which could lead to no other results.”); First Amended Complaint at 6, Women of R.I. 
v. Israel, No. 4605 (D.R.I. May 14, 1971) (“[I]n their application, [the laws] affect least those 
with the money and contacts to afford and obtain a legal abortion . . . ; a legal abortion out of 
the State; or at least a safe and discreet illegal abortion. Most women who die or become 
seriously ill or sterile from unsafe self-abortions, or illegal abortions, are poor women.”); and 
Complaint at 15, Abramowitz v. Kugler, 342 F. Supp. 1048 (D.N.J. 1972) (No. 431-70), which 
employs the same language used in the Rhode Island complaint to challenge the socioeco-
nomic effect of New Jersey’s laws. 
239. 342 F. Supp. 800, 801 (D. Conn. 1972) (invalidating Connecticut’s abortion ban on the ground 
that it “trespasses unjustifiably on the personal privacy and liberty of [the state’s] female citi-
zenry”). 
240. Siegel, supra note 226, at 1892. 
241. Abele, 342 F. Supp. at 801-02. 
242. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 169-70 (1973) (quoting Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 
(1972)). 
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whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.”
243
 It invalidated Texas’s law, which 
barred abortion except where necessary to save a woman’s life, for infringing this 
right. In Doe v. Bolton, decided the same day, the Court also invalidated several 
provisions of Georgia’s “reform” statute, including the requirements that abor-
tions be performed only in licensed hospitals, that they be approved by hospital 
committees, that two other physicians agree with the woman’s own doctor that 
an abortion was necessary, and that abortion patients reside in-state.
244
 These 
decisions established abortion as a fundamental right.
245
 But they focused pre-
dominantly on doctors’ interest in practicing medicine free from overly intrusive 
state intervention, and they treated pregnancy largely “as a physiological prob-
lem,” rather than analyzing the social and economic consequences to women of 
laws that sought to force them to bear children.
246
 
The consequences of such laws for financially disadvantaged women did, 
however, very much play a part in the litigation in Roe and Doe.
247
 Lawyers chal-
lenging Georgia’s “reform” statute in Doe argued that the statute 
operates in such a way that (1) white women of means get an overwhelm-
ingly disproportionate share of the legal hospital abortions as compared 
to poor, non-white women; and (2) women of means are able to obtain 
illegal but medically safe abortions while poorer women are forced to 
choose between bearing children they do not want and cannot afford to 





243. Id. at 170. 
244. 410 U.S. 179 (1973). 
245. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 953 (1992) (Rehnquist, C.J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (acknowledging that Roe “classified a woman’s de-
cision to terminate her pregnancy as a ‘fundamental right’ that could be abridged only in a 
manner which withstood ‘strict scrutiny’”); Roe, 410 U.S. at 152-53 (“[O]nly personal rights 
that can be deemed ‘fundamental’ or ‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty’ are included 
in [the constitutional] guarantee of personal privacy . . . . This right of privacy . . . founded in 
the Fourteenth Amendment’s concept of personal liberty and restrictions upon state ac-
tion . . . is broad enough to encompass a woman’s decision whether or not to terminate her 
pregnancy.” (citation omitted)).  
246. Reva Siegel, Reasoning from the Body: A Historical Perspective on Abortion Regulation and Ques-
tions of Equal Protection, 44 STAN. L. REV. 261, 274 (1992). 
247. See Linda Greenhouse, How the Supreme Court Talks About Abortion: The Implications of a Shift-
ing Discourse, 42 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 41, 45-46 (2008) (observing that there was a “disconnect 
between what the Court heard in Roe and what it chose to say”). 
248. Brief as Amici Curiae & Appendix for State Communities Aid Ass’n at 10-11, Roe, 410 U.S. 113 
and Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973) (Nos. 70-18, 70-40), 1971 WL 126671; see also Brief as 
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Advocates in Roe made similar arguments. Roe’s lawyers pointed out that un-
planned pregnancies were far more common among poor women than they were 
among the more affluent
249
 and that “the procedures which are open to the 




Justice Thurgood Marshall emphasized these disparities at one of the Jus-
tices’ postargument conferences on Roe and Doe. Justice Marshall’s biographer, 
Juan Williams, notes that “[g]oing back to his days in Baltimore and Harlem, 
[Marshall] had heard stories about penniless black women who suffered or died” 
as a result of obtaining illegal abortions.
251
 Justice Marshall urged his colleagues 
to protect abortion under the Fourteenth Amendment because, he argued, rich 
women could often get around state laws by going to private doctors or leaving 
the country, while poor women who wished to end their pregnancies had no safe 
options.
252
 In other words, he argued, recognizing abortion as a fundamental 
right would be a class-salient move. 
Although concerns about the hardships faced by women seeking abortions—
rather than by doctors who performed them—were muted in the Court’s opinion 
in Roe, they helped to shape the fundamental rights framework the Court con-
structed. When Justice Harry Blackmun first circulated his draft opinion in the 
case, it identified the end of the first trimester of pregnancy as the moment at 
which the balance of constitutional interests tipped in favor of the state.
253
 But 
several of his colleagues, including Justice Marshall, pushed back against this 
early date, arguing that women’s interests should prevail until the fetus became 
 
Amici Curiae for the American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists et al. at 67, Doe, 410 
U.S. 179 (No. 70-40), 1971 WL 126685 (arguing that Georgia’s statute discriminates “between 
the patient with means, and the patient with none,” and condemning the “socio-economic 
and racially discriminatory aspects of this type of legislation”). 
249. Brief for Appellants at 44, Roe, 410 U.S. 113 (No. 70-18) (quoting Larry Bumpass & Charles 
F. Westoff, The “Perfect Contraceptive” Population, 169 SCIENCE 1177, 1179 (1970)), 1971 WL 
128054. 
250. Id. at 30 (quoting J.L. McKelvey, The Abortion Problem, 50 MINN. MED. 119, 124 (1967)); see 
also, e.g., Brief Amicus Curiae on Behalf of New Women Lawyers et al. at 22-23, Roe, 410 U.S. 
113 and Doe, 410 U.S. 179 (Nos. 70-18, 70-40), 1971 WL 134283 (describing the “cycle of pov-
erty” in which women of limited means may find themselves as a result of unplanned preg-
nancies and resulting discrimination in numerous social contexts); Brief as Amici Curiae for 
Planned Parenthood Federation of America, Inc. et al. at 26-27, Roe, 410 U.S. 113 and Doe, 410 
U.S. 179 (Nos. 70-18, 70-40), 1971 WL 128049 (discussing the ways in which economic dep-
rivation increases women’s need for abortion and compounds the hardships associated with 
unwanted pregnancies). 
251. JUAN WILLIAMS, THURGOOD MARSHALL: AMERICAN REVOLUTIONARY 354 (1998). 
252. Id. 
253. LINDA GREENHOUSE, BECOMING JUSTICE BLACKMUN 95 (2005). 
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viable, at the end of the second trimester.
254
 “Given the difficulties which many 
women may have in believing that they are pregnant and in deciding to seek an 
abortion,” Justice Marshall wrote, “I fear the earlier date may not in practice serve 
the interests of those women, which your opinion does seek to serve.”
255
 Such 
concerns about timing have always been particularly acute for poor women, who 
typically take more time than wealthier women to confirm suspected pregnan-
cies and also to obtain an abortion after deciding to seek one.
256
 For this reason, 
the Court’s ultimate adoption of the viability, or second-trimester, line
257
 as the 
point at which the state’s interest in protecting fetal life becomes compelling 
strongly promoted the interests of financially disadvantaged women. 
Roe and Doe also promoted those interests by limiting the ways in which the 
state could regulate the infrastructure of abortion provision. Like the birth con-
trol ban in Griswold, laws banning abortion or restricting it to accredited hospi-
tals prevented the development of a publicly accessible infrastructure of repro-
ductive-healthcare providers. The resulting prevalence of reproductive-
healthcare deserts particularly hurt women of limited means, who could neither 
travel to places where abortion was legally available nor access reliable, but ex-
pensive, illegal providers closer to home. Roe expressed concern about the “ille-
gal ‘abortion mills’” that had arisen to meet this need.
258
 As long as the govern-
ment continued to ban or tightly restrict abortion, those mills would remain one 
of the only options for disadvantaged women who wanted to end pregnancies—
and this situation did not afford such women much control over “matters so fun-
damentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child.”
259
 
The Court’s concerns about the infrastructure of abortion provision in the 
United States were responsive to the many public health arguments made in this 
 
254. Id. at 96-97. 
255. Bob Woodward, Opinion, The Abortion Papers, WASH. POST (Jan. 22, 1989), https://www
.washingtonpost.com/archive/opinions/1989/01/22/the-abortion-papers/ce695bcc-a7f9 
-4b09-bd57-8d7efff37a46 [https://perma.cc/DE5W-L8GR] (quoting a memo from Justice 
Marshall to Justice Blackmun dated December 12, 1972). 
256. See Heather D. Boonstra, The Heart of the Matter: Public Funding of Abortion for Poor Women in 
the United States, GUTTMACHER POL’Y REV., Winter 2007, at 12, 14-15 (explaining that poor 
women are delayed even after deciding to obtain abortions because they need time to come 
up with money and may do so at great sacrifice to themselves and their families). 
257. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164-65 (1973) (holding that the state may regulate abortion 
during the second trimester only to protect women’s health and that its interest in promoting 
fetal life does not ripen until after fetal viability, which at that time coincided with the end of 
the second trimester). 
258. Id. at 150 (discussing “[t]he prevalence of high mortality rates at illegal ‘abortion mills’”). 
259. Id. at 169-70 (Stewart, J., concurring) (quoting Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972)). 
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period by opponents of restrictive abortion laws.
260
 As noted above, illegal abor-
tion could be dangerous, particularly for poor women.
261
 Arguments for abor-
tion rights grounded in public health concerns suggested that “what made illegal 
abortion a social disease were the health harms that [it] inflicted on women; 
and . . . the disproportionate burden of that harm that poor women had to en-
dure.”
262
 As the public health argument developed in this period, it “[i]mplic-
itly—and over time explicitly— . . . invoked the equality claim that there should 
be one law, for wealthy women and for poor.”
263
 This class-inflected argument 
made its way to the Supreme Court in a number of the briefs in Roe and Doe.
264
 
By invalidating fetal-protective restrictions on previability abortions, those deci-
sions paved the way for the development of a legal infrastructure of abortion 
providers able to perform the procedure “under safe, clinical conditions”
265
—a 
development that responded to the needs of financially disadvantaged women in 
particular. As in Griswold, the most tangible result of Roe and Doe was an explo-




260. For more on the prevalence of public health arguments for the right to abortion in the 1960s 
and early 1970s, see Greenhouse & Siegel, supra note 219, at 2036-38. 
261. See supra notes 221-225 and accompanying text. 
262. Greenhouse & Siegel, supra note 219, at 2036. 
263. Id. 
264. See, e.g., Brief as Amici Curiae for the American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists et 
al., supra note 248, at 11-13; Supplemental Brief for Amici Curiae Planned Parenthood Feder-
ation of America, Inc. et al., supra note 95, at 22-29, 41-43; Brief as Amici Curiae & Appendix 
for State Communities Aid Ass’n, supra note 248, at 4-12. 
265.  Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 121 (1973); see also Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 195 (1973) (“Appel-
lants . . . have presented us with a mass of data purporting to demonstrate that some facilities 
other than hospitals are entirely adequate to perform abortions . . . . The State, on the other 
hand, has not presented persuasive data to show that only hospitals meet its acknowledged 
interest in insuring the quality of the operation . . . . We feel compelled to agree with appel-
lants that the State must show more than it has in order to prove that only the full resources 
of a licensed hospital, rather than those of some other appropriately licensed institution, sat-
isfy these health interests. We hold that the hospital requirement of the Georgia law, because 
it fails to exclude the first trimester of pregnancy . . . is . . . invalid.”); Roe, 410 U.S. at 163 
(stating that, prior to the second trimester, the decision to have an abortion “may be effectu-
ated by an abortion free of interference by the State” and that health-related questions, such 
as whether abortion must be performed in “a hospital or may be [performed in] a clinic or 
some other place of less-than-hospital status,” arise only with respect to second- and third-
trimester abortions). 
266. The number of nonhospital abortion providers, including clinics, in the United States more 
than quadrupled in the years after these decisions, from approximately 350 in 1973 to 1,500 in 
1982. See GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL 
CHANGE? 197 (1991) (combining data sources to estimate the rapid increase in the number of 
nonhospital abortion providers in the years after Roe and Doe). 
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The Court’s conclusion in Roe and Doe that the state could no longer bar the 
development of an infrastructure of abortion provision, and thereby impede 
women’s access to abortion, led many federal appellate and district courts to con-
clude that the state was now required to pay for poor women’s abortions when 
it paid for childbirth.
267
 Indeed, every court that considered this question in the 
years after Roe and Doe reached the same conclusion.
268
 Courts viewed the de-
termination that it was unconstitutional to exempt abortion from coverage in 
public hospitals and Medicaid-type programs that covered childbirth as flowing 
directly from Roe and Doe.
269
 They held that to allow governments to exempt 
abortion from coverage in these situations would be to permit discrimination 
against poor women “by reason of [their] poverty.”
270
 Post-1973, affluent women 
often had a choice about whether to become mothers, but social welfare pro-
grams that paid for poor women to deliver babies while depriving them of abor-
tion care robbed them of that choice. Federal district and appellate courts held 
that governmental programs that funded childbirth and not abortion coerced 
poor women into giving birth, and, in so doing, impinged on their fundamental 
 
267. Most of the relevant lawsuits in this period involved the exemption of abortion where child-
birth was covered, but some involved the exemption of elective abortions where “medically 
necessary” abortions were covered. See, e.g., Doe v. Hale Hosp., 500 F.2d 144, 147 (1st Cir. 
1974) (“A public medical facility . . . may not forbid elective abortions so long as it offers med-
ically indistinguishable procedures, without violating the fundamental rights associated with 
the decision to terminate pregnancy set out in Roe v. Wade and Doe v. Bolton.”). 
268. See, e.g., Wulff v. Singleton, 508 F.2d 1211 (8th Cir. 1974); Hale Hosp., 500 F.2d; Doe v. Rose, 
499 F.2d 1112 (10th Cir. 1974); Nyberg v. City of Virginia, 495 F.2d 1342 (8th Cir. 1974); Klein 
v. Nassau Cty. Med. Ctr., 409 F. Supp. 731 (E.D.N.Y. 1976) (per curiam); Doe v. Westby, 383 
F. Supp. 1143 (D.S.D. 1974); Roe v. Norton, 380 F. Supp. 726 (D. Conn. 1974); Doe v. Wohlge-
muth, 376 F. Supp. 173 (W.D. Pa. 1974); Doe v. Rampton, 366 F. Supp. 189 (D. Utah 1973); 
Nyberg v. City of Virginia, 361 F. Supp. 932 (D. Minn. 1973); see also Hathaway v. Worcester 
City Hosp., 475 F.2d 701 (1st Cir. 1973) (invalidating on fundamental rights equal protection 
grounds a public hospital’s refusal to provide voluntary sterilizations). 
269. See, e.g., Rose, 499 F.2d at 1115-16 (“Without analyzing in depth Roe v. Wade . . . and Doe v. 
Bolton, a contrary holding in the instant case [involving Utah’s welfare program’s exemption 
of abortion from coverage] would in our view fly in the face of those two cases.” (citations 
omitted)); Wohlgemuth, 376 F. Supp. at 189 (concluding that “Roe v. Wade . . . must be con-
sidered as dispositive of the contentions in the instant case,” which involved the denial of 
abortion coverage by Pennsylvania’s medical assistance program). 
270. Wulff, 508 F.2d at 1215-16; see also Rose, 499 F.2d at 1117 (holding that when an indigent woman 
“is denied the medical assistance that is in general her statutory entitlement, and that is oth-
erwise extended to her even with respect to her pregnancy[,] . . . [s]he is . . . discriminated 
against both by reason of her poverty and by reason of her behavioral choice”). 
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right to choose abortion free from state interference in the first trimester of preg-




The Supreme Court ultimately rejected this interpretation in the abortion 
funding cases. It held that the state was not constitutionally obligated to pay for 
abortion simply because it opted to pay for childbirth, and it declined to treat 
poor women as a protected class for equal protection purposes. These decisions 
were obviously a major blow to advocates of reproductive rights, particularly for 
poor women. But the Court did not hold in the funding cases that class is cate-
gorically irrelevant to the adjudication of Fourteenth Amendment claims. In-
deed, the funding decisions were explicitly predicated on a distinction between 
a state’s decision not to fund abortion, on the one hand, and state action that 
actually infringes abortion rights, on the other.
272
 No amount of concern about 
poor women is sufficient to trigger the imposition of affirmative obligations on 
the state because the Fourteenth Amendment is not built to impose such obliga-
tions: its purpose is “to protect Americans from oppression by state government, 
not to secure them basic governmental services.”
273
 A state’s decision to fund 
childbirth in no way detracts from women’s ability to have abortions, the Court 
reasoned.
274
 It simply means that the state has declined to subsidize that partic-
ular choice, which is not a Fourteenth Amendment problem. 
 
271. See, e.g., Rose, 499 F.2d at 1116-17 (holding that the exemption of abortion from coverage un-
der Utah’s welfare program “would deny indigent women the equal protection of the laws” 
because “[t]hey alone are subjected to State coercion to bear children which they do not wish 
to bear” (internal quotation marks omitted)); id. at 1117 (“The indigent is advised by the State 
that the State will deny her medical assistance unless she resigns her freedom of choice and 
bears the child.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Rampton, 366 F. Supp. at 173 (holding 
that Utah’s exemption of abortion from Medicaid coverage “is invalid because it would limit 
exercise of the right to an abortion by the poor in all trimesters, for reasons having no apparent 
connection to health of the mother or child” and that “[t]he State may not so use its Medicaid 
program to limit abortions”). 
272. See, e.g., Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 475-76 (1977) (“Our conclusion signals no retreat from 
Roe or the cases applying it. There is a basic difference between direct state interference with 
a protected activity and state encouragement of an alternative activity consonant with legisla-
tive policy. Constitutional concerns are greatest when the State attempts to impose its will by 
force of law; the State’s power to encourage actions deemed to be in the public interest is 
necessarily far broader.”); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 315 (1980) (quoting same); id. at 
317-18 (“Although the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause affords protection against 
unwarranted government interference with freedom of choice in the context of certain per-
sonal decisions, it does not confer an entitlement to such funds as may be necessary to realize 
all the advantages of that freedom.”). 
273. Jackson v. City of Joliet, 715 F.2d 1200, 1203 (7th Cir. 1983) (Posner, J.). 
274. See supra note 206. 
the new class blindness 
63 
It is a different story, the Court held, when a state acts in ways that actually 
restricts the abortion right. That is what the state did in Roe and Doe: it regulated 
abortion in ways that made it more difficult for women—particularly those with-
out financial resources—to effectuate a fundamental right. The state did the 
same in Griswold in the context of birth control. The funding decisions reaf-
firmed that in situations like this—where the state regulates in ways that burden 
a constitutionally protected liberty interest—Fourteenth Amendment concerns 
are activated and courts must determine whether the state has encroached too 
far on people’s rights.
275
 The funding decisions in no way suggested that con-
cerns about class, by that point deeply interwoven with concerns about liberty 
and equality in the context of reproductive rights, were now irrelevant to that 
analysis. 
B. The Survival of Class-Based Concerns in Abortion Doctrine 
Progressive critics of the Court’s abortion jurisprudence often portray the 
funding decisions as a kind of terminus: the official end of judicial class-con-
sciousness under the Fourteenth Amendment. But the Burger Court’s rejection 
of its predecessor’s more capacious understanding of governmental obligation 
was not tantamount to a declaration that concerns about class have no place in 
Fourteenth Amendment law. Maher, Poelker, McRae, and Zbaraz were the prod-
ucts of a major political shift; they reflected the resurgence of judicial conserva-
tism and the emergence of an influential new brand of libertarianism. They en-
shrined in the law a more circumscribed account of governmental obligation 
under the Fourteenth Amendment. But those decisions did not suggest that class 
is irrelevant in determining the constitutionality of regulations that burden the 
abortion right. In fact, in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Ca-
sey
276
—decided more than a decade after the funding cases—the Court developed 
a doctrinal mechanism that sometimes requires courts to take financial disad-
vantage into account when determining the constitutionality of laws restricting 
abortion. 
In the run-up to Casey, commentators variously hoped and feared the Court 
would seize the opportunity to overrule Roe.
277
 Instead, the Court responded to 
 
275. See supra note 272. 
276. 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
277. See Linda Greenhouse, High Court, 5-4, Affirms Right to Abortion but Allows Most of Pennsylva-
nia’s Limits, N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 1992, at A1 (reporting that Casey left the abortion right 
“stronger than many abortion-rights supporters had expected and opponents had hoped for 
from a Court that had appeared for the last three years to be on a course leading inevitably to 
the evisceration, if not complete overruling, of Roe v. Wade”). 
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the enormous public conflict over abortion with a compromise. On the abortion-
rights side of the ledger, Casey reaffirmed abortion’s status as a fundamental 
right, declaring several times that “the essential holding of Roe v. Wade should 
be retained and once again reaffirmed.”
278
 Roe recognized abortion as a funda-
mental right because decades of precedent, from Meyer and Pierce through Gris-
wold and Loving, had “ma[d]e clear that freedom of personal choice in matters of 
marriage and family life is one of the liberties protected by the Due Process 
Clause.”
279
 Indeed, the Court observed in Roe that  
the interests of a woman in giving of her physical and emotional self dur-
ing pregnancy and the interests that will be affected throughout her life 
by the birth and raising of a child are of a far greater degree of significance 
and personal intimacy than the right to send a child to private school 
protected in Pierce v. Society of Sisters or the right to teach a foreign lan-
guage protected in Meyer v. Nebraska.
280
  
In Casey, the Court reaffirmed that abortion rights “involv[e] the most intimate 
and personal choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal 
dignity and autonomy,” and that those rights are therefore “central to the liberty 
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.”
281
 In subsequent decisions, the Court 
has reiterated this understanding of the right to abortion as fundamental.
282
 
But Casey also changed abortion doctrine in ways that allowed the govern-
ment more leeway to regulate. Roe’s trimester framework permitted almost no 
regulation of abortion in the first trimester, on the ground that the state’s inter-
ests in protecting maternal health and fetal life did not become compelling until 
 
278. Casey, 505 U.S. at 846; see also id. at 870-71 (describing the Court’s “unbroken commit-
ment . . . to the essential holding of Roe” and stating that this holding “should be reaf-
firmed”); Michael C. Dorf, Make No Mistake: Abortion Is a Fundamental Right, NEWSWEEK 
(Jan. 1, 2016, 3:27 PM), https://www.newsweek.com/abortion-roe-wade-fundamental 
-right-412908 [https://perma.cc/76MU-9ZUR] (observing that “abortion remains a funda-
mental right” even after Casey’s application of “the relatively permissive undue-burden test”). 
279. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 169 (1973). 
280. Id. at 170 (quoting Abele v. Markle, 351 F. Supp. 224, 227 (D. Conn. 1972)). 
281. Casey, 505 U.S. at 851. 
282. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 565 (2003) (“Roe recognized the right of a woman 
to make certain fundamental decisions affecting her destiny and confirmed once more that the 
protection of liberty under the Due Process Clause has a substantive dimension of fundamen-
tal significance in defining the rights of the person.”); Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 921 
(2000) (“[C]onsidering the matter in light of the Constitution’s guarantees of fundamental 
individual liberty, this Court, in the course of a generation, has determined and then redeter-
mined that the Constitution offers basic protection to the woman’s right to choose.”). 
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the second and third trimesters, respectively.
283
 Casey held “that the State has 
legitimate interests from the outset of the pregnancy in protecting the health of 
the woman and the life of the fetus that may become a child”—meaning that the 
state could regulate abortion “throughout pregnancy.”
284
 Casey also modified the 
standard of review used to assess the constitutionality of abortion regulations. 
Whereas Roe applied strict scrutiny to such regulations,
285
 Casey adopted an un-
due burden test. Under this test, states may regulate abortion—even in ways de-
signed to persuade women to continue their pregnancies—but not in ways that 
unduly burden the abortion right. The Court defined an undue burden as a “reg-
ulation [that] has the purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the 
path of a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus.”
286
 It went on to ex-
plain that a “statute with this purpose is invalid because the means chosen by the 
State to further the interest in potential life must be calculated to inform the 
woman’s free choice, not hinder it.”
287
 In practice, this undue burden test has 




The relevant question for purposes of this Article is what happened to class-
related concerns in the abortion context when the Court adopted the undue bur-
den test. One of the first challenges the Court confronted was determining which 
set of people—or whose difficulties accessing abortion—it should consider when 
analyzing whether a challenged regulation constitutes a substantial obstacle to 
the exercise of the abortion right. In other words, when assessing whether the 
 
283. Roe, 410 U.S. at 163-64. 
284. Casey, 505 U.S. at 846, 878. 
285. Roe, 410 U.S. at 153, 164-66 (holding that the fundamental right to privacy “is broad enough 
to encompass a woman’s decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy” and that the 
state must therefore offer “compelling justifications for intervention” when regulating abor-
tion). 
286. Casey, 505 U.S. at 877. 
287. Id. 
288. Planned Parenthood Se., Inc. v. Strange, 33 F. Supp. 3d 1330, 1337-38 (M.D. Ala. 2014) (de-
scribing the undue burden standard as a “middle ground between those who would impose 
strict-scrutiny review of such regulations and those who would require only a rational basis” 
(internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Adam Winkler, Fundamentally Wrong About Fun-
damental Rights, 23 CONST. COMMENT. 227, 227, 234-35 (2006) (explaining that not all—or 
even most—fundamental rights trigger strict scrutiny and citing abortion as an example of a 
fundamental right that triggers a standard of review somewhat lower than strict scrutiny); 
Clarke D. Forsythe et al., Constitutional Law & Abortion Primer, AM. UNITED FOR LIFE 23, 
https://www.aul.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/02/Constitutional-Law-and-Abortion 
-Primer.pdf [https://perma.cc/K8KA-NPYC] (observing that in Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 
124 (2007), the Court “expressly readopted Casey and its undue-burden, intermediate stand-
ard of review”). 
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state has substantially impeded women’s access to abortion, whose access should 
courts focus on? All women? All women seeking abortions? A particular subset 
of women seeking abortions? 
This question arose most pointedly in Casey in the context of Pennsylvania’s 
husband-notification provision. This provision required married women seek-
ing abortions to produce signed statements attesting that they had informed 
their husbands of their intentions.
289
 The state argued that, by definition, the 
notification provision could not constitute a substantial obstacle because it bur-
dened only a very small fraction of women seeking abortions.
290
 In fact, the state 
claimed, because only 20% of women seeking abortions are married, and because 
95% of those women voluntarily inform their husbands of their plans, the effects 
of the notification provision were felt by only 1% of women seeking abortions.
291
 
The state argued that nothing that affects only 1% of abortion seekers could pos-
sibly qualify as “substantial.”
292
 
The Court in Casey rejected that argument. It held that “[t]he proper focus 
of constitutional inquiry is the group for whom the law is a restriction, not the 
group for whom the law is irrelevant.”
293
 Thus, it explained, “[t]he analysis does 
not end with the one percent of women upon whom the statute operates; it be-
gins there.”
294
 When assessing whether an abortion restriction constitutes an un-
due burden, courts must look to the group of women actually burdened by the 
law and ask, for the women in that group, whether the law imposes a substantial 
obstacle to the exercise of their rights. Thus, in the context of the husband-no-
tification provision, the Court asked: does the notification requirement place a 
substantial obstacle in the path of “married women seeking abortions who do 
not wish to notify their husbands of their intentions”?
295
 The Court concluded 
that the provision did create such an obstacle because in a large fraction of the 
cases in which married women choose not to inform their husbands that they 
intend to obtain an abortion, they are concerned for their safety.
296
 For women 
 
289. Casey, 505 U.S. at 887-88. 
290. Id. at 894. 
291. Id. 
292. In fact, the state argued that the provision burdened less than one percent of women because 
some of the women who do not notify their husbands of their plans could safely do so or could 
qualify for an exception to the notification provision. Id. 
293. Id. 
294. Id. 
295. Id. at 895. 
296. Id. at 897-98. 
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in that position, the notification requirement constitutes a substantial obstacle 
to obtaining an abortion. 
The issue of class did not arise in the Court’s discussion of the husband-no-
tification provision. But elsewhere in Casey, it did. The plaintiffs also challenged 
Pennsylvania’s imposition of a twenty-four-hour waiting period, which required 
women seeking abortions to meet with their providers at least one day prior to 
undergoing the procedure.
297
 The district court invalidated this requirement on 
the ground that it was “particularly burdensome to those women who have the 
least financial resources”—women for whom two trips to a clinic might require 
transportation, motel stays, childcare, and missed workdays they could scarcely 
afford.
298
 The Supreme Court acknowledged that this situation was “troubling 
in some respects.”
299
 But it drew a distinction between a “particular” burden and 
one that was “undue.”
300
 The district court found only that the waiting period 
“particularly burdened” women without financial resources. It did not also find 
that the waiting period placed a substantial obstacle in their path. This was a 
problem, in the Court’s view, because a “particular burden is not of necessity a 
substantial obstacle.”
301
 For the waiting period to be invalid, there would need 
to be evidence that, in addition to having a disparate impact on women without 
financial resources, it also significantly impeded their ability to obtain abor-
tions.
302
 As the district court’s opinion did not cite any such evidence, the Court 
observed that, “on the record before [it],” there was insufficient ground to con-
clude that the waiting period constituted an undue burden.
303
 
This holding was hardly an exemplar of judicial sensitivity to the challenges 
faced by financially disadvantaged women seeking to terminate pregnancies. But 
it was not tantamount to a declaration that class is irrelevant to the determina-
tion of whether an abortion regulation violates the Fourteenth Amendment. In-
deed, some courts, post-Casey, invalidated waiting periods and other such regu-
lations, explicitly citing their effects on financially disadvantaged women as 
 
297. Id. at 885-86. 
298. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 744 F. Supp. 1323, 1352 (E.D. Pa. 1990), aff ’d in part, 
rev’d in part, 947 F.2d 682 (3d Cir. 1991), aff ’d in part, rev’d in part, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
299. Casey, 505 U.S. at 886 (acknowledging the district court’s finding “that for those women who 
have the fewest financial resources . . . the 24-hour waiting period will be ‘particularly bur-
densome’”). 
300. Id. at 886-87. 
301. Id. at 887. 
302. Id. (“Whether a burden falls on a particular group is a distinct inquiry from whether it is a 
substantial obstacle even as to the women in that group.”). 
303. Id. 
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evidence of their unconstitutionality.
304
 Other courts have been more permissive 
toward laws restricting abortion.
305
 The trend over time has been toward greater 
permissiveness—certainly relative to what courts permitted in the way of abor-
tion regulation prior to Casey. 
In that sense, Casey represented another shift to the right, in line with the 
funding decisions fifteen years earlier. But just as the funding decisions pre-
served space in abortion doctrine for taking class into account, so too did Casey. 
The decision supported the basic proposition that when the state substantially 
burdens women’s right to decide whether or not to carry a pregnancy to term, it 
deprives them of the liberty and equal citizenship the Fourteenth Amendment 
 
304. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Daugaard, 799 F. Supp. 2d 1048, 1065 
(D.S.D. 2011) (enjoining numerous provisions of a South Dakota law, including a seventy-
two-hour waiting period, after finding that the vast majority of state residents who obtain 
abortions are poor and that “[t]he effective doubling of the financial burden” caused by the 
waiting period “constitute[d] a substantial obstacle for a large fraction of the relevant cases”); 
Reprod. Servs. v. Keating, 35 F. Supp. 2d 1332, 1335 (N.D. Okla. 1998) (issuing a temporary 
restraining order against an Oklahoma law requiring second-trimester abortions to be per-
formed in hospitals after noting plaintiff ’s claim “that the increased burdens of which it com-
plains will fall most heavily upon the poor, the young, and the uneducated”); Planned 
Parenthood of S. Ariz., Inc. v. Woods, 982 F. Supp. 1369, 1373 (D. Ariz. 1997) (invalidating a 
law banning “partial birth abortions” after observing that women who obtain later abortions 
often do so because they are “indigent,” “homeless,” or “poverty stricken,” and thus do not 
receive timely abortion care); see also Tucson Woman’s Clinic v. Eden, 379 F.3d 531, 541 (9th 
Cir. 2004) (asserting that “[a] significant increase in the cost of abortion or the supply of 
abortion providers and clinics can, at some point, constitute a substantial obstacle to a signif-
icant number of women choosing an abortion”); cf. A Woman’s Choice–E. Side Women’s 
Clinic v. Newman, 904 F. Supp. 1434, 1460 (S.D. Ind. 1995) (enjoining an Indiana law requir-
ing women to receive certain information in the presence of a medical professional at least 
eighteen hours before obtaining an abortion after finding that it constituted an undue bur-
den—and distinguishing Casey on the ground that the Court in Casey “did not have available 
to it evidence showing that such a law had in fact caused a significant drop in the incidence of 
abortion”), rev’d 305 F.3d 684 (7th Cir. 2002). 
305. See, e.g., Cincinnati Women’s Servs., Inc. v. Taft, 468 F.3d 361 (6th Cir. 2006) (upholding an 
Ohio law requiring a woman to attend an in-person meeting with a physician for informed 
consent purposes at least twenty-four hours prior to obtaining an abortion); A Woman’s 
Choice–E. Side Women’s Clinic v. Newman, 305 F.3d 684 (7th Cir. 2002) (reversing the in-
junction of an Indiana law requiring women to receive certain information in the presence of 
a medical professional at least eighteen hours before obtaining an abortion); Greenville 
Women’s Clinic v. Bryant, 222 F.3d 157 (4th Cir. 2000) (upholding a law imposing licensure 
and operational requirements on abortion clinics); Karlin v. Foust, 188 F.3d 446 (7th Cir. 
1999) (upholding various provisions of a Wisconsin abortion law, including a twenty-four-
hour waiting period); Fargo Women’s Health Org. v. Schafer, 18 F.3d 526 (8th Cir. 1994) 
(upholding North Dakota’s twenty-four-hour waiting period); Utah Women’s Clinic, Inc. v. 
Leavitt, 844 F. Supp. 1482 (D. Utah 1994) (upholding a Utah abortion law imposing a twenty-
four-hour waiting period and informed consent requirements). 
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was designed to protect.
306
 And it reaffirmed that it was appropriate—in fact, 
sometimes necessary—for courts assessing the constitutionality of abortion reg-
ulations to consider the particular, compounding forms of disadvantage experi-
enced by the women subject to those regulations.
307
 
In the 1970s, the constitutional question with respect to financial disad-
vantage was whether the state was constitutionally obligated to fund abortions 
through welfare programs that funded childbirth. By the time of Casey, the scope 
of constitutional protection under the Fourteenth Amendment had narrowed, 
and the question with respect to financial disadvantage was different. The ques-
tion now was whether courts could legitimately consider the experiences of par-
ticular subgroups of disadvantaged women when determining whether the state 
had substantially burdened the right to abortion. On this narrower question, the 
Court answered in the affirmative. It developed a doctrinal framework that in 
certain circumstances mandated special consideration of the real-world chal-
lenges facing particular subsets of women seeking abortions. Although less pro-
tective of financially disadvantaged women than Roe’s trimester framework, Ca-
sey’s undue burden test reflected the Court’s recognition that abortion 
regulations that do not necessarily prevent every woman, or even most women, 
from exercising their constitutional rights may nonetheless infringe the rights of 
some women—most often, less privileged women. Casey reaffirmed the basic 
principle that burdening the rights of disadvantaged women in this way was a 
constitutional problem. In this sense, Casey preserved the law’s ability to respond 
to class-related deprivations of the fundamental right to abortion. 
 
306. Indeed, Casey made the sex-equality dimensions of the abortion right more visible than they 
had been in previous Supreme Court decisions. See Reva B. Siegel, Dignity and the Politics of 
Protection: Abortion Restrictions Under Casey/Carhart, 117 YALE L.J. 1694, 1753-66 (2008); id. 
at 1766 (“Casey . . . interprets the Due Process Clause in ways that are deeply informed by 
modern understandings of the Equal Protection Clause . . . . Casey appreciates that for 
women, a crucial dimension of freedom is freedom from legally imposed family roles . . . . At 
multiple junctures . . . the Court explains that there are equality values secured by the deci-
sional autonomy Casey protects.”). 
307. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 887-98 (engaging in a lengthy and detailed analysis of the way Pennsyl-
vania’s husband-notification provision affected the ability of married women who suffered 
domestic violence to obtain abortions); id. at 894 (explaining that the constitutional analysis 
of this provision focuses on the provision’s effects not on all abortion-seekers, but on abortion-
seekers who experience domestic violence, as “[l]egislation is measured for consistency with 
the Constitution by its impact on those whose conduct it affects”). 
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i i i . the emergence of the new class blindness 
Not too long ago, a prominent constitutional scholar called for “de-constitu-
tionalizing” the right to abortion.
308
 What made this call for jettisoning Roe 
atypical is that it came from a progressive scholar who believes women ought to 
be able to obtain abortions.
309
 The logic behind the argument was this: when 
the Court determined in the funding cases that the state bears no constitutional 
obligation to pay for abortion, it drained constitutional law of any ability to help 
financially disadvantaged women. “To be a meaningful support for women’s 
equality or liberty,” the argument went, “a right to legal abortion must mean 
much more than a right to be free . . . to purchase one. It must guarantee access 
to one.”
310
 Thus, given that “[i]t is so unlikely as to be a certainty that neither 
this Court nor likely any Court will commence a jurisprudence of positive con-
stitutional rights[] by beginning in the contested terrain of mandating public 
funds for abortions,”
311
 there is no point in reproductive-justice advocates con-
tinuing to waste their energies on constitutional battles.
312
 The vast majority of 
women who seek abortions lack financial resources, and constitutional law 




308. Robin West, From Choice to Reproductive Justice: De-Constitutionalizing Abortion Rights, 118 
YALE L.J. 1394, 1394 (2009). 
309. Id. at 1431 (arguing that “[w]omen need legal abortion . . . in order to live better and more 
integrated lives in their families and workplaces both”). For discussion of a different kind of 
call from the left for jettisoning Roe, based on the idea that the decision is too politically costly 
to defend, see Cary Franklin, Roe as We Know It, 114 MICH. L. REV. 867, 886 (2016). 
310. West, supra note 308, at 1403 (“To be a meaningful support for women’s equality or liberty, a 
right to legal abortion must mean much more than a right to be free of moralistic legislation 
that interferes with a contractual right to purchase one. It must guarantee access to one. And, 
for a right to legal abortion to guarantee that a woman who needs an abortion will have access 
to one, whether or not she can pay for it, the state must be required to provide considerable 
support.”). In fact, West locates the blame for what she views as constitutional law’s abandon-
ment of low-income women even earlier than the funding cases, in Roe itself. She argues that 
Roe created only “a negative right against the criminalization of abortion in some circum-
stances” and that the funding decisions logically followed from that paltry conception of what 
was necessary genuinely to protect women’s liberty and equality in this domain. Id. 
311. Id. 
312. Id. at 1431 (arguing that “a shift in focus away from courts to more democratic fora might open 
the door to moral and political opportunities to which we have been blinded by the light of 
the promises of a living Constitution”); id. at 1432 (“The reproductive justice that might be 
achieved through [pro-life and pro-choice] coalitions—that is, achieved through ordinary 
modes of political persuasion—might prove more enduring than what we have garnered to 
date from the Court.”). 
313. Id. at 1425 (“It is not possible . . . to read Roe as a part of an adjudicative, narrative movement 
toward a robust conception of reproductive justice. That is ruled out by the right’s negativity. 
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This scholarly, feminist complaint that constitutional law offers no protec-
tion to financially disadvantaged women seeking abortions overlaps—in the way 
that claims from opposite ends of the political spectrum sometimes do—with a 
recent push by some conservative judges to suggest that the challenges facing 
such women fall outside the scope of constitutional concern. These judges too 
cite the funding decisions as evidence that the particular struggles low-income 
women encounter when seeking abortions are irrelevant under the Fourteenth 
Amendment and that constitutional law offers such women no special protec-
tion. 
Whatever the motivation behind this claim, this Part argues against it. It 
shows how an overly broad, and in some instances just plain wrong, interpreta-
tion of the funding decisions has obscured extant constitutional protections for 
women of limited financial means. Abortion doctrine today still contains a mech-
anism for taking financial disadvantage into account and for ratcheting up con-
stitutional protection when the state regulates in ways that substantially burden 
the rights of those on the lower rungs of the economic ladder. 
This is an important form of constitutional protection. It was not so long ago 
that there was no protection for abortion under the Fourteenth Amendment, 
even as a so-called negative right. Those were not great days as far as women’s 
health was concerned—particularly the health of poor women and women of 
color.
314
 In the period before Roe, “[e]very large municipal or county hospital 
had a ‘septic abortion ward,’ and infected induced abortion was the most com-
mon reason for admission to gynecology services nationwide.”
315
 A study con-
ducted in New York City in the mid-1960s revealed the truly ghastly assortment 
of chemicals and instruments women used to perform abortions on themselves 
in the years before the Court extended constitutional protection to the abortion 
right.
316
 Today, rates of abortion-related injuries and death remain quite high in 
countries with the most restrictive abortion laws and are much lower in countries 
 
Reproductive justice requires a state that provides a network of support for the processes of 
reproduction . . . . The Court is not equipped to mandate [such support] . . . . The negative 
right that it has recognized suggests something very different: it suggests at best a right to 
nonreproductive sex, and at worst, a right to end a pregnancy by killing the fetus so as to free 
oneself of the burden of impossible parental obligations in an unjust world. Either way, it is 
not all that clear that women, parents, or children are the beneficiaries.”). 
314. See supra notes 68-76, 221-225 and accompanying text. 
315. GRIMES & BRANDON, supra note 72, at 8. 
316. Id. at 10-14. 




 There is no disputing that the Burger Court’s determi-
nation that the government was not constitutionally obligated to pay for abor-
tion, even where it paid for childbirth, has resulted in substantial hardship for 
poor women seeking abortions. But it makes an enormous difference in those 
women’s lives that American law limits how far states may go in restricting access 
to abortion—and that it sometimes requires courts to consider how abortion re-
strictions impede their access in particular. The more restrictive abortion laws 
passed in recent years often force poor women to delay their abortions
318
 and to 
forgo paying rent and utility bills or buying food for themselves and their chil-
dren.
319
 But the fact that abortion is still constitutionally protected in the United 
States means that currently—even in the face of ever-tightening regulation—
“most low-income women who want an abortion manage to obtain one.”
320
 
Recently, however, some judges have attempted radically to curtail this re-
maining protection by holding that class-based considerations can play no role 
in the adjudication of abortion-rights claims under the Fourteenth Amendment. 
A few years ago, the Fifth Circuit embraced what this Article calls the “new class 
 
317. Lisa B. Haddad & Nawal M. Nour, Unsafe Abortion: Unnecessary Maternal Mortality, 2 REVIEWS 
OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 122, 124 (2009) (“Data indicate an association between unsafe 
abortion and restrictive abortion laws. The median rate of unsafe abortions in the 82 countries 
with the most restrictive abortion laws is up to 23 of 1000 women compared with 2 of 1000 in 
nations that allow abortions. Abortion-related deaths are more frequent in countries with 
more restrictive abortion laws (34 deaths per 100,000 childbirths) than in countries with less 
restrictive laws (1 or fewer per 100,000 childbirths).”). 
318. Rachel K. Jones et al., At What Cost? Payment for Abortion Care by U.S. Women, 23 WOMEN’S 
HEALTH ISSUES e173, e174 (2013) (noting that patients seeking second-trimester abortions cite 
travel and procedure costs—which have been driven up by abortion regulation—as among the 
most common reasons for delays in seeking care); Sarah C.M. Roberts et al., Out-of-Pocket 
Costs and Insurance Coverage for Abortion in the United States, 24 WOMEN’S HEALTH ISSUES e211, 
e215 (2014) (finding, in a study of women seeking abortions at thirty clinics throughout the 
country, that fifty-four percent of respondents reported that raising money for an abortion 
delayed obtaining care); see also Heather D. Boonstra, Abortion in the Lives of Women Struggling 
Financially: Why Insurance Coverage Matters, 19 GUTTMACHER POL’Y REV. 49 (2016) (report-
ing that low-income women seeking abortions can “get caught in a cruel cycle, in which the 
delays associated with raising the funds to pay for the abortion can lead to additional costs 
and delays,” because “[a]bortion in the second trimester can cost 2-3 times as much as abortion 
in the first trimester”). 
319. Jones et al., supra note 318, at e176. 
320. Boonstra, supra note 318, at 49. That said, it is important to note that a substantial minority 
of low-income women who want abortions do not manage to obtain them and are forced to 
bear children against their wishes. See Stanley K. Henshaw et al., Restrictions on Medicaid 
Funding for Abortions: A Literature Review, GUTTMACHER INST. 27 (2009), https://www
.guttmacher.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/medicaidlitreview.pdf [https://perma.cc
/L2PZ-XUM5] (“[A] reasonable estimate is that lack of funding influences about a quarter of 
Medicaid-eligible women to continue unwanted pregnancies.”). 
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blindness,” holding that class-related concerns have no purchase in constitu-
tional abortion doctrine. Although the Supreme Court ultimately rejected that 
proposition,
321
 this new class blindness appeared to garner support among some 
of the Justices. This Part shows how these recent efforts to exclude class-related 
considerations from the analysis of abortion regulation threaten to rewrite his-
tory and reformulate Fourteenth Amendment doctrine in unprecedented ways. 
In fact, the new class blindness is not limited to the context of reproductive 
rights. It is part of a transcontextual effort to restrict judicial consideration of 
class in the realm of fundamental rights. Thus, the second Section of this Part 
turns from the context of abortion to the contexts of voting and criminal proce-
dure. In voting, the new class blindness has arisen in ways strikingly parallel to 
the ways it has arisen in the context of reproductive rights. In the context of 
criminal procedure, a number of Supreme Court Justices have argued that the 
Burger Court effectively overruled some of its predecessor’s landmark class-re-
lated decisions—decisions such as Griffin and Douglas, which to this day provide 
important protections for indigent criminal defendants. 
Thus far, the Court has rejected these efforts to expunge class-related con-
cerns from fundamental rights law. But it has devoted very little space in its opin-
ions to explaining the reasons behind its rejection of these efforts. This Part aims 
to show how the new class blindness misreads constitutional precedent and why 
the recent push to strike class-related concerns from Fourteenth Amendment ju-
risprudence is inconsistent with due process and equal protection as those con-
cepts have been understood for the past half century. 
A. Efforts Toward a New Class Blindness in Abortion Law 
In 2013, the state of Texas enacted a new law regulating abortion. The law, 
known as H.B. 2, required that abortion providers obtain admitting privileges at 
 
321. See Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016). 
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nearby hospitals and that abortion clinics outfit themselves as ambulatory sur-
gical centers.
322
 H.B. 2 was one of hundreds of similar abortion restrictions en-
acted in the wake of the 2010 midterm elections.
323
 Those elections swept into 
office a host of Tea Party and other conservative candidates for whom outlawing 
abortion was a top priority.
324
 Indeed, state legislators passed more laws regu-
lating abortion in 2011 than in any other year in American history.
325
 More than 
 
322. See H.B. 2, 2013 Tex. Gen. Laws 5013 (codified at TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. 
§§ 171.0031, 171.041-048, 171.061-064, 245.010-011 (West 2015) and TEX. OCC. CODE ANN. 
§§ 164.052, 164.055 (West 2015)). For more on the ambulatory surgical center requirement, 
see Whole Woman’s Health v. Lakey, 46 F. Supp. 3d 673, 682 (W.D. Tex. 2014), aff ’d in part, 
modified in part, vacated in part, and rev’d in part sub nom. Whole Women’s Health v. Cole, 790 
F.3d 563 (5th Cir. 2015), rev’d sub nom. Whole Women’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 1363 S. Ct. 2292 
(2016), which notes:  
The requirement applies equally to abortion clinics that only provide medication 
abortion, even though no surgery or physical intrusion into a woman’s body occurs 
during this procedure. The standards prescribe electrical, heating, ventilation, air 
conditioning, plumbing, and other physical plant requirements as well as staffing 
mandates, space utilization, minimum square footage, and parking design. Nota-
bly, grandfathering of existing facilities and the granting of waivers from specific 
requirements is prohibited for abortion providers, although other types of ambu-
latory-surgical facilities are frequently granted waivers or are grandfathered due to 
construction dates that predate the newer construction requirements. 
For more on the admitting privileges requirement, see Planned Parenthood of Greater Texas Sur-
gical Health Services v. Abbott, 951 F. Supp. 2d 891, 897-98 (W.D. Tex. 2013), aff ’d in part and 
rev’d in part, 748 F.3d 583 (5th Cir. 2014), which explains that the law assesses a criminal penalty 
against any physician who performs an abortion without having admitting privileges at a hos-
pital within thirty miles of where the abortion is performed. For more on the legislative history 
of H.B. 2, see Cary Franklin, Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt and What It Means to Pro-
tect Women, in REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS AND JUSTICE LAW STORIES, supra note 84 (manuscript 
at 3-11) (on file with author). 
323. See Linda Greenhouse & Reva B. Siegel, Casey and the Clinic Closings: When “Protecting Health” 
Obstructs Choice, 125 YALE L.J. 1428, 1449-54 (2016) (describing the concerted passage of sim-
ilar types of antiabortion legislation around the country in the wake of the 2010 elections). 
324. See Elizabeth Nash & Rachel Benson Gold, In Just the Last Four Years, States Have Enacted 231 
Abortion Restrictions, GUTTMACHER INST. (Jan. 5, 2015), https://www.guttmacher.org/article
/2015/01/just-last-four-years-states-have-enacted-231-abortion-restrictions [https://perma
.cc/8FNX-QGKX] (noting that the new wave of abortion laws were enacted after “the 2010 
midterm elections swept abortion opponents into power in state capitals across the country”); 
Robert Pear, Push for Stricter Abortion Limits Is Expected in House, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 11, 2010), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/12/health/policy/12abortion.html [https://perma.cc
/4WTZ-EA7K] (reporting that, in the U.S. House of Representatives, “[o]pponents of abor-
tion gained about 45 seats in the midterm elections”). 
325. See Alastair Gee, Anti-Abortion Laws Gain More Ground in the USA, 377 LANCET 1992, 1992-93 
(2011); Sarah Kliff, 2011: The Year of the Abortion Restrictions, WASH. POST (Dec. 29, 2011), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/post/2011-the-year-of-the-abortion 
-restrictions/2011/12/29/gIQAbJqjOP_blog.html [https://perma.cc/J6UP-XJGY]. 
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a quarter of all abortion regulations passed since Roe were passed in the five years 
after those legislators took office.
326
 The effect of much of this new regulation 
was to block women’s access to abortion, often by forcing the closure of clinics 
that provided it.
327
 H.B. 2’s admitting-privileges requirement closed roughly half 
of Texas’s forty-one abortion clinics. The surgical-center requirement threatened 
to halve the remaining number, leaving Texas—a state with a population of 
twenty-five million—with only seven or eight clinics.
328
 
Whole Woman’s Health, which operates a number of women’s health clinics 
that provide abortions, challenged the law’s constitutionality and prevailed in 
the district court.
329
 The district court found that Texas had no legitimate health 
interest in requiring abortion providers to meet these new requirements, as there 
was no evidence in this context that admitting privileges enable doctors to pro-
vide better care
330
 or that outfitting clinics as ambulatory surgical centers would 
further reduce the already very low complication rates associated with abor-
tion.
331
 Moreover, while the health benefits of the law were negligible, the effects 
 
326. Last Five Years Account for More than One-Quarter of All Abortion Restrictions Enacted Since Roe, 
GUTTMACHER INST. (Jan. 13, 2016), https://www.guttmacher.org/article/2016/01/last-five 
-years-account-more-one-quarter-all-abortion-restrictions-enacted-roe [https://perma.cc
/BFC5-BMEN]. 
327. Esmé E. Deprez, Abortion Clinics Are Closing at a Record Pace, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 24, 2016), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-02-24/abortion-clinics-are-closing-at-a 
-record-pace [https://perma.cc/VT4M-JJBE] (reporting that “[a]bortion access in the U.S. 
has been vanishing at the fastest annual pace on record, propelled by Republican state law-
makers’ push to legislate the industry out of existence,” and that “[s]ince 2011, at least 162 
abortion providers have shut or stopped offering the procedure, while just 21 opened”). 
328. See Whole Woman’s Health v. Lakey, 46 F. Supp. 3d 673, 682 (W.D. Tex. 2014), aff ’d in part, 
modified in part, vacated in part, and rev’d in part sub nom. Whole Women’s Health v. Cole, 790 
F.3d 563 (5th Cir. 2015), rev’d sub nom. Whole Women’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 1363 S. Ct. 2292 
(2016); see also Alexa Ura et al., Here Are the Abortion Clinics that Have Closed Since 2016, TEX. 
TRIB. (June 28, 2016), https://www.texastribune.org/2016/06/28/texas-abortion-clinics 
-have-closed-hb2-passed-2013 [https://perma.cc/G7CT-TBDW] (listing the names and lo-
cations of the Texas clinics that closed in the wake of H.B. 2). 
329. See Lakey, 46 F. Supp. 3d 673. 
330. Planned Parenthood of Greater Tex. Surgical Health Servs. v. Abbott, 951 F. Supp. 2d 891, 
899-901 (W.D. Tex. 2013) (finding that abortion is so safe that abortion providers rarely treat 
patients in hospitals and thus rarely qualify for admitting privileges and that whether or not 
a provider has such privileges has no impact on the quality of care patients receive in the rare 
instances when they are treated in hospitals), aff ’d in part and rev’d in part, 748 F.3d 583 (5th 
Cir. 2014). 
331. Lakey, 46 F. Supp. 3d at 684 (“The great weight of the evidence demonstrates that, before the 
act’s passage, abortion in Texas was extremely safe with particularly low rates of serious com-
plications and virtually no deaths occurring on account of the procedure . . . . [R]isks are not 
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on women’s access to abortion were enormous. The court found that if both pro-
visions of H.B. 2 were allowed to take effect, approximately 2 million women 
would live in a county further than 50 miles from an abortion provider, 1.3 mil-
lion would live further than 100 miles from a provider, 900,000 would live fur-
ther than 150 miles from a provider, and 750,000 would live further than 200 
miles from a provider.
332
 The problem was not just distance, the court found. It 
was the way these distances interacted with other “practical concerns,” such as 
“lack of availability of child care, unreliability of transportation, unavailability of 
appointments at abortion facilities, unavailability of time off from work, immi-
gration status and inability to pass border checkpoints, poverty level, the time 
and expense involved in traveling long distances, and other, inarticulable psy-
chological obstacles” to render abortion inaccessible, particularly to “poor, rural, 
or disadvantaged women.”
333
 The court acknowledged that many middle-class 
women would still be able to access abortion in the wake of H.B. 2.
334
 But, the 
court asserted, “Roe’s essential holding guarantees to all women, not just those 
of means, the right to a previability abortion.”
335
 
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit rejected this reasoning. It held that a state is en-
titled to near-total deference on the question of whether a law advances its inter-
est in protecting women’s health.
336
 The Fifth Circuit also rejected the district 
court’s reasoning about the interplay between travel distance and financial dis-
advantage. It held that obstacles that arise from women’s own lack of funds are 
irrelevant to determining whether a regulation qualifies as a substantial obstacle 
under Casey.
337
 That, the court reasoned, was the lesson of the abortion funding 
 
appreciably lowered for patients who undergo abortions at ambulatory surgical centers as 
compared to nonsurgical-center facilities.”). 
332. Id. at 681. 
333. Id. at 683. 
334. Id. 
335. Id. 
336. See Whole Woman’s Health v. Cole, 790 F.3d 563, 587 (5th Cir. 2015) (holding that, if “any 
conceivable rationale exists for an enactment,” the state has satisfied its burden, and that it is 
“not required to prove that the objective of the law would be fulfilled” (quoting Planned 
Parenthood of Greater Tex. Surgical Health Servs. v. Abbott, 748 F.3d 583, 594 (5th Cir. 2014), 
rev’d sub nom. Whole Women’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292)). 
337. See id. at 589 (“We do not doubt that women in poverty face greater difficulties. However, to 
sustain a facial challenge, the Supreme Court and this circuit require Plaintiffs to establish 
that the law itself imposes an undue burden on at least a large fraction of women.” (quoting 
Whole Woman’s Health v. Lakey, 769 F.3d 285, 299 (5th Cir.), vacated in part, 135 S. Ct. 399 
(2014)). 
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decisions: the state is not responsible under the Fourteenth Amendment for bur-
dens it did not create.
338
 The only burdens courts ought to take into account are 
those created by “the law itself.”
339
 Difficulties that arise out of women’s own 
straitened financial circumstances—such as lack of transportation, childcare, 
days off work, and money for travel—are not part of the constitutional calculus 
when determining the size of the burden an abortion regulation imposes.
340
 
With all those considerations pushed to one side, the court determined that H.B. 
2 did not constitute a substantial obstacle to abortion.
341
 
There was some support for this reasoning at the Supreme Court. Justice 
Alito, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Thomas, rejected the idea that 
courts should focus on the struggles of particular subgroups of women when 
applying the undue burden test.
342
 Justice Alito argued that Whole Woman’s 
Health “must show, at a minimum, that [the controverted provisions of H.B. 2] 
have an unconstitutional impact on at least a ‘large fraction’ of Texas women of 
reproductive age.”
343
 Indeed, Justice Alito went so far as to suggest that it is never 
appropriate to narrow the scope of the undue burden inquiry to particular sub-
groups of women in the context of a facial challenge to an abortion law. For one 
thing, he argued, doing so would predetermine the outcome. If courts examine 
a law’s effects only on women who are burdened by the law, the fraction of 





338. See id. (citing the Court’s observation in Maher v. Roe that “[t]he indigency that may make it 
difficult—and in some cases, perhaps, impossible—for some women to have abortions is nei-
ther created nor in any way affected by the state’s regulation” (alteration in original) (internal 
quotation marks omitted) (quoting 432 U.S. 464, 474 (1977))). The Court in Maher, however, 
made this observation in the course of explaining why the state was not constitutionally obli-
gated to fund abortion. The Fifth Circuit cited this observation (out of context) to suggest 
that the difficulties financially disadvantaged women face when the state restricts abortion are 
not properly considered when assessing the magnitude of the obstacles such restrictions gen-
erate—a proposition for which Maher provides no support. See supra note 272 and accompa-
nying text. 
339. Cole, 790 F.3d at 589. 
340. See id. 
341. Id. at 591 (holding that the ambulatory surgical center requirement did not constitute a sub-
stantial obstacle to abortion); Planned Parenthood of Greater Tex. Surgical Health Servs. v. 
Abbott, 748 F.3d 583, 600 (5th Cir. 2014) (holding that the admitting privileges requirement 
did not constitute a substantial obstacle). 
342. See Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2343 (2016) (Alito, J., dissenting). 
343. Id. 
344. Id. at 2343 n.11. 
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This is a misreading of the doctrine. Casey held that courts must begin with 
the subset of women actually burdened by a regulation and then ask whether 
that regulation constitutes a substantial obstacle for a large fraction of those 
women. Not all burdens constitute substantial obstacles, as the Court’s analysis 
of the twenty-four-hour waiting period in Casey demonstrated. Had Justice 
Alito’s interpretation prevailed, the central doctrinal mechanism for protecting 




The Court, however, declined to follow that path. It did not devote signifi-
cant attention in Whole Woman’s Health to class-related questions because H.B. 
2 was so sweeping in its effects, and so baseless as a purported regulation of 
health, that no particularized inquiry was necessary.
346
 But the Court went out 
of its way to reaffirm that abortion doctrine not only permits, but in some cases 
requires, such an inquiry. The Court observed that “Casey used the language 
‘large fraction’ to refer to ‘a large fraction of cases in which [the contested provi-
sion] is relevant,’ a class narrower than ‘all women,’ ‘pregnant women,’ or even 
‘the class of women seeking abortions.’”
347
 “Here, as in Casey,” the Court wrote, 
“the relevant denominator is ‘those [women] for whom [the provision] is an 
actual rather than an irrelevant restriction.’”
348
 If a regulation impedes access to 
abortion for “poor, rural, or disadvantaged women,”
349
 then those are the sub-
groups on which the constitutional inquiry must focus—regardless of whether 
the state is responsible for the difficult life circumstances faced by many women 
in these groups. 
 
345. In fact, Justice Alito objected not only to the way the Court deployed the “large fraction” test, 
but also to the fact that it deployed that “more plaintiff-friendly” test at all. Id. He argued—
contrary to the assumptions of the majority in Whole Woman’s Health—that “[t]he proper 
standard for facial challenges is unsettled in the abortion context” and that a litigant bringing 
a facial challenge to an abortion regulation might be required to “show that no set of circum-
stances exists under which the [regulation] would be valid.” Id. (quoting Gonzales v. Carhart, 
550 U.S. 124, 167 (2007) (internal quotation marks omitted)). This standard would bar facial 
challenges to laws that burden the rights of some, but not all, women. It would mean that any 
particular burdens a law places on financially disadvantaged women would be irrelevant in 
the context of a facial challenge. 
346. See id. at 2319 (majority opinion) (observing that the challenged provisions of H.B. 2 “vastly 
increase the obstacles confronting women seeking abortions in Texas without providing any 
benefit to women’s health capable of withstanding any meaningful scrutiny”). 
347. Id. at 2320 (quoting Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 894-95 (1992)). 
348. Id. (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 895 (alterations in original)). 
349. Id. at 2302 (quoting Whole Woman’s Health v. Lakey, 46 F. Supp. 3d 673, 683 (W.D. Tex. 2014), 
which found that H.B. 2’s requirements “erect a particularly high barrier” for such women). 
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This facet of Whole Woman’s Health had immediate and significant conse-
quences for abortion law, particularly for women without financial resources. In 
the years leading up to Whole Woman’s Health, courts assessing the constitution-
ality of post-2010 abortion regulations frequently invoked Casey’s teachings with 
regard to subgroup analysis under the undue burden test. They began to hold 
that some of these laws were unconstitutional in part because they placed a sub-
stantial obstacle in the path of financially disadvantaged women seeking abor-
tions. Judges in these cases engaged in lengthy analysis of the class-related effects 
of the new laws. They observed that a “woman who does not own her own car 
may need to buy two inter-city bus tickets (one for the woman procuring the 
abortion, and one for a companion) in order to travel to another city.”
350
 They 
noted that “[w]ithout regular internet access, it is more difficult to locate an 
abortion clinic in another city or find an affordable hotel room.”
351
 They pointed 
out that “many low-income women have never left the cities in which they live,” 
and that “[t]he idea of going to a city where they know no one and have never 
visited, in order to undergo a procedure that can be frightening in itself, can pre-
sent a significant psychological hurdle.”
352
 They explained that the fact “that a 
woman has some conceivable opportunity to exercise her right does not mean 




350. Planned Parenthood Se., Inc. v. Strange, 33 F. Supp. 3d 1330, 1357 (M.D. Ala. 2014); see also 
Planned Parenthood of Wis., Inc. v. Schimel, 806 F.3d 908, 919 (7th Cir. 2015) (noting that 
an admitting privileges law could force women to make a ninety-mile trip by bus or train, 
which could make the process of obtaining an abortion “prohibitively expensive”); Planned 
Parenthood Se., Inc. v. Bentley, 951 F. Supp. 2d 1280, 1286 (M.D. Ala. 2013) (noting that for 
women without a car, the increased distances between providers “would be no mere encum-
brance, but an insurmountable barrier to obtaining an abortion”). 
351. Strange, 33 F. Supp. 3d at 1357; see also Schimel, 806 F.3d at 919 (observing that “more than 50 
percent of Wisconsin women seeking abortions have incomes below the federal poverty line” 
and that “[f]or them a round trip to Chicago, and finding a place to stay overnight in Chicago” 
is a serious, and potentially impossible, undertaking); McCormack v. Hiedeman, 694 F.3d 
1004, 1017 (9th Cir. 2012) (noting that travel, which sometimes necessitates making arrange-
ments for an overnight stay, “has been shown to be a significant factor when a woman delays 
an abortion, and low-income women are more likely to have this problem”). 
352. Strange, 33 F. Supp. 3d at 1357; see also McCormack v. Hiedeman, 900 F. Supp. 2d 1128, 1145 
(D. Idaho 2013) (observing that “low-income women living in rural areas . . . often must 
travel long distances to the closest abortion provider, requiring an already financially strapped 
pregnant woman to miss work, find childcare, make arrangements for travel and for an over-
night stay to satisfy the 24-hour requirement,” and finding that “[t]hese obstacles, coupled 
with the threat of criminal prosecution based on an abortion provider’s purported failure to 
comply with state abortion regulations, are simply too much”). 
353. Bentley, 951 F. Supp. 2d at 1286; see also Planned Parenthood of Wis, Inc. v. Van Hollen, 963 
F. Supp. 2d 858, 867 (W.D. Wis. 2013) (citing this language in Bentley); Jackson Women’s 
Health Org. v. Currier, 940 F. Supp. 2d 416, 422 n.4 (S.D. Miss. 2013) (“A significant increase 
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these judges held, “can a serious burden be ignored because some women of 




The Fifth Circuit’s decision in Whole Woman’s Health—which deemed con-
straints attributable to women’s own financial circumstances constitutionally ir-
relevant—raised serious questions about the legitimacy of this analysis. Indeed, 
after the Fifth Circuit issued its decision, courts in that circuit began to excise all 
consideration of class from their abortion rulings. A Louisiana district court de-
ciding whether to grant a preliminary injunction against that state’s admitting 
privileges law observed that “[t]he vast majority of women who undergo abor-
tions in Louisiana are poor” and that “[a]s a result of that poverty, the burden of 
traveling farther to obtain an abortion would be significant, fall harder on these 
women than those who are not poor and cause a large number of these women 
to either not get an abortion, perform the abortions themselves, or have someone 
who is not properly trained and licensed perform it.”
355
 But, the court concluded, 
it was barred by the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Whole Woman’s Health from taking 




When the plaintiffs in the Louisiana case returned to court the following year 
in pursuit of a permanent injunction against the admitting privileges law, the 
court’s analysis looked very different.
357
  Now—as a result of the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Whole Woman’s Health—the class-related evidence the Loui-
siana court had previously refused to consider formed the centerpiece of its anal-
ysis. The court wrote extensively about the hardships that closing clinics would 
impose on low-income Louisianans, noting among other things that “[w]omen 
 
in the cost of abortion or the supply of abortion providers and clinics can, at some point, 
constitute a substantial obstacle to a significant number of women choosing an abortion.” 
(quoting Tucson Woman’s Clinic v. Eden, 379 F.3d 531, 541 (9th Cir. 2004))). 
354. Bentley, 951 F. Supp. 2d at 1286; see also Schimel, 806 F.3d at 919 (observing that “a 90-mile 
trip is no big deal for persons who own a car or can afford an Amtrak or Greyhound ticket,” 
but that evidence showed that “18 to 24 percent of [Wisconsin] women who would need to 
travel to Chicago or the surrounding area for an abortion would be unable to make the trip”); 
McCormack, 694 F.3d at 1017 (“Because they do not have the financial wherewithal to confirm 
suspected pregnancies, low-income women are often forced to wait until later in their preg-
nancies to obtain an abortion . . . . Delayed confirmation compounds the financial difficulties, 
as the cost of abortion services increases throughout the gestational period.”). 
355. June Med. Servs. v. Kliebert, 158 F. Supp. 3d 473, 505-06 (M.D. La. 2016). 
356. Id. at 525. 
357. See June Med. Servs. v. Kliebert, 250 F. Supp. 3d 27 (M.D. La. 2017), rev’d sub nom. June Med. 
Servs. v. Gee, No. 17-30397, 2018 WL 4611031 (5th Cir. Sept. 26, 2018). For more on this 
reversal, see infra note 360. 
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who cannot afford to pay the costs associated with travel, childcare, and time off 
from work may have to make sacrifices in other areas like food or rent expenses, 
rely on predatory lenders, or borrow money from family members of abusive 
partners or ex-partners, sacrificing their financial and personal security.”
358
 The 
Louisiana court granted the injunction
359
—joining a number of other courts that 
have engaged in similar forms of analysis and reached similar conclusions about 





358. Id. at 83. 
359. Id. at 89. 
360. See, e.g., Whole Woman’s Health v. Paxton, 280 F. Supp. 3d 938, 953 (W.D. Tex. 2017) (inval-
idating a statute effectively banning the standard dilation and evacuation (D&E) procedure 
because, by lengthening the number of days required for an abortion, it would increase costs 
associated with “travel, lodging, time away from work, and child care,” and that “delay and 
extra cost would be particularly burdensome for low-income women”); W. Ala. Women’s Ctr. 
v. Miller, 299 F. Supp. 3d 1244, 1261 (M.D. Ala. 2017) (invalidating statutes effectively banning 
the D&E procedure and limiting provider proximity to schools, in part because the need to 
travel longer distances would be “particularly devastating for low-income women who repre-
sent the majority of women seeking abortions in Alabama”); Hopkins v. Jegley, 267 F. Supp. 
3d 1024, 1061 (E.D. Ark. 2017) (invalidating a regulation that would effectively end standard 
D&E practice in part because abortion “would become time and cost-prohibitive for some 
women,” and faced with new “financial and logistical burden[s], some low income women 
may delay obtaining an abortion or not have an abortion at all”); Planned Parenthood of Ind. 
& Ky. v. Comm’r, Ind. State Dep’t of Health, 273 F. Supp. 3d 1013, 1022-26 (S.D. Ind. 2017) 
(invalidating a law requiring an ultrasound eighteen hours prior to an abortion after finding 
that “the burdened group is low-income women who do not live near one of [Planned 
Parenthood’s] six health centers at which ultrasounds are available” and that the regulation 
substantially burdens a large fraction of women in this group, who often lack “access to a car,” 
“do not have employment that pays them for days during which they do not work,” and may 
“delay scheduling an appointment because they cannot arrange childcare, which they now 
must do on two occasions rather than one”); Planned Parenthood of the Heartland v. Reyn-
olds ex. rel. Iowa, 915 N.W.2d 206, 232 (Iowa 2018) (observing that “it is axiomatic that a right 
that is only accessible to the wealthy or privileged is no right at all,” and invalidating Iowa’s 
seventy-two-hour waiting period after hearing from poverty experts, considering the chal-
lenges the waiting period presented to low-income women, and “measur[ing] its constitu-
tionality by its impact on those whose conduct it affects” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
Just as this Article was going to print, however, two federal circuit courts pushed back 
against this trend, emboldened in the wake of Justice Kennedy’s retirement to press once again 
toward class blindness. In late September 2018, the Fifth Circuit reversed the Louisiana district 
court’s 2017 ruling in June Medical Services, dismissing the challenge to Louisiana’s admitting 
privileges law. Gee, 2018 WL 4611031. In this recent decision, the Fifth Circuit characterized 
Whole Woman’s Health as “highly fact-bound,” id. at *22, and once again applied the undue 
burden test in a manner blind to the particular burdens faced by financially disadvantaged 
women, see id. at *31-33 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority’s rejection of 
the district court’s finding that the law would significantly burden the rights of large numbers 
of women seeking abortions, particularly “low-income women in the state, one of the poorest 
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Early commentary on Whole Woman’s Health focused on its preservation of 
the intermediate scrutiny standard.
361
 The Fifth Circuit had applied rational ba-
sis review, holding that courts should defer to the government when it regulates 
abortion in the name of protecting women’s health. Had the Supreme Court 
adopted the Fifth Circuit’s approach, there would be little left in the way of con-
stitutional protection for the abortion right. All the government would have to 
do to justify an abortion regulation (in many jurisdictions) would be to cite an 
ostensibly health-related and not aggressively irrational reason for the regula-
tion. But intermediate scrutiny was not the only important feature of Casey that 
Whole Woman’s Health preserved. By reaffirming Casey’s holding that courts 
must consider the real-world effects of abortion regulation on the (sub)groups 
of women actually burdened by it, Whole Woman’s Health averted a very signifi-
cant attempt to expunge class-related considerations from the law. By a majority 
of five votes to three, the Court preserved the law’s ability to protect the rights 
of financially disadvantaged women—its ability to recognize that an obstacle that 
may be a surmountable nuisance to some can deprive others of their most fun-
damental liberties. 
B. The New Class Blindness Across Fourteenth Amendment Law 
This Article challenges the idea that the Court’s rightward turn in the 1970s 
spelled the end of Fourteenth Amendment concerns about class. As we have seen, 
the Burger Court rejected a number of doctrinal mechanisms the Warren Court 
developed to protect the rights of people without financial resources. But this 
Article reveals what the simple story about the Burger Court’s treatment of class 
obscures. Decisions like Rodriguez and McRae did not completely expunge class-
related concerns from Fourteenth Amendment doctrine. Such concerns lived on, 
in more circumscribed ways, in the Court’s fundamental rights jurisprudence in 
 
in the country”); see also Comprehensive Health of Planned Parenthood Great Plains v. Haw-
ley, No. 17-1996, 2018 WL 4288362, at *5-6 (8th Cir. Sept. 10, 2018) (vacating a district court 
decision enjoining Missouri’s admitting privileges and “physical plant” requirements and re-
manding the case to the lower court to engage in further fact-finding on questions such as 
whether abortion really was safe in Missouri: Whole Woman’s Health had held only that it was 
safe in Texas). 
361. See, e.g., Comment, Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 130 HARV. L. REV. 397 (2016); 
David Gans, No More Rubber-Stamping State Regulation of Abortion, SCOTUSBLOG (June 27, 
2016, 5:15 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2016/06/symposium-no-more-rubber 
-stamping-state-regulation-of-abortion [https://perma.cc/69ZH-W9YA]; Jane S. Schacter, 
SCOTUS Whole Woman’s Health Decision: Casey Endures, STAN. LAW. (June 27, 2016), 
https://law.stanford.edu/2016/06/27/scotus-whole-womans-health-decision-casey-endures 
[https://perma.cc/Z63W-GDXS]. 
the new class blindness 
83 
the area of reproductive rights. Indeed, by curtailing other class-sensitive doctri-
nal mechanisms, cases such as Rodriguez and McRae underscored the important 
role of fundamental rights law in limiting how substantially the state may inter-
fere with the ability of financially disadvantaged people to exercise their consti-
tutional rights. 
This Article does not claim that class-related concerns motivated the recog-
nition of all fundamental rights or that all strains of fundamental rights doctrine 
protect people without financial resources. More historical work must be done 
in order to understand what role, if any, class has played in various fundamental 
rights contexts outside the sphere of reproductive rights, which has been the pri-
mary focus of this Article. But this Section focuses on two additional constitu-
tional contexts—voting and criminal procedure—in which there is no question 
that class-related concerns have shaped fundamental rights doctrine in signifi-
cant and lasting ways. 
This Section focuses on these additional contexts in order to show that the 
new class blindness that has recently emerged in abortion law is part of a broader 
effort to delegitimize judicial consideration of class. In both election law and 
criminal procedure, some judges have begun to argue that it is illegitimate for 
courts to take class into account when adjudicating Fourteenth Amendment 
claims—not only in the context of equal protection, but also where fundamental 
rights are concerned. These judges have begun to argue, as they have in the area 
of abortion, that Burger Court precedent compels courts to adopt a permissive 
approach toward regulation that particularly burdens the fundamental rights of 
people without financial resources. Thus far, the Supreme Court has resisted this 
argument, as it has in the context of abortion. But advocates of the new class 
blindness have nonetheless continued to try to strip important and enduring 
class-based protections from Fourteenth Amendment law. 
1. Class Blindness in Voting 
There are a number of striking parallels between voting rights law and re-
productive rights law. The Fifteenth Amendment expanded constitutional pro-
tection for voting in the aftermath of the Civil War. But modern voting rights 
law, like modern reproductive rights law, arguably dates back to the mid-
1960s,
362
 a period in which constitutional concerns about class were at their 
 
362. See, e.g., Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 52 U.S.C.) (creating the modern law of race discrimination in voting); 
Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (invalidating the poll tax); Reynolds v. 
Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (revolutionizing the law of districting with the one-person, one-
vote rule). 
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apex. Such concerns were apparent in decisions like Harper.
363
 Decided the year 
after Griswold, Harper invalidated Virginia’s $1.50 tax on voting. The majority 
opinion, written by Justice Douglas, was a perfect hybrid of due process and 
equal protection. It cited the burden the poll tax imposed on the right to vote as 
evidence of its unconstitutionality. Because “the right to exercise the franchise in 
a free and unimpaired manner is preservative of other basic civil and political 
rights,” the Court declared, “any alleged infringement of the right of citizens to 
vote must be carefully and meticulously scrutinized.”
364
 But the Court placed 
even greater emphasis on the state’s “invidious discrimination” against poor vot-
ers. It likened class-based discrimination to race-based discrimination and 
claimed that both had traditionally been disfavored under the Fourteenth 
Amendment.
365
 The (perfectly hybrid) problem with the poll tax was that it 




For many years after Harper, the Court applied strict scrutiny to laws that 
infringed the right to vote. In 1992, however, in the same month it decided Casey, 
the Court adopted a more “flexible” standard of review in a case called Burdick v. 
Takushi,
367
 which involved a Hawaii law that barred write-in voting. The Court 
had gestured in the direction of this new standard a few years earlier in a case 
involving early filing deadlines for political candidates.
368
 But Burdick applied 
the new standard in a case involving a law that arguably burdened the right to 
vote itself. The Court declared in Burdick that “[a] court considering a challenge 
to a state election law must weigh the character and magnitude of the asserted 
 
363. 383 U.S. 663. 
364. Id. at 667. 
365. See supra notes 19 and 161. 
366. Harper, 383 U.S. at 667-68. For more on the hybrid character of Harper, see Karlan, supra note 
23, at 479 (citing Harper as a paradigm case of a “de facto stereoscopic” approach to due pro-
cess and equal protection, involving both values though formally relying only on the latter). 
Congress, in the text of the Voting Rights Act itself, framed the problem of the poll tax in 
terms of this same intersection of class and fundamental rights, plus race. Because “the pay-
ment of a poll tax as a precondition to voting . . . precludes persons of limited means from 
voting” and also often has a disparate racial impact, “Congress declares that the constitutional 
right of citizens to vote is denied or abridged” by poll taxes. Voting Rights Act of 1965 § 10 
(codified as amended at 52 U.S.C. § 10306 (2018)). The statute then invokes Congress’s en-
forcement powers under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment and Section 2 of the Fif-
teenth Amendment to authorize litigation to invalidate poll taxes. See 3 BRUCE ACKERMAN, 
WE THE PEOPLE: THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION 83-104 (2014) (situating section 10 and the 
struggle over the poll tax at the center of the Civil Rights Revolution). 
367. 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992). 
368. See Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780 (1983). 
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injury to the rights protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments against 
the precise interests put forward by the State as justifications for the burden im-
posed by its rule, taking into consideration the extent to which those interests 
make it necessary to burden the plaintiff ’s rights.”
369
  When the restrictions 
placed on First and Fourteenth Amendment rights are “severe,” the Court held, 
the state’s regulation must be “narrowly drawn to advance a state interest of com-
pelling importance.”
370
 When those restrictions are reasonable and nondiscrim-




This new test resembled the undue burden test the Court unveiled a few 
weeks later in Casey in a number of key respects. It offered less protection than 
strict scrutiny. Henceforth, when the state restricted the right to vote, it would 
most of the time face a balancing test similar to the one in Casey.
372
 Like Casey’s 
undue burden test, the new voting test preserved some elements of the old doc-
trinal regime. It too functioned as a doctrinal mechanism for taking into account 
special circumstances, such as financial disadvantage, that the Court had long 
recognized as a concern in the context of voting (even though Burdick itself did 
not implicate any such concern). 
Today, the United States is awash in new voting restrictions that directly im-
plicate class-related concerns. The paradigmatic example of these new re-
strictions is probably the voter identification laws that have swept the nation in 
the past decade and that condition the right to vote (in person) on the presenta-
tion of particular forms of government-issued photo identification. In 2008, the 
Court heard a Fourteenth Amendment challenge to one such law in Crawford v. 
 
369. Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
370. Id. 
371. Id. 
372. Courts continue to apply strict scrutiny, rather than the Burdick balancing test, to laws that 
outright prohibit some citizens from voting. See Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15, 395 
U.S. 621 (1969) (applying strict scrutiny in striking down a rule that only parents and prop-
erty owners were permitted to vote in school board elections); see also, e.g., Obama for Am. v. 
Husted, 697 F.3d 423, 429 (6th Cir. 2012) (distinguishing vote denial claims where “strict 
scrutiny is the appropriate standard” from those where the Burdick balancing test applies); 
Carlson v. Wiggins, 675 F.3d 1134, 1139 (8th Cir. 2012) (observing that laws denying the right 
to vote for reasons other than “age, residence, and citizenship . . . are suspect and must with-
stand strict scrutiny to survive a constitutional attack”). Essentially, the Burdick balancing test 
applies to laws that burden or restrict, rather than flatly prohibit, the right to vote. Today, that 
describes most vote denial claims. 
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Marion County Election Board.
373
 The Court in Crawford applied Burdick’s balanc-
ing test—the first time it had done so in a case involving “vote denial.”
374
 After 
weighing the burden the ID requirement imposed on voters’ Fourteenth Amend-
ment rights against the state’s interests in preventing voter fraud and safeguard-
ing voter confidence in the electoral system, the Court determined that the state 
had not unduly burdened the right to vote.
375
 Although the Court acknowledged 
that the photo-ID requirement might make it harder for poor people and others 
who tend to lack government-issued ID to vote, it held that, “on the basis of the 
record that has been made in this litigation,” it could not “conclude that the stat-
ute imposes ‘excessively burdensome requirements’ on any class of voters.”
376
 
There simply was not enough evidence in this case—a facial challenge—to show 
that the burden on poor people and other populations that tend to lack govern-
ment-issued ID was of sufficient magnitude to outweigh the state’s strong inter-
ests in preventing voter fraud and safeguarding voter confidence.
377
 
In his concurring opinion in Crawford, Justice Scalia, joined by Justices 
Thomas and Alito, took issue with the fact that the Court had inquired into the 
law’s effects on financially disadvantaged voters at all. “The lead opinion assumes 
petitioners’ premise that the voter-identification law ‘may have imposed a special 
burden on’ some voters, but holds that petitioners have not assembled evidence 
 
373. 553 U.S. 181 (2008) (plurality opinion). 
374. See Daniel Tokaji, The New Vote Denial: Where Election Reform Meets the Voting Rights Act, 57 
S.C. L. REV. 689 (2006) (arguing that a variety of new controversies surrounding who can 
cast a ballot, such as those surrounding voter ID laws, are best viewed as a revival of old ques-
tions of “vote denial” rather than the more familiar set of modern controversies about vote 
dilution). 
375. See Crawford, 553 U.S. at 202. 
376. Id. (quoting Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 738 (1974)). 
377. See id. at 200-01 (observing that “the evidence in the record does not provide us with the 
number of registered voters without photo identification,” nor does it “provide any concrete 
evidence of the burden imposed on voters who currently lack photo identification”); id. at 
201-02 (“The record says virtually nothing about the difficulties faced by . . . indigent voters. 
While one elderly man stated that he did not have the money to pay for a birth certificate, 
when asked if he did not have the money or did not wish to spend it, he replied, ‘both.’ From 
this limited evidence we do not know the magnitude of the impact [the law] will have on 
indigent voters in Indiana. The record does contain the affidavit of one homeless woman who 
has a copy of her birth certificate, but was denied a photo identification card because she did 
not have an address. But that single affidavit gives no indication of how common the problem 
is.” (citations omitted)). The Crawford plurality, in carefully characterizing their decision as a 
rejection of a facial challenge to the law, left open the possibility of further litigation by voters 
for whom the law was an especially heavy burden. 
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to show that the special burden is severe enough to warrant strict scrutiny,” Jus-
tice Scalia observed.
378
 “That is true enough,” he asserted, but “I prefer to decide 
these cases on the ground[] that petitioners’ premise is irrelevant.”
379
 
Why irrelevant? For one thing, Justice Scalia argued, the Burger Court de-
termined in the abortion funding decisions that wealth is not a protected classi-
fication and triggers no special constitutional concern under the Fourteenth 
Amendment.
380
 Moreover, he argued, the plaintiffs’ complaint was ultimately 
one of disparate impact: their objection was to a facially neutral law that dispro-
portionately burdens indigents and others who tend to lack government-issued 
IDs.
381
 Justice Scalia pointed out that, in addition to the abortion funding deci-
sions, the Burger Court decided Washington v. Davis, which established that 
without proof of discriminatory intent, facially neutral laws with a disparate im-
pact raise no constitutional concerns.
382
 Thus, he concluded that the plurality in 
Crawford was wrong to inquire into the particular effects of the voter ID law on 
indigents. Such effects are constitutionally irrelevant, Justice Scalia asserted. The 
only thing that matters under the Fourteenth Amendment is the size of the bur-
den the law imposes on “voters generally”
383
—which in this case is de minimis, as 
most voters already have a government-issued ID. Thus, the state should be free 
to pursue its “important regulatory interests.”
384
 It would be hard to find a better 
encapsulation of the logic of the new class blindness. 
Crawford undoubtedly restricted constitutional protection for voting rights. 
It further narrowed the category of voting rights claims to which strict scrutiny 
applies. It upheld a voter ID law that impeded the ability of poor and otherwise 
disadvantaged citizens to vote, and it enabled the spread of such laws throughout 
the country.
385
 Like Whole Woman’s Health, however, Crawford also fended off a 
 
378. Crawford, 553 U.S. at 204 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). 
379. Id. 
380. Id. at 207 (citing Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980), for the proposition that the Equal 
Protection Clause offers no special protection against laws that burden some people because 
of “poverty”). 
381. See id. at 207-08. 
382. See 426 U.S. 229 (1976); see also Pers. Adm’r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979) (holding that 
discrimination claims under the Equal Protection Clause require a showing of discriminatory 
purpose, and defining that term to mean that the state “selected or reaffirmed a particular 
course of action at least in part ‘because of,’ not merely ‘in spite of,’ its adverse effects upon an 
identifiable group”). 
383. Crawford, 553 U.S. at 206 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). 
384. Id. at 204. 
385. See generally Richard L. Hasen, Softening Voter ID Laws Through Litigation: Is It Enough?, 2016 
WIS. L. REV. 100, 111 (finding that Crawford and the challenges to other voter ID laws that 
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significant challenge by proponents of the new class blindness. Three Justices 
were prepared to hold in Crawford that class-based effects are doctrinally irrele-
vant when assessing the constitutionality of voter ID laws. They were prepared 
to hold that courts must ignore the particular difficulties such laws impose on 
subgroups of disadvantaged voters and consider only the effects of such laws on 
voters generally.
386
 But the Court in Crawford rejected that reasoning. It refused 
to extend Washington v. Davis into the voting rights context and to hold that real-
world effects do not matter absent discriminatory intent. And it rejected the sug-
gestion that the nonsuspect status of class under equal protection means that 
courts are barred from paying attention to the interaction between financial dis-
advantage and laws restricting the right to vote. Crawford upheld the idea that 
voting, like abortion, is different. There are fundamental liberties at stake in 
these contexts, and that necessitates preserving a constitutional doctrine capable 
of recognizing when the state is preventing people without financial resources 
from exercising those liberties. 
Preserving a doctrine that facilitates judicial consideration of class does not 
guarantee robust class-based protection, as Crawford itself demonstrates. But the 
Court’s reaffirmation of the relevance of class in the context of voting means that 
class continues to shape the constitutional inquiry. It means that disparate class-
based effects continue to trigger constitutional concerns, and it provides courts 
with a doctrinal mechanism for addressing those concerns. Crawford itself may 
have made limited use of this doctrine, evaluating the evidence of burdens on 
financially disadvantaged voters in a relatively stingy way. But it left space open 
 
have followed in its wake have blunted or softened those laws, but that these effects have so 
far been “underwhelming”). Some of the most effective challenges to these laws have occurred 
at the three-way intersection of race, class, and fundamental rights. See infra note 387. 
386. Like the Fifth Circuit’s opinion in Whole Woman’s Health, the circuit court opinion in Crawford 
avoided any analysis of the statute’s class dimensions. The opinion, by Judge Posner, ob-
served: “No doubt most people who don’t have photo ID are low on the economic ladder.” 
Crawford v. Marion Cty. Election Bd., 472 F.3d 949, 951 (7th Cir. 2007), aff ’d, 553 U.S. 181 
(2008). But it found this conjecture significant only in that it might help give the Democratic 
Party Article III standing, since lower socioeconomic status is predictive of Democratic votes. 
In its actual constitutional analysis, the opinion focused on the burden the law imposed on an 
average person rather than the specific burden it might impose on a poor person. See id. (not-
ing that “it is exceedingly difficult to maneuver in today’s America without a photo ID (try 
flying, or even entering a tall building such as the courthouse in which we sit, without one),” 
and declining to inquire into the burden the law might impose on people who lack such an 
ID because they are poor). 
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to expand on that protection in the future, if evidence indicates that new regula-
tions are screening out financially disadvantaged voters without doing much to 
advance the state’s interest in sound elections.
387
 
A few years after Crawford, Judge Richard Posner, who wrote the Seventh 
Circuit’s opinion in the case upholding the law,
388
 repudiated his earlier opinion. 
At the time of the Crawford litigation, Posner explained, voter ID laws were new 
and courts did not have enough information about them to make informed de-
cisions about their constitutionality. “[T]here hadn’t been that much activity in 
the way of voter identification,” he asserted, and judges “weren’t really given 
strong indications that requiring additional voter identification would actually 
disenfranchise people entitled to vote.”
389
 However, he argued, by 2013 it had 
become clear that that is precisely what such laws were doing: blocking other-
wise qualified voters—particularly financially disadvantaged voters—from cast-
ing ballots. Had he the case to decide again, Judge Posner asserted, he would 




387. Crawford’s balancing test is not the only doctrinal mechanism for addressing problems at the 
intersection of financial disadvantage and the right to vote. Courts have also applied the Vot-
ing Rights Act, which implements the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, in ways that 
consider damage inflicted at the intersection of race, class, and the right to vote. This occurs 
in at least two ways. First, courts have recognized the interrelation of race and class, and have 
therefore found evidence that election regulations burden the poor to be highly probative—
occasionally even sufficient—to prove a violation of the Voting Rights Act’s prohibition on 
race discrimination. See, e.g., Texas v. Holder, 888 F. Supp. 2d 113, 127 (D.D.C. 2012) (holding 
that because Texas’s voter ID law “will weigh more heavily on the poor,” and “racial minorities 
in Texas are disproportionately likely to live in poverty,” it follows that the voter ID law “will 
likely have retrogressive effect” under section 5 of the Voting Rights Act (VRA)), vacated, 570 
U.S. 928 (2013). Second, courts have constructed constitutional and statutory tests for deter-
mining when voting laws constitute race discrimination that incorporate concerns about pov-
erty. See, e.g., White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 768-69 (1973) (introducing, in a Fourteenth 
Amendment case that today would be a Voting Rights Act case, the idea that “economic real-
ities” matter, so that the “low income and high rate of unemployment” of residents of the San 
Antonio “Barrio,” along with their race, were factors relevant to the assessment of whether 
current voting rules were unconstitutionally hindering this group’s political participation); 
League of Women Voters of N.C. v. North Carolina, 769 F.3d 224, 246 (4th Cir. 2014) (treat-
ing the fact that black “citizens of North Carolina currently lag behind whites in several key 
socioeconomic indicators, including education, employment, income, access to transporta-
tion, and residential stability,” as a reason for concluding that North Carolina’s rules on same-
day registration and out-of-precinct voting likely violate section 2 of the VRA). 
388. Crawford, 472 F.3d 949. 
389. John Schwartz, Judge in Landmark Case Disavows Support for Voter ID, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 15, 
2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/16/us/politics/judge-in-landmark-case-disavows
-support-for-voter-id.html [https://perma.cc/MLX7-F33H]. 
390. See RICHARD A. POSNER, REFLECTIONS ON JUDGING 84-85 (2013) (“I plead guilty to having 
written the majority opinion” in Crawford.); Schwartz, supra note 389. 
the yale law journal 128:2  2018 
90 
Judge Posner retired in 2017 without writing another opinion in a voter ID 
case. But in 2013, at the same time he was repudiating his decision in Crawford, 
he was confronted with Planned Parenthood v. Van Hollen, a case involving a Wis-
consin law requiring abortion providers to obtain admitting privileges at nearby 
hospitals.
391
 In that case, Judge Posner focused on the ways in which the result-
ing closure of two-and-a-half of the state’s four abortion clinics would affect “the 
financially strapped,” who would “be unable to afford the longer trips they’ll 
have to make to obtain an abortion when the clinics near them shut down.”
392
 
Posner noted that most of the clinics’ patients lived below the federal poverty 
line, and that traveling long distances was not easy for many women in that po-
sition, especially in light of the waiting period the state also imposes on abortion 
patients.
393
 “When one abortion regulation compounds the effects of another, 
the aggregate effects on abortion rights must be considered,” he wrote.
394
 Only 
then will courts have a complete picture of the challenges women face in obtain-
ing abortions and only then will they be able to determine whether a law consti-
tutes a substantial obstacle for a large fraction of the women it affects. 
Assessing these factors, and weighing them against the state’s purported in-
terest in protecting women’s health, Judge Posner and his colleagues declared 
Wisconsin’s admitting privileges law unconstitutional.
395
 It is tempting to read 
Posner’s opinion in Van Hollen as a direct repudiation of his opinion in Crawford. 
Regardless of whether the judge himself thought in those terms, however, his 
two opinions illustrate what Americans without financial resources stand to lose 
if the new class blindness prevails: not a guarantee that courts will determine 
that their rights outweigh the interests of the state in any particular case, but a 
doctrine that at least requires courts to take account of the real-world effects on 
financially disadvantaged rights holders of regulations that impinge on funda-
mental constitutional liberties. Judge Posner’s opinion invalidating Wisconsin’s 
 
391. Planned Parenthood of Wis., Inc. v. Van Hollen, 738 F.3d 786 (7th Cir. 2013). 
392. Id. at 796. Had the law taken effect, “two of the state’s four abortion clinics—one in Appleton 
and one in Milwaukee—would have had to shut down . . . and a third clinic would have lost 
the services of half its doctors.” Id. at 789. 
393. Id. (appending a map illustrating the increased travel distances that would result from the 
new law and that would, in combination with the state’s waiting period, constitute “a non-
trivial burden on the financially strapped”); see also Planned Parenthood of Wis., Inc. v. 
Schimel, 806 F.3d 908, 919 (7th Cir. 2015) (Posner, J.) (observing “that a 90-mile trip is no 
big deal for persons who own a car or can afford an Amtrak or Greyhound ticket . . . [b]ut 
more than 50 percent of Wisconsin women seeking abortions have incomes below the federal 
poverty line,” and for them, a round-trip ticket to one of the very few clinics the law would 
leave standing “may be prohibitively expensive”). 
394. Van Hollen, 738 F.3d at 796 (affirming preliminary injunction). 
395. Schimel, 806 F.3d at 922 (permanently enjoining the law challenged in Van Hollen). 
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admitting privileges law demonstrates the ongoing relevance of this doctrine and 
the kind of protection it still affords those who are especially likely to be shut out 
when the state erects barriers to the exercise of fundamental constitutional 
rights. 
2. Class Blindness in Criminal Procedure 
The ongoing role of class in the adjudication of cases involving fundamental 
rights was also recently on display in a groundbreaking set of criminal procedure 
cases involving money bail. Early in 2018, a California Court of Appeal held that 
there were significant class-based constitutional problems with the way the state 
administered its money bail system.
396
 The court held that requiring money bail 
as a condition of pretrial release at an amount that was impossible for an arrestee 
to pay (without first considering the arrestee’s ability to pay or alternatives to 
money bail) violated the Fourteenth Amendment.
397
 The court employed an ex-
plicitly hybrid form of due process-equal protection reasoning to conclude that 
incarcerating poor arrestees simply because they could not afford to post bail, 
while allowing richer ones to pay their way out of pretrial detention, violated the 
poor arrestees’ rights.
398
 Shortly thereafter, the Fifth Circuit reached a similar 
conclusion about the use of money bail in Harris County, Texas.
399
 The Fifth 
Circuit noted that, as a result of posting bail, “the wealthy arrestee is less likely 
to plead guilty, more likely to receive a shorter sentence or be acquitted, and less 
likely to bear the social costs of incarceration.”
400
 The poor arrestee, on the other 
hand, “must bear the brunt of all of these, simply because he has less money than 
his wealthy counterpart.”
401
 The court concluded that such a system violates due 





396. See In re Humphrey, 228 Cal. Rptr. 3d 513 (Ct. App. 2018). 
397. Id. at 526 (concluding that “a court may not order pretrial detention unless it finds either that 
the defendant has the financial ability but failed to pay . . . ; or that the defendant is unable to 
pay that amount and no less restrictive conditions of release would be sufficient to reasonably 
assure such appearance”). 
398. Id. at 526-31; see also supra note 185. 
399. ODonnell v. Harris Cty., 892 F.3d 147 (5th Cir. 2018). 
400. Id. at 163. 
401. Id. 
402. Id. at 158 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also id. at 159 (observing that “[f]ar from 
demonstrating sensitivity to the indigent misdemeanor defendants’ ability to pay, Hearing 
Officers and County Judges almost always set a bail amount that detains the indigent,” and 
finding that this almost automatic imposition of bail fees deprives indigent defendants of due 
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Both courts in these money bail cases located their holdings in a line of hy-
brid due process-equal protection cases stretching back to Griffin and Doug-
las
403
—key decisions in the Warren Court’s so-called criminal procedure revolu-
tion. As Part I showed, many of the decisions that constituted this revolution 
sought to secure access to justice for people without financial resources.
404
 In 
Griffin, the Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the state from 
conditioning criminal defendants’ right to appeal on their ability to pay for a trial 
transcript.
405
 In Douglas, the Court held that when the state grants criminal de-
fendants a statutory right to appeal, it must provide legal representation to indi-
gent defendants who wish to exercise that right.
406
 
These longstanding decisions and the substantial body of law to which they 
gave rise have now come under attack by advocates of the new class blindness. 
Justice Thomas, for instance, has argued that the problem alleged in Griffin and 
Douglas was disparate impact. He claims that the Court in Griffin and Douglas 
found constitutional fault with facially neutral policies—requiring defendants to 
pay for trial transcripts and legal representation on appeal—on the ground that 
those policies had a disparate impact on people without financial resources.
407
 
Subsequent to Griffin and Douglas, however, the Court decided Washington v. 
Davis, which held that disparate impact alone is insufficient to establish an equal 
protection violation.
408
 In so holding, Justice Thomas argues, the Burger Court 
undermined the jurisprudential foundation of the Griffin-Douglas line of 
cases.
409
 Indeed, he argues that the Burger Court effectively overruled those cases 
 
process); id. at 163 (“[T]ake two . . . arrestees who are identical in every way . . . except that 
one is wealthy and one is indigent. Applying the County’s current custom . . . with [its] lack 
of individualized assessment and mechanical application of the secured bail schedule, both 
arrestees would . . . receive identical secured bail amounts. . . . [T]his state of affairs vio-
lates . . . equal protection . . . .”). 
403. See id. at 161 (citing Griffin); In re Humphrey, 228 Cal. Rptr. 3d 513, 527 (Ct. App. 2018) (“In 
imposing a judicial responsibility to inquire into the financial circumstances of an allegedly 
indigent defendant, the Bearden court relied heavily on the reasoning of its earlier opinions in 
Williams v. Illinois and Tate v. Short, both of which advanced the process of mitigating the 
disparate treatment of indigents in the criminal justice system initially set in motion by Griffin 
v. Illinois and Douglas v. California.” (citations omitted)). 
404. See infra notes 155-162 and accompanying text. 
405. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956). 
406. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963). 
407. M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 133-35 (1996) (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
408. 426 U.S. 229 (1976). 
409. See, e.g., M.L.B., 519 U.S. at 135-39 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Griffin-Douglas 
line of cases is no longer viable after Davis); Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 375-77 (1996) 
(Thomas, J., concurring) (arguing the same); cf. Halbert v. Michigan, 545 U.S. 605, 629 
the new class blindness 
93 
and that they are inconsistent with contemporary Fourteenth Amendment law, 
which no longer polices disparate impact and which repudiated the Warren 
Court’s “‘fetish for indigency’” decades ago.
410
 
Thus far, the Court has rejected this reading of Burger Court precedent. It 
has repeatedly held that Washington v. Davis “does not have the sweeping effect 
[Justice Thomas] attribute[s] to it.”
411
 Davis held that disparate impact alone is 
not enough to prove discrimination for equal protection purposes. But Davis did 
not suggest that when fundamental rights and interests are at stake, a law’s actual 
effects on financially disadvantaged rights holders are constitutionally irrelevant. 
On this point, the Court has explained that there are certain forms of state action 
that “work a unique kind of deprivation.”
412
 Among the forms of state action that 
fall into this category are those that severely encroach on important liberty inter-
ests and cause targeted harm to people without financial resources. The Court 
has repeatedly made clear that Davis did not repudiate this hybrid due process-
equal protection form of reasoning. Indeed, in a few cases, the Rehnquist and 




To be sure, the Court has not extended that line of cases very far. It has in 
recent decades been relatively conservative when it comes to protecting the rights 
of historically subordinated groups, and it has inherited the Burger Court’s war-
iness of recognizing anything that looks like an affirmative benefit. Fourteenth 
Amendment law today does not require courts to take account of class-based ef-
fects when assessing the constitutionality of most of the legislation that states 
and the federal government enact. But when the government legislates in areas 
such as abortion, voting, and criminal procedure, where fundamental constitu-
tional liberties are involved, the law does, through a variety of doctrinal mecha-
nisms, require courts to take class into account and to ensure that the govern-
ment is not unwarrantedly depriving people without financial resources of those 
 
(2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing that “the precise rationale for the Griffin/Douglas 
line of cases has never been made explicit” and dissenting from the Court’s extension of that 
line of cases in Halbert). 
410. M.L.B., 519 U.S. at 134 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting Douglas, 372 U.S. at 359 (Clark, J., 
dissenting)). 
411. Id. at 126 (majority opinion). 
412. Id. at 127 (quoting Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 412 U.S. 18, 27 (1981)). 
413. See, e.g., Halbert, 545 U.S. at 610 (holding that due process and equal protection require the 
appointment of counsel for defendants convicted on guilty or nolo contendere pleas who seek 
first-tier review in the Michigan Court of Appeals); M.L.B., 519 U.S. at 107 (holding that a 
state violates due process and equal protection when it “condition[s] appeals from trial court 
decrees terminating parental rights on the affected parent’s ability to pay record preparation 
fees”). 
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liberties. To jettison the long-standing Fourteenth Amendment doctrines that 
require courts to consider class would imperil the equal citizenship of an already 
vulnerable group of Americans, those least able to rely on private funds to protect 
themselves. That is why, even forty years after its rightward shift, the Court has 
retained these basic forms of constitutional protection. 
conclusion 
In 2016, the Texas Supreme Court overturned a trial court ruling favorable 
to the plaintiffs in “the most far-reaching funding challenge in Texas his-
tory”
414
 —a challenge to the state’s school finance system. Unlike the Federal 
Constitution, the Texas Constitution expressly guarantees a right to education. 
To ensure the “general diffusion of knowledge,” it requires the state “to establish 
and make suitable provision for the support and maintenance of an efficient sys-
tem of public free schools.”
415
 In this latest round of Texas school finance litiga-
tion, a large group of school districts alleged, among other things, that poor stu-





 It found that the state’s school finance system, based largely 
on local property taxes, yielded an education system constitutionally inadequate 
to meet the needs of economically disadvantaged students and English language 




The Texas Supreme Court rejected this finding. It held that the trial court 
erred in considering the effects of the school finance system on a “subgroup” of 
the student population.
419
 The Court observed that it had “never squarely held 
 
414. Morath v. Tex. Taxpayer & Student Fairness Coal., 490 S.W.3d 826, 833 (Tex. 2016). 
415. TEX. CONST. art. VII, § 1 states: “A general diffusion of knowledge being essential to the 
preservation of the liberties and rights of the people, it shall be the duty of the Legislature of 
the State to establish and make suitable provision for the support and maintenance of an effi-
cient system of public free schools.” 
416. Morath, 490 S.W.3d at 858. Texas courts refer to the requirement that the state achieve a “gen-
eral diffusion of knowledge” as the “adequacy” requirement. Id. at 849 (“The school system 
is constitutionally adequate if it achieves a general diffusion of knowledge.”). The adequacy 
claim on behalf of economically disadvantaged students was not the only claim in the case, 
but it was a central one. 
417. See Tex. Taxpayer & Student Fairness Coal. v. Williams, No. D-1-GN-11-003130, 2014 WL 
4254969 (Tex. Dist. Ct. Aug. 28, 2014), aff ’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Morath, 490 S.W.3d 
826. 
418. Id. at *78, *107. 
419. Morath, 490 S.W.3d at 857-63. 
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that a separate, cognizable adequacy claim can be asserted by a student subpop-
ulation such as economically disadvantaged or ELL students.”
420
 Instead, the 
Court embraced the State’s argument that the constitutional adequacy provision 
“only requires an efficient system of free public schools, considering the system as 
a whole, not a system with efficient components.”
421
 In other words, the Court 
concluded, the Texas Constitution “only requires a general diffusion of 
knowledge, not a diffusion of knowledge to particular groups.”
422
 Considering 
the system as a whole, the Court concluded that Texas was providing its students 
with an adequate education.
423
 
This was not a Fourteenth Amendment case. But the Texas Supreme Court’s 
determination that it was illegitimate to consider the school finance system’s ef-
fects on economically disadvantaged students, rather than on students in gen-
eral, strongly resembles the Fifth Circuit’s holding two years earlier in Whole 
Woman’s Health that it was illegitimate to consider H.B. 2’s effects on economi-
cally disadvantaged women, rather than on women in general. This refusal to 
consider the effects of regulation on economically disadvantaged people, even in 
contexts involving fundamental constitutional rights and interests, is part of the 
broader rise of the new class blindness. Advocates of this approach have begun 
to claim that it is outside, or even anathema to, our constitutional tradition for 
courts to take account of economic disadvantage when determining the consti-
tutionality of state action that burdens fundamental rights and interests. They 
have begun to assert that precedent requires courts to take a more general view, 
asking only whether laws that interfere with the exercise of fundamental rights 
and interests substantially burden rights holders in general, which often seems 
to mean focusing on the burdens imposed on the average rights holder. This 
more general view would in many cases make it impossible to see the distinctive, 
class-linked burdens some laws impose on the exercise of fundamental rights. 
Contrary to what these advocates suggest, however, there is a long history in 
American constitutional law of taking class into account in the adjudication of at 
 
420. Id. at 858. 
421. Id. (quoting Neely v. W. Orange-Cove Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist., 176 S.W.3d 746, 790 (Tex. 
2005)). 
422. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court asserted that its decision did not “foreclose 
completely a ruling of constitutional inadequacy as to subgroups,” but it made clear “that the 
showing necessary for such a ruling would have to be truly exceptional.” Id. at 859. Such a 
showing would have to be “truly exceptional,” the Court claimed, because it seemed more 
legally sound to consider the system as a whole and because, if it granted this claim, other 
subpopulations might follow the economically disadvantaged in seeking constitutional re-
dress of perceived education inadequacies—a situation that could become unmanageable. Id. 
(“Some resort to practical concerns is appropriate in constitutional decisionmaking, because 
our Constitution’s framers were practical people with practical concerns and intentions.”). 
423. Id. at 863. 
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least some fundamental rights claims. Indeed, this Article argues that concerns 
about the equal citizenship of the economically disadvantaged in some cases 
helped to shape what rights the Court recognized as fundamental in the first 
place. When the Court in the 1950s and 1960s recognized a right as fundamental, 
it often examined how a challenged regulation interfered with poor people’s abil-
ity to exercise that right in determining whether the regulation violated the Four-
teenth Amendment. If the Court in Griffin and Harper had asked whether the 
small fees associated with voting or obtaining a trial transcript substantially bur-
dened the rights of the average American, those cases would probably have come 
out differently. It was the practice of examining the particular burdens those fees 
imposed on the financially disadvantaged that enabled the Court to recognize 
the state’s actions as constitutional violations. 
In 1963, Justice Tom Clark accused his colleagues of having a “fetish for in-
digency.”
424
 To the extent that the word fetish implies a certain irrationality, a 
subconscious drive, it does not seem like the right word to describe the Warren 
Court’s development of class-related constitutional protections. Those protec-
tions were born of an understanding that the Fourteenth Amendment emerged 
in the aftermath of the Civil War to protect an impoverished and disenfranchised 
group of people—people whose liberty and equal citizenship were especially vul-
nerable to infringement. If the Court failed to take economic disadvantage into 
account when interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment—which it in fact did in 
the Lochner era
425
—the risk was high that encroachments on the rights of people 
without financial resources might go unnoticed. Adopting a doctrine wholly in-
sensitive to the class-based effects of state action would render the Fourteenth 
 
424. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 359 (1963) (Clark, J., dissenting). 
425. Indeed, the Court in the Lochner era often interpreted the Fourteenth Amendment as a bar to 
assisting the economically disadvantaged. Lochner itself is sometimes remembered as a pure 
freedom-of-contract case, but that is not quite right. In a way that makes the case emblematic 
of the jurisprudence of its era, the Court in Lochner rejected what it called “a labor law, pure 
and simple”—a term the Court used, in a derogatory way, to describe a law “designed to alter 
the bargaining power between employers and employees, or more generally, the haves and 
the have-nots, the rich and the poor.” Akhil Reed Amar, The Constitutional Virtues and Vices of 
the New Deal, 22 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 219, 220 (1998); see also id. (“The essence of Loch-
ner . . . [is] the illegitimacy of governmental redistribution.”); Jed Rubenfeld, The Anti-Anti-
discrimination Agenda, 111 YALE L.J. 1141, 1146-47 (2002) (showing that Lochner era jurispru-
dence was essentially “antiredistributive” at its core, across doctrinal settings); Laurence H. 
Tribe, The Supreme Court, 1972 Term—Foreword: Toward a Model of Roles in the Due Process of 
Life and Law, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1, 6, 12 n.69 (1973) (explaining that “[i]n the era of Lochner v. 
New York, the crucial substantive judgment [was] one denying the legitimacy of legislation 
designed to redress economic inequalities”). 
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Amendment powerless to protect a group of people who in many ways resem-
bled the disenfranchised and economically disadvantaged Americans whose 
rights the Amendment was originally designed to secure. 
Advocates of the new class blindness claim that Fourteenth Amendment doc-
trine has indeed been almost wholly insensitive to class since the late 1970s, 
when the Burger Court rejected the Warren Court’s class-based jurisprudence. 
Thus far, the Court has resisted this characterization, preserving the law’s sensi-
tivity to class where certain fundamental rights and interests are concerned. But 
the Court now seems poised to shift even further to the right, as do the federal 
appeals courts.
426
 These are ideal conditions for the continued promotion of the 
new class blindness. There is every reason to believe that its advocates will con-
tinue to try to expunge the remaining forms of class-based protection from Four-
teenth Amendment law, fundamentally altering the way courts adjudicate fun-
damental rights claims—all the while insisting that they are simply applying 
Burger Court precedent. 
As this Article has shown, the Burger Court substantially limited the ability 
of Fourteenth Amendment law to redress class-related harms. The Court in the 
1970s was concerned about the ramifications of formally extending protected-
class status to the poor; it was wary of imposing funding mandates on the state 
in the name of vindicating constitutional rights. But it never suggested that 
when confronted with claims that the state had actively infringed fundamental 
rights and interests—some of which gained constitutional protection in the first 
place because people without financial resources had been deprived of them—it 
was somehow constitutionally suspect to take class into account. That kind of 
class blindness harkens back not to the Burger Court era, but to an earlier period 
in American history, a period that predates the constitutional revolution that oc-
curred in the mid-twentieth century. 
In the 1950s and especially the 1960s, the Court began to interpret the Four-
teenth Amendment in ways that protected, rather than harmed, economically 
disadvantaged people. It began to interpret the Fourteenth Amendment to pro-
tect voting rights, welfare rights, reproductive rights, and the rights of criminal 
defendants. It began to deploy due process and equal protection to protect peo-
ple who were actually subordinated and disenfranchised. Not all of the constitu-
tional protections that emerged in the Warren Court era survived the Court’s 
conservative turn in the mid-to-late 1970s. Constitutional law offers less protec-
tion to people without financial resources today than it did at the start of that 
decade. Despite all that changed since then, however, the Court has never repu-
diated the idea that the Fourteenth Amendment limits the extent to which the 
state may deprive economically disadvantaged people of the ability to exercise 
 
426. See supra note 29. 
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certain fundamental rights. Through decades of narrowing constitutional pro-
tection for historically subordinated groups, the Court has preserved doctrinal 
mechanisms for scrutinizing state action that tramples the fundamental rights of 
people without financial resources. It has done so because to do otherwise—to 
abandon these last important constitutional limitations on the state’s power to 
block economically disadvantaged people from exercising fundamental rights—
would return Fourteenth Amendment law to an era, long before our own, in 
which the liberty and equal citizenship of such people fell outside the scope of 
constitutional concern. 
